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Summary  
 
The thesis contributes to the feminist and critical engagements with the Israeli 
military and its violent behaviour against Palestinian civilians. Intrigued by the public, 
military, and political reluctance to condemn the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for their 
individual and collective violence against Palestinians, this research presents the 
artificial and multifaceted construction of a professional, non-threatening, and 
humanitarian military subjectivity as a material and symbolic figure that constrains 
local and international dissent against the Israeli military. This idealised image is 
constituted through a variety of Israeli soldiering (self-)representations that capture, 
circulate, and provoke emotions that determine affinity with the Israeli military and the 
denigration of Palestinians. Therefore, this project shows that a repertoire of emotions 
constitute and circulate a romanticised military image that strengthens the affective 
divisions that sanction and justify the enactment of violence in the Middle East.  
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  1 
Introduction 
 
Local and international human rights organisations, Israeli conscientious 
objectors, local and foreign journalists, scholars and human rights attorneys warn about 
the widespread violence pursued by the Israeli military against Palestinians. 
Nevertheless, despite the growing visual and written evidence that incriminates the 
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) for their violent behaviour, the Israeli public, political 
figures, and military leaders are reluctant to condemn the Israeli troops for the violence 
perpetuated in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.1  With an interest in the limited 
investigation, prosecution, and conviction of the IDF’s violent behaviour against 
Palestinians, this project examines the Israeli military’s reduced accountability for the 
violence enacted against Palestinians, and interrogates the societal, military, and 
political tolerance for the violent behaviour of the Israeli forces in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. Situated at the blurred intersection between civil and military relations 
in Israel, this research studies individual and collective practices, processes, and actors 
that contribute to the constitution and the (re)production of the conviction that the ‘IDF 
is the most moral army in the world’ despite incriminatory evidence that shows the 
Israeli forces’ pervasive violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
More significantly, the disclosure of the IDF’s violence against Palestinians 
through visual or narratives of dissent elicits intense debates regarding the methods 
used to record these episodes of violence, concerning the actors that circulate visual 
representations of violence, or regarding the subjects (both Israeli military forces and 
Palestinians) of those recordings. For instance, during the early days of the Second 
Intifada, a twelve-year-old Palestinian boy, Mohammed al-Dura, and his father were 
killed by the Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip. The killing was recorded and its video 
recording was disseminated in the local and international public sphere. If the killing 
of the Palestinian boy outraged the international community, Israeli voices doubted the 
authenticity of the footage that was circulated to the wider public.2 In Israel, the debates 
                                                        
1 B’Tselem, ‘The Occupation’s Fig Leaf: Israel’s Military Law Enforcement System as a Whitewash 
Mechanism’ (Jerusalem, B’Tselem, 2016). Available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/download/201605_occupations_fig_leaf_eng.pdf [Accessed 30 July 2017]. 
2 Dawber, A. ‘The Killing of 12-year-old Mohammed al Durrah in Gaza became the defining image of 
the second Intifada. Only Israel claims it was all a fake’. The Independent, 20 May 2013. Available at: 
  2 
provoked by this episode transformed al-Dura into a recurring figure that is associated 
with the Palestinian cunningness to simulate pain and death in order to unfairly 
condemn the Israeli security forces for violence pursued in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories.3 Moreover, Breaking the Silence, a human rights organisation that includes 
Israeli veterans and active duty military personnel, is both admired and condemned for 
its continuous efforts to disseminate the Israeli forces’ confessions of the violence 
witnessed and perpetuated in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.4 With a focus on the 
military, political, and public leniency for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians and 
the passionate debates that accompany the revelation of the Israeli military’s violent 
behaviour in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the following central research 
question and thesis statement drive this project: 
 
How do emotions arise within and constitute the conviction that the ‘IDF is the most 
moral army in the world’ inside civil and military spheres?  
 
The project argues that emotions arising from (self-)representations within the IDF 
constitute a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian soldiering image that 
nurtures civil, military, and political tolerance for violence against Palestinians. 
 
In order to support this argument, this thesis focuses on the productive power 
of emotions in cultivating the contemporary Israeli military subjectivity. It examines 
the role of emotions in constituting an impeccable Israeli military figure and in securing 
its dominance despite visual and written incriminatory evidence that shows the Israeli 
forces’ violence against Palestinians. In this regard, this research studies the aesthetic, 
educational, rhetorical, forensic, commemoration, legal, and bureaucratic practices that 
craft the Israeli military subjectivity. By examining the pedagogical practices through 
which recruits are immersed in the Israeli military culture and the aesthetic military 
                                                        
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-killing-of-12-year-old-mohammed-al-
durrah-in-gaza-became-the-defining-image-of-the-second-8624311.html [Accessed 24 August 2017].  
3 Auerbach, Y. and Lowenstein, H. ‘The Role of National Narratives in Reconciliation: The Case of 
Mohammad al-Dura’, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 16 (2011) pp. 210-33.  
4 Ziffer, B. ‘The Problem with Breaking the Silence’. Haaretz, 26 June 2015. Available at: 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.662860 [Accessed 30 July 2017]; Lynfield, B. 
‘Breaking the Silence: Former Israeli soldier branded a traitor for asking troops to tell their West Bank 
stories’. The Independent, 2 January 2016. Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/breaking-the-silence-former-israeli-soldier-
branded-a-traitor-for-asking-troops-to-tell-their-west-a6794256.html [Accessed 30 July 2017]. 
  3 
(self-)representations on social media, the project shows the efforts pursued by the IDF 
to constitute a proficient, compassionate, and devoted soldiering figure that resembles 
the Western military forces. Furthermore, it examines the affective reverberations 
caused by various violent encounters between the Israeli military and Palestinian 
civilians. These episodes provoke controversies, contentions, and polemics that 
reinterpret the IDF’s violence against Palestinians and shift accountability from the 
former to the latter. Finally, this research explores the emotional complexity that 
accompanies the commemoration, bureaucratic, and legal practices of burying and 
honouring dead Palestinian and Israeli Jewish bodies within the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. It indicates these various social practices capture, circulate, and invite a 
repertoire of emotions that cultivate a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian 
military figure. This romanticised representation circulates between the civil and 
military spheres, and provokes kinship and affinity with the IDF, and respectively, 
antagonism and opposition towards Palestinians.  
By mapping out the social practices through which the Israeli romanticised 
military figure is constituted and sustained, this project tries to elucidate the social 
processes, institutions, and actors that inform the political, military, and public 
reluctance to investigate, prosecute, and condemn the Israeli military forces for the 
violence enacted against Palestinians. Moreover, the study of the affective constitution 
of the Israeli military subjectivity illustrates this image informs the societal, military, 
and political indignation regarding the conviction and the imprisonment of military 
forces guilty of abusing, harassing or killing Palestinians. Finally, yet significantly, the 
study of the role of emotions in fashioning military subjectivity interrogates the 
continuous Israeli individual and collective support for the IDF despite their violent 
behaviour against Palestinians, and explains the continuous hostility and opposition 
towards Palestinians who have been hurt by the Israeli military personnel.  
This project speaks alongside other feminist critiques of the occupation, of the 
Israeli military practices under the occupation, and of the power asymmetry that marks 
Palestinians’ everyday lives. The project situates itself along other critical voices of the 
IDF such as Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Simona Sharoni, Jeffrey Goldfarb, or Amir 
Merav and Hagar Kotef. They study the power asymmetry between the IDF and 
Palestinians, and investigate both the Israeli military’s powerful position and the 
  4 
practices through which Palestinians contest their marginalisation. 5  Furthermore, 
through its aim to map out the productive role of emotions in constituting the Israeli 
military subjectivity, this research is affiliated with the eclectic scholarship that 
approaches military practices through critical and feminist lenses. This literature pays 
attention to individual and institutional military expressions and criticises both 
everyday and structural dimensions of militarism, militarisation, and military life. It 
questions the permeability between civil and military spheres, the reverberation of 
military violence within the most intimate and private spheres of life, and interrogates 
the gendered, racialised, classed, and ethnic hierarchies that characterise the military 
and that reverberate in its social practices.6  
 
Research Design: Approach, Methods, and Limitations  
A Feminist Approach 
This thesis is a qualitative research project that follows a feminist approach in 
order to study the political role of emotions in sustaining hierarchies of visibility, 
subjectivity, and accountability that shield the Israeli military personnel from individual 
and collective responsibility for their violent behaviour against Palestinian civilians. It 
stresses that pedagogical, aesthetic, forensic, rhetorical, legal, bureaucratic, and 
respectively, commemoration practices produce a benign military subjectivity that is 
infused by a repertoire of emotions that enable the justification, concealment, and 
reinterpretation of the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. The research shows this 
image confines dissent against the Israeli military and informs the Israeli public, 
military, and political tolerance for the IDF’s violent behaviour in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. Educational practices refer to the didactic activities through 
which recruits are socialised within the Israeli military culture. Furthermore, aesthetic 
                                                        
5 E.g. Sharoni, S. ‘Homefront as battlefield: Gender, military occupation, and violence against women’, 
in Women and the Israeli Occupation: The Politics of Change, edited by Tamar Mayer (London, 
Routledge, 1994), pp. 107-22; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. Militarization and Violence against Women in 
Conflict Zones in the Middle East: A Palestinian Case-Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2009); Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. Security Theology, Surveillance and the Politics of Fear (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Kotef, H. and Merav, A. ‘Between Imaginary Lines: Violence and 
its Justifications at the Military Checkpoints in Occupied Palestine, Theory, Culture & Society, 28 
(2011) pp. 55-80; Goldfarb, J. C. ‘The Sociology of Micro-politics: An Examination of a Neglected 
Field of Political Action in the Middle East and Beyond’, Sociology Compass, 2 (2008) pp. 1816-1832. 
6 E.g. Basham, V. M. War, Identity and the Liberal State: Everyday Experiences of the Geopolitical in 
the Armed Forces (London and New York, Routledge, 2013); Belkin, B. Bring Me Men: Military 
Masculinity and the Benign Façade of American Empire, 1898-2001 (New York, Colombia University 
Press, 2012); Duncanson, C. Forces for Good?: Military Masculinities and Peacebuilding in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
  5 
practices describe the IDF’s (self-)images on its official social media accounts while 
forensic practices capture pathological and medical practices through which Israeli and 
Palestinian dead bodies are given different degrees of care in the aftermath of a violent 
event. Rhetorical practices designate the discursive moves through which the Israeli 
political, military, and respectively public figures react to, interpret, and debate violent 
encounters between Palestinians and Israeli forces. Commemoration practices describe 
the practices through which Palestinian and Israeli Jewish bodies are buried and 
honoured within the context of war, conflict, and violence. Finally, legal and 
respectively, bureaucratic practices indicate the actions pursued by Israel’s Supreme 
Court and other state and non-state bodies in order to confine the commemoration of 
Palestinian dead bodies or to restrict the joint commemoration of Israeli Jewish and 
Palestinian dead bodies in Israel. Sometimes separate, sometimes blending into each 
other, these social practices carry an affective baggage for the purposes of constituting 
military subjectivity. As affective practices that consolidate the Israeli soldiering 
image, they embody, disseminate, and cultivate emotions that sustain violence, 
division, and harm, yet they remain open to appropriation, alternation, and disruption 
within the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
In order to study the productive power of emotions in the Israel/Palestine 
conflict, this research scrutinises the materialisation of emotions and the emotionality 
of material (self-)representations of living and serving under the occupation in order to 
map out the role of emotions in constituting, (re)producing, and at times, troubling the 
Israeli professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military image. Therefore, the 
empirical material gathered in this research project represents ‘an archive of feelings’ 
insofar as the ‘cultural texts [assembled here are seen] as repositories of feelings and 
emotions, which are encoded not only in the content of the texts themselves, but in the 
practices that surround their production and reception’. 7  Due to its focus on the 
emotions recorded, disseminated, and invited by military (self-) representations that 
construct the Israeli soldiering subjectivity, this research regards emotions both as 
cultural expressions of personal experiences, and as affective relations between and 
among subjects, and the materiality of the world they encounter.  
                                                        
7 Cvetkovich, A. An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures (Durham, 
NC and London, Duke University Press, 2003), p. 7. 
  6 
Liz Bondi, Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith claim emotions are relational, and 
implicate and constitute subjects, objects, and contexts. They argue for a ‘non-
objectifying view of emotions as relational flows, fluxes or currents, in-between people 
and places rather than ‘things’ or ‘objects’ to be studied or measured’.8 Put differently, 
emotions do not refer solely to the emotional baggage of subject, but they are also social 
constructs that entail, capture, and describe a series of affective relations between and 
across subjects and the socio-political, cultural, and economic power dynamics they 
encounter. Likewise, Sara Ahmed stresses that emotions are ‘social and cultural 
practices’ that ‘do not reside in subjects or objects, but are produced as effects of 
circulation’.9 This definition describes emotions as social relations between and across 
bodies and the materiality of the world in which they are situated. Drawing on Ahmed 
and Liz Bondi et al, this project defines emotions as socio-cultural and relational 
practices that are not bounded by subjectivity, spatiality, and temporality. It focuses 
less on the essence of emotions and is more interested in exploring, as Stewart suggests, 
 
‘the intensities they [emotions] build and what thoughts and feelings 
they make possible. The question they beg is not what they might 
mean in an order of representations, or whether they are good or bad 
in an overarching scheme of things, but where they might go and what 
potential modes of knowing, relating, and attending to things are 
already somehow present in them in a state of potentiality and 
resonance’.10 
 
The definition of emotions as socio-cultural and relational practices situates 
subjective experiences within the wider power structures and trajectories that 
characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict. This research focuses on the political role of 
emotions in sustaining hierarchies and examines the ways in which emotions are 
presented, incited, and acted through for the purposes of justifying and concealing the 
IDF’s violence against Palestinians. It interrogates the means of and the consequences 
of individual and collective actors’ reliance on emotions in order to govern war, 
                                                        
8 Bondi, L., Davidson, J. and Smith, M. ‘Introduction: Geography’s ‘Emotional Turn’ ’, in Emotional 
Geographies, edited by Liz Bondi, Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith (London and New York, 
Routledge, 2005), p. 3.  
9 Ahmed, S. The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2004), p. 8.  
10 Stewart, K. Ordinary Affects (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 2007), p. 3.  
  7 
conflict, and violence within the Middle East. Explicitly, the thesis focuses on the role 
of emotions in producing subjectivity in the Israel/Palestine conflict, on the emotions 
that govern the social relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, and on the 
emotions that characterise local and international engagement with the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. Therefore, this study engages with the emotions recorded in military (self-) 
representations (pain, hate, happiness or kindness) and with the emotions circulated to 
and elicited by the dissemination of these (self-)images to local and international 
viewers (anger, solidarity, compassion, empathy or kinship). By investigating the 
emotions encoded in military (self-)representations and in their distribution and 
reception, the project examines the emotional repertoire that nurtures affinity and 
support for the Israeli military, and respectively, hostility and opposition towards 
Palestinians. In this regard, the thesis builds on Sara Ahmed’s investigation of the role 
of emotions in the social world. It concentrates on her interrogation of the role of 
emotions in producing collective bodies and the boundaries that define them, and on 
her exploration of the relation between and across subjectivities and the socio-political 
context in which they are invested.11  
This thesis acknowledges the development of ‘an affective turn’ in social 
theory that is preoccupied with the ‘scholarly inquiry’ of ‘emotions, feelings, and affect 
(and their differences)’.12 Although scholars like Brian Massumi or Patricia Ticineto 
Clough are inclined to view the ‘affective turn’ as a discipline that follows an individual 
trajectory, this project highlights that the ‘affective turn’ was developed concurrently 
within, against, and alongside feminist theory.13 In this respect, ‘the affective turn’ 
represents a branch of feminist theory that permits scholars to rethink key questions of 
feminism.14 By turning towards the study of emotions, feminist theory challenges the 
mind/body dichotomy and argues against a gendered reading of the social world that 
associates objectivity and rationality with masculinity, and irrationality and passion 
                                                        
11 Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion; Ahmed, S. ‘Affective Economies’, Social Text, 22 (2004) 
pp. 117-39; Ahmed, S. ‘The Skin of the Community: Affect and Boundary Formation’, in Revolt, 
Affect, Collectivity: The Unstable Boundaries of Kristeva’s Polis, edited by Tina Chanter and Ewa 
Płonowska Ziarek (Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2005), pp. 95-111. 
12 Cvetkovich, A. ‘Depression is Ordinary: Public Feelings and Saidiya Hartman’s Lose Your Mother’, 
Feminist Theory, 13 (2012) p. 133.  
13 Massumi, B.  Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, NC, Duke University 
Press, 2002).  
14 Koivunen, A. ‘An affective turn? Reimagining the subject of feminist theory’, in Working with Affect 
in Feminist Readings: Disturbing Differences, edited by Marianne Liljeström and Susanna Paasonen 
(London, Routledge, 2010), pp. 8-27. 
  8 
with femininity. 15  The feminist scholarship has a long tradition in introducing 
emotions, passions, affects, and feelings in its research programme. For instance, Audre 
Lorde and bell hooks use emotions in order to articulate the intersectional 
underpinnings of social injustice.16 Donna Haraway and Sandra Harding discuss the 
ethics of research and the emotional entanglement between the researcher, and the 
objects and the subjects researched.17 Finally, yet significantly, Julia Kristeva provides 
a socio-cultural examination of emotions through the lens of philosophy and 
psychoanalysis.18  
Equally significant, the ‘affective turn’ amends feminist theory. Some feminist 
scholars, due to their interest in Michel Foucault’s disciplinary power, have been 
accused of failing to explore corporeal and material subjective experiences due to their 
interest in critiquing the productive role of power over the subject.19 Consequently, the 
‘affective turn’ argues for an engagement with affects and focuses on the intensities, 
the forces, the desires, the potentialities, the flows, and the connectivities associated 
with the human body and the relations between human and non-human bodies.20 By 
presenting a materialist critique of the social world, scholars closely associated with the 
‘affective turn’ are concerned with ‘matter, biology and energetic forces’ thus arguing 
for distinguishing between emotions and affects.21 Brian Massumi, one of the leading 
scholars associated with the ‘affective turn’, believes that ‘affect is irreducibly bodily 
and autonomic’ while emotion refers to ‘subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing 
of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal’.22 
Similarly, Patricia Ticineto Clough differentiates between emotions and affects. If one 
links emotions with subjective experiences, for Clough, affect captures ‘a substrate of 
                                                        
15 Koivunen, ‘An affective turn?’, p. 11; Pedwell, C. Affective Relations: The Transnational Politics of 
Empathy (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 13. 
16 Lorde, A. Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Trumansburg, NY, Crossing Press, 1984); hooks, b. 
Yearning: race, gender, and cultural politics (Boston, South End Press, 1990). 
17 Harding, S. (ed.) The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies 
(New York and London, Routledge, 2004); Haraway, D. J. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The 
Reinvention of Nature (New York and London, Routledge, 1991). 
18 Kristeva, J. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1982); Kristeva, J. Hatred and Forgiveness (New York, Colombia University Press, 2012). 
19 McNay, L. Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1992), 
pp. 1-11.   
20 Gregg, M. and Seigworth, G. J. ‘An Inventory of Shimmers’, in The Affect Theory Reader, edited by 
Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth (Durham, NC and London, Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 
1-25. 
21 Liljeström, M. and Paasonen, S. ‘Introduction: Feeling differences – affect and feminist reading’, in 
Working with Affect in Feminist Readings: Disturbing Differences, edited by Marianne Liljeström and 
Susanna Paasonen (London, Routledge, 2010), p. 1.  
22 Massumi, B. ‘The Autonomy of Affect’, Cultural Critique, 31 (1995) pp. 88-9. 
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potential bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in excess of 
consciousness’.23Alternatively, Teresa Brennan blurs the distinction between the social 
and the physiological by presenting affect as ‘a process that is social in origin but 
biological and physical in effect. Affects do not only arise within a particular person 
but also come from without (…) via an interaction with other people and an 
environment’. 24  Nevertheless, with an awareness of their nuances and the intra-
disciplinary debates that shape the ‘affective turn’ in social theory, this thesis does not 
overstate the difference between emotions and affects. Rather, it interprets them as a 
continuum both in discourse and in practice. For instance, Elspeth Probyn argues 
emotion is the ‘social expression of affect, and affect in turn is the biological and 
physiological experience of it’. 25  The project follows Probyn’s dualistic view on 
emotions and affects, yet remains focused on the social construction of emotions and 
in their productive power in the social world. Therefore, it assumes that any 
physiological and bodily experience cannot be disentangled from the cultural and the 
social context in which it emerges since it gains meaning only through recognition and 
naming. Similarly, Ahmed is reluctant to distinguish between emotions and affect, 
between cognition and respectively, bodily experience, by arguing that it is difficult to 
believe ‘they could be “experienced” as distinct realms of human “experience” ’.26  
Furthermore, by keeping in mind the relation between bodily experiences and 
their discursive representations, this research traces the interaction and the ambiguities 
between the corporeality of subjectivity (possibility of acting and being acted upon) 
and its materiality (the ways in which it is written, talked about, and represented). In 
this regard, it assigns equal significance to the discursive and the material by examining 
‘their interrelations as intimate co-dependence’ therefore avoiding to think about 
‘materiality, affect and embodiment in opposition to textual analysis’.27 The project 
travels between and intersects embodied and sensuous experiences of serving under the 
occupation with their discursive and symbolic representations in public statements, in 
local and international media, on social media or in popular culture references. Since 
                                                        
23 Clough, P. T. ‘Introduction’, in The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social, edited by Patricia Ticineto 
Clough and Jean Halley (Durham, NC and London, Duke University Press, 2007), p. 2. 
24 Brennan, T. The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca, NY and London, Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 
3. 
25 Probyn, E. Blush: Faces of Shame (Minneapolis, MN and London, University of Minnesota Press, 
2005), p. 25.   
26 Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, p. 6. 
27 Liljeström and Paasonen, ‘Introduction: Feeling differences’, p. 2.  
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emotions are ‘generated within, circulated through, and productive of’ Israeli (self-
)images of military service, this research examines the relations between the sensuous 
and the material representations of serving under the occupation and the political 
implications of circulating these (self-) images to local and international audiences.28 
Likewise, Victoria Basham believes the study of everyday military life should ‘take 
account of the wider interests that are served by those lived lives’.29 Take, for instance, 
one of the pictures with military personnel disseminated on the IDF’s official Facebook 
account, which is discussed in the third chapter of the project. The picture shows Israeli 
servicewomen dressing up for the Purim festival.30 Beyond illustrating the joy and the 
liveliness of young female recruits, it uses femininity to conceal the violence inherent 
to the military and to alleviate any worries regarding the violence they might pursue 
and experience. Concurrently, this picture functions as a recruitment tool to attract 
further Diaspora Jews to the IDF (and Israel), and as an emotional technique through 
which viewers are invited to express regret and sorrow for the possible loss of these 
young and playful Israeli women during alleged confrontations with unruly and 
radicalised Palestinian freedom fighters. The investigation of the repertoire of emotions 
that accompanies digital military representations indicates that media technology puts 
forward a gendered Israeli military image. This representation confines local and 
international criticism against the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. It offers viewers 
an attractive military representation that conceals violence behind illustrations of 
‘youthfulness, life, normality, and playfulness’ while ‘the uniform and weapons 
themselves appear as harmless customs and toys’.31  Therefore, by circulating this 
relaxed and joyful military representation, social media permits the IDF to extract 
military personnel from the complexity of the Israel/Palestine conflict by disguising the 
violence that is intrinsic to military service, and by circulating an attractive military 
image that appeals to local and international audiences. 
 
                                                        
28 Pedwell, Affective Relations, p. xi. 
29 Basham, War, Identity and the Liberal State, p. 9. 
30 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Timeline Photos’, The IDF’s Official Facebook Page, 5 March 2015. 
Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/idfonline/photos/a.250335824989295.62131.125249070831305/943812422
308295/?type=3&theater [Accessed 30 July 2017].  
31 Hochberg, G. Z. Visual Occupations: Violence and Visibility in a Conflict Zone (Durham, NC and 
London, Duke University Press, 2015), [emphasis in original] p. 11.  
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© The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit 
Figure 1 Servicewomen Celebrating Purim 
 
The analysis of this picture invites further justification for the choice to study 
the productive power of emotions through a feminist lens. As the discussion about the 
Israeli servicewomen’s (self-)representation on social media shows, the (Israeli) 
military is a gendered institution. The complexity of the Israeli military service under 
conditions of compulsory conscription requires the study of the social practices through 
which the gendered identity of the military is (re)produced at the intersection between 
the military and the civil spheres. Due to their interest in power relations of domination 
and subordination, feminist scholars study the role of gendered structures of 
masculinity and femininity in justifying war and violence. This project focuses on the 
role of a diverse individual and social practices in constructing the Israeli military’s 
gendered representation that conceals, justifies, and downplays the IDF’s violence 
against Palestinians. Relatedly, feminist scholars scrutinise the intersection between 
race, gender, class, religion, and ethnicity in examining (in)security in international 
politics.32 In this regard, Peterson and True caution that ‘gender infuses all our identities 
so that race, age, class, ethnicity, ability and nationality are also gender specific 
                                                        
32 Tickner, J. A. ‘Feminism meets International Relations: some methodological issues’, in Feminist 
Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria Stern, and Jacqui True 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 23-4. 
  12 
identities’.33 This research shows the cultivation of an idealised military image depends 
on the marginalisation of Palestinians. Therefore, a feminist approach on war and 
conflict exposes the hierarchical order of security in the Israel/Palestine conflict, 
according to which the security of a dominant group depends on the insecurity of other 
vulnerable groups and on their unequal power relations.34 Although examining the 
hierarchies that define relations between the Israeli military forces and Palestinian 
civilians, this thesis returns at times to the gendered, classed, racialised, ethnic, and 
religious configuration of the IDF in order to highlight the reverberation of its 
multifaceted identity in the military’s violent interactions with the Palestinian 
population.  
This study also embraces the feminist focus on personal experiences of war, 
conflict, and violence insofar as individuals ‘are embedded in, and constituted by, 
historically unequal political, economic, and social structures’. 35  Feminist scholars 
argue that in order to understand the unequal power relations that mark individual lives 
one has to challenge the discrete separation of levels of analysis in International 
Relations by relating individual experience to (gendered) structures of inequality.36 The 
thesis focuses on the production, modification, and fragmentation of the Israeli and 
Palestinian subjectivities. Although the production of subjectivity depends on language, 
discourse, and representation in making bodies meaningful, feminist authors stress that 
within these structures of meaning ‘there can be agency, in the sense that people can 
accept, resist or counter constructions of gendered identities, and be empowered or 
disempowered by them’.37  In this regard, feminist approaches favour the study of 
marginalised voices in international politics in order to challenge hegemonic 
discourses, to expose the power asymmetry that characterises war, conflict, and 
violence, and to show that alternative forms of existence and identification exist beyond 
the prevailing ones.38 Therefore, feminist scholars examine the unfolding of power and 
                                                        
33 Peterson, V. S. and True, J. ‘ “New Times” and New Conversations’, in The “Man” Question in 
International Relations, edited by Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 
1998), p. 16.  
34 Tickner, ‘Feminism meets International Relations’, pp. 31-2.  
35 Tickner, ‘Feminism meets International Relations’, pp. 24-5.  
36 Tickner, J. A. ‘You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR 
Theorists’, International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1997) p. 626.  
37 Ramazanoğlu, C. and Holland, J. Feminist Methodologies: Challenges and Choices (London, Sage 
Publications, 2002), p. 153.  
38 Wibben, A. T. R. Feminist Security Studies: A narrative approach (London and New York, 
Routledge, 2011), p. 110. 
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resistance in the social world in order to revise the conceptualisation of international 
politics and to question the narratives, symbols, and images that recreate conditions of 
war, violence, and conflict.39 Similarly, this research interrogates the practices through 
which the belief that the ‘IDF is the most moral army in the world’ is contested by 
Israeli and Palestinian subjects alike. It investigates the practices through which Israeli 
citizen-soldiers challenge this idealised military representation during their 
socialisation in the military culture or through activism for the purposes of conflict 
resolution. Moreover, the thesis explores the construction of Palestinian subjectivity 
within and beyond the confines of the Israel/Palestine conflict. It highlights the social 
practices through which the Israeli military, political, and public figures assign 
Palestinians the perpetrator position in order to construct a flawless Israeli military 
image. Equally, this study examines the Palestinian efforts and challenges in circulating 
their narrative of loss and pain for the purposes of ending the cycle of violence and 
harm that characterises the Israel/Palestine conflict.  
Finally, yet significantly, feminist scholars are interested in the relation 
between emotions and violence in their study of war and conflict. They provide intense 
accounts of the horrendous personal experience of living through and in the aftermath 
of warfare. For instance, Carolyn Nordstom and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian study 
women’s experiences of violence during the civil war in Mozambique and respectively, 
within the Israel/Palestine conflict. 40  Due to their focus on marginalised voices, 
feminist authors have turned mostly towards women’s voices and their embodied 
experiences in order to expose intense experiences of war, conflict, and violence 
beyond the clinical language of war strategy and tactics. Other scholars study the 
embodied experiences of military personnel across different historical time periods and 
in a variety of geopolitical settings across the Western and non-Western world.41 For 
                                                        
39 Ackerly, B. and True, J. Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social Science (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 246.  
40 Sharoni, ‘Homefront as battlefield’, pp. 107-22; Nordstom, C. A Different Kind of War Story 
(Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Militarization and 
Violence against Women; Sharoni, S. Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of 
Women’s Resistance (Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1995). 
41 Kronsell, A. and Svedberg, E. Making Gender, Making War: Violence, Military and Peacekeeping 
Practices (New York and London, Routledge, 2012); Baaz Eriksson, M. and Stern, M. Sexual Violence 
as a Weapon of War?: Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond (London and 
New York, Zed Books, 2013); Baaz Erikson, M. and Stern, M. ‘Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, 
Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC)’, International Studies Quarterly, 53 
(2009) pp. 495-518; Wilcox, V. ‘ ‘Weeping tears of blood’: Exploring Italian soldiers’ emotions in the 
First World War’, Modern Italy, 17 (2012) pp. 171-84.  
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instance, Erella Grassiani and James Ron have emphasised the complexity of the 
affective dispositions that mark the Israeli military service and its aftermath, and have 
stressed the deterministic relation between military forces’ anger, fear, rage, tiredness, 
stress and the enactment of violence against civilians and non-combatants.42  
Inspired by the literature that studies the relation between emotions and 
military violence, the project intervenes in the study of the political role of emotions in 
the Israel/Palestine conflict by proposing a re-evaluation of the causal link between 
emotions and violence. It builds on feminist and cultural approaches that study the role 
of emotions in fostering political exclusion, social division and cultural distinction in 
order to highlight the role of emotions in rationalising, excusing, and downplaying the 
IDF’s violence against Palestinians. With an interest in the productive power of 
emotions in the Israel/Palestine conflict, this research is informed by the theoretical 
insights forwarded by feminist scholars and cultural theorists like Judith Butler, Sara 
Ahmed, Lauren Berlant, Ann Cvetkovich, Claire Hemmings, or Carolyn Pedwell.43 
They study the fluidity, ambivalence, and complexity of emotions and their political 
trajectories in the social world. Suspicious of the progressive role of emotions in social 
affairs, these authors believe emotions carry the potential to sanction and reinforce 
hierarchies, divisions, differences, harm, violence, and insecurity. While arguing that 
emotions have political and social trajectories that mask power inequalities, they are 
interested in emotions as sites of ‘governance and regulation’ and in their 
embeddedness in relations of power.44 Building on their insights, this project studies 
the role of emotions in cultivating the Israeli military subjectivity, scrutinises the 
affective responses and readings elicited by the dissemination of violent episodes in the 
public sphere, and maps out the emotions recorded, circulated, and provoked by the 
distribution of Israeli military (self-) representations to local and Western audiences. 
Therefore, the thesis shows that compassion, empathy, solidarity, pain, loss, mourning, 
                                                        
42 Grassiani, E. Soldiering Under Occupation: Moral Numbing among Israeli Conscripts during the Al-
Aqsa Intifada (New York and Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2013); Ron, J. ‘Savage Restraint: Israel, 
Palestine and the Dialectics of Legal Repression’, Social Problems, 47 (2000) pp. 445-72. 
43 Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion; Ahmed, ‘Affective Economies’, pp. 117-39; Ahmed, ‘The 
Skin of the Community’, pp. 95-111; Berlant, L. ‘Intimacy: A Special Issue’, Critical Inquiry, 24 
(1998) pp. 281-88; Berlant, L. The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in 
American Culture (Durham, NC and London, Duke University Press, 2008); Butler, J. Precarious Life: 
The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London and New York, Verso, 2004); Butler, J. Frames of 
War: When is Life Grievable (London and New York, Verso, 2009); Cvetkovich, An Archive of 
Feelings; Hemmings, C. ‘Invoking Affect: Cultural theory and the ontological turn’, Cultural Studies, 
19 (2005) pp. 548-67. 
44 Pedwell, Affective Relations, p. 14.  
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grief, disgust or aversion sanction the enactment of violence, reinforce the affective 
boundaries that characterise the social relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, 
and downplay the IDF’s violence against Palestinians and its consequences for Israeli 
Jews and Palestinians alike. 
 
Methods 
The project draws upon a diversity of empirical material and an eclecticism of 
methods in order to trace the social practices that construct the Israeli military 
subjectivity. It employs a content analysis approach in order to engage with various 
empirical sources, from expert interviews, policy documents, human rights reports to 
social media websites and popular culture references for the purposes of interrogating 
the dominant representations of the Israel/Palestine conflict, which are circulated to 
Western and local audiences.  
First-hand observation in the form of a field trip to Israel and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories has contributed to outlining the main areas of inquiry. During 
eight weeks spent in and between Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Bethlehem, eleven semi-
structured interviews were performed with educational officers at pre-military 
academies in Israel, with human rights attorneys at Israeli human rights organisations, 
and with Israeli veterans and Palestinian human rights activists. They were coupled 
with innumerable informal conversations with Palestinians and Israelis whose lives are 
touched by conflict and violence. In addition, this project collected data through other 
corollary methods such as participant observation at pre-military academies in Israel 
and at Israeli and Palestinian human rights organisations in order to gather information 
regarding their activities, or through a variety of trips within the West Bank, sometimes 
accompanied by Palestinian civilians, in order to witness daily life under the 
occupation. The field trip was supposed to be followed by another one, in order to 
perform further interviews at Israeli pre-military academies and with other Israeli and 
Palestinian human rights attorneys. Yet, due to logistical reasons and after a careful risk 
assessment of the security situation in the region in late 2015 and early 2016, it was 
decided to turn towards alternative ways of collecting data for the project. As a 
consequence, the scope of the project broadened and the interviews pursued have 
served as a guiding material rather than as the core method of the thesis. Initially, this 
project aimed to provide a representation of the contemporary Israeli military 
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subjectivity through narratives of military recruitment, service, and its aftermath. 
However, the development of this research showed the importance of situating 
personalised representations of war within the power structures that define them. By 
studying not only the emotions embedded in individualised illustrations of war but also 
the emotions circulated and provoked by these images, the thesis shows embodied 
narratives of war may reinforce the hegemonic subjectivities, trajectories, and 
discourses that sustain war and violence in the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
This research responds to Cynthia Enloe’s invitation to conduct one’s research 
with ‘feminist curiosity’ while ‘listening carefully, digging deep, developing a long 
attention span, [yet] being ready to be surprised’.45 Therefore, it complements and 
enriches the ethnographic material collected through the content and visual analysis of 
media accounts, activist material, human rights reports, popular culture representations, 
and social media references. Carol Cohn has argued for the assemblage and the 
juxtaposition of a wide range of empirical material when investigating the layers, 
threads, and dissonances that inform the (gendered) construction and representation of 
American national security in military and public discourse.46 Similarly to Cohn, this 
research follows an interdisciplinary route in order to explore the justification and 
exoneration of the violence pursued by the Israeli military personnel against 
Palestinians. It explores aesthetic military representations, pedagogical military 
practices, rhetorical engagements with the IDF’s violence against Palestinians, and 
forensic, bureaucratic, and commemoration practices that involve Israeli and 
Palestinian dead bodies alike in order to unearth emotions that inform hierarchies of 
subjectivity, visibility, and accountability that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict.  
Nonetheless, this empirical material does not always make explicit references 
to the role of emotions in cultivating military subjectivity or in contributing to the 
creation of hierarchies that shape the Israel/Palestine conflict. Therefore, the thesis 
follows Annica Kronsell’s method to ‘ “reading” what is not written, or what “is 
between the lines”, or what is expressed as symbols and in procedures” ’ in places, 
                                                        
45 Enloe, C. The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire (Berkeley, CA, 
University of California Press, 2004), p. 3.  
46 Cohn, C. ‘Motives and methods: using multi-sited ethnography to study US national security 
discourses’, in Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, 
Maria Stern, and Jacqui True (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 93. 
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narratives, practices, and (self-)representations. 47  Taking a cue from Kronsell’s 
method, this research explores the explicit and implicit ways in which emotions imbue 
practices of subjectivity formation, contribute to social relations of enmity and 
antagonism in the Israel/Palestine conflict, and are instrumental in concealing and 
depoliticising violence against Palestinians. Thus the project is informed by Roland 
Blieker and Emma Hutchison’s belief that the study of the role of emotions in 
international politics requires a ‘type of scholarly and political sensibility that could 
conceptualise the influence of emotions even when and where it is not immediately 
apparent’.48  
Feminist scholarship asks researchers to be self-reflective about politics and 
power and to pay attention to the relations between themselves, and the subject(s) 
researched and engaged throughout their intellectual journey.49 During conversations 
at pre-military academies, both a sense of distrust and a need to repeat the obvious 
prevailed. Signalling a noticeable reluctance to discuss with a researcher based in a 
Western country, male and female staff members seemed guarded in their interviews 
and preferred to recall and to refer to material already available in the public sphere. 
Nevertheless, their insistence on the IDF’s standard of morality and the efforts of the 
military to construct soldiering subjectivity by cultivating an affective connection 
between the individual and the Israeli society has helped this project to study the role 
of emotions in crafting the Israeli military figure. Furthermore, conversations with 
human rights activists also informed this project’s aim to study the reluctance of the 
Israeli society to condemn the military for its abuses against Palestinians, and to 
interrogate the reduced investigation, sentencing, and conviction of military personnel 
guilty of violently assaulting Palestinian civilians. Lastly, conversations with local 
Israeli Jews and Palestinians occurred throughout the entire period of research. Most 
Israeli Jews interviewed identified themselves with the Israeli political left and 
condemned the current status quo regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict. Palestinians 
shared stories regarding life under the occupation, and questioned the Israeli and 
Palestinian political establishments alike for the current situation in the region. 
                                                        
47 Kronsell, A. ‘Methods for studying silence: gender analysis in institutions of hegemonic 
masculinity’, in Feminist Methodologies for International Relations, edited by Brooke A. Ackerly, 
Maria Stern, and Jacqui True (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 109.  
48 Bleiker, R. and Hutchison, E. ‘Fear no more: emotions and world politics’, Review of International 
Studies, 34 (2008) p. 128.  
49 Wibben, Feminist Security Studies, p. 18.   
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Nevertheless, encounters with Palestinians recalled the privileges of movement, 
citizenship, nationality, and financial stability that a Western researcher possesses. 
Palestinian voices were not only approached with these significant caveats in mind but 
also throughout the writing stages of this project. Rather than adding their voices to the 
thesis, this research focuses on the ways in which Palestinians appear and disappear 
from the Israeli imaginary yet highlights their active contestation of the stereotypical 
representations assigned to them. 
The eclecticism of methods and the material used in this research examines 
the gendered and racialised practices through which violence against Palestinians is 
justified and interrogates the Israeli societal and military tolerance for the IDF’s 
violence against Palestinians. To this end, the thesis studies the emotions embodied, 
circulated, and elicited by Israeli (self-)representations disseminated by themselves or 
by the Israeli military, by the institutions affiliated with the military or with the state, 
or by local and international actors engaged in the Israel/Palestine conflict. In this 
regard, the project draws on (self-)images of war, conflict, and violence in order to 
criticise hierarchies of visibility, accountability, and subjectivity that mark and mask 
the Israel/Palestine conflict. Consequently, it highlights the importance of studying not 
only the construction but also the dislocation of these hierarchies. 
 
Limitations  
A number of methodological limitations apply to this research project. The 
interviews were pursued in English due to the relative proficiency demonstrated by staff 
members at both human rights organisations and at pre-military academies. Human 
rights organisations count on English speaking professionals in order to reach Western 
audiences and to invite action on behalf of Palestinians and against the occupation. Staff 
members at pre-military academies rely on English speaking professionals in order to 
design educational programmes that support the integration of Diaspora Jews in the 
military, and in order to create programmes of collaboration with educational military 
staff from Western countries. However, due to the fact that interviews were pursued in 
a non-native language, meaning could have been lost throughout the interviewing 
process or might have lead to occasional misinterpretation. Although all necessary 
effort has been pursued during fieldwork in order to clarify any misunderstanding or 
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confusion, this possibility has remained a constant issue throughout the interviewing 
process, the transcription of the material, and the drafting stages of the project.  
Furthermore, access to subjects-participants represented a continuous 
challenge throughout fieldwork in the region. The educational profile of pre-military 
academies divides between secular and religious ones. Understandably, religious pre-
military academies are less open towards meeting (Western) researchers and 
information regarding their functioning has been gleaned through their online presence 
on Internet websites, in the media, and in reports published by Israeli civil associations 
that criticise the growing influence of religious nationalism in Israel. Few scholars have 
accessed their pedagogical activities. Their insights offer additional material for the 
research purposes of this project.50 Although this thesis has developed at a time of 
growing national religious influence over the military and the Israeli state, it does not 
specifically address the role of religion in the Israeli military. Since both scholars and 
journalists have already provided rich accounts of the growing role that religion plays 
in the IDF, this project addresses the power struggles between secular and religious pre-
military academies in shaping the pedagogical activities of the IDF’s Education and 
Youth Corps.51 Despite the complex socio-political atmosphere that reverberates in 
their functioning, secular pre-military academies that pursue a didactic programme 
based on universal and multicultural values are highly regarded by the IDF’s Education 
and Youth Corps, and their activities are important in constituting the Israeli military 
subjectivity. Two secular pre-military academies allowed the interviewing of their staff 
members: BINA – The Jewish Movement for Social Change (Tel Aviv) and Beit 
Morasha of Jerusalem: The Center for Advanced Judaic Studies and Leadership 
(Jerusalem).52 
                                                        
50 Eastwood, J. ‘ ‘Meaningful Service’: Pedagogy at Israeli pre-military academies and the ethics of 
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In addition, the project studies local and international organisations affiliated 
with the left that advocate for a just political order for Israelis and Palestinians alike. 
However, the project does not address the politicisation of human rights discourse in 
the Israel/Palestine conflict. For example, Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon provide 
an extensive analysis of the efforts pursued by the Israeli human rights organisations 
sponsored by the state and the Jewish settler movement to politicise humanitarian 
discourses in order to sustain the Israeli domination and military occupation.53  In 
contrast, Lori Allen has studied the role of human rights actors in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories and argues the politicisation of their activities has encouraged 
Palestinians to question both local power dynamics and the Western humanitarian 
intervention in the region.54 Finally, yet significantly, Sophia Stamatopoulous-Robbins, 
Gada Mahrouse, and Fiona Wright claim that international and local left wing activism 
poses significant political challenges because it reproduces a gendered and racialised 
discourse that imagines Palestinians as helpless individuals, who are defeated and 
crushed by their fate.55 Despite the political complexity that underpins activism against 
war, violence, and human rights, this research is driven by the normative assumption 
that a joint Israeli-Palestinian grassroots movement permits the contestation of the 
current conflict resolution stalemate. 
Finally, the project studies the Israeli forces’ violence against Palestinians and 
the social practices through which violence is concealed, condoned, and downplayed 
for the exoneration of the Israeli military personnel and their accountability at the 
societal and military levels. Yet significantly, it leaves out a number of aspects worth 
addressing in further research. The thesis does neither address Palestinian violence 
against the Israeli forces and civilians nor studies the security collaboration between 
Israeli security forces and Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.56 These 
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aspects merit a comprehensive study on their own, especially having in mind 
contemporary developments in the region. Criticising the occupation from legal, moral, 
and political points of view, this research focuses less on the numbers of violent 
episodes or in adjudicating between who is right and who is wrong during such 
episodes. Rather, it interrogates the Israeli military and civil tolerance for the IDF’s 
violence and the confined attempts to hold them accountable for their violent behaviour 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
 
Contribution to Knowledge  
The project offers a threefold contribution to the literature. First, by 
investigating the productive role of emotions in the Israel/Palestine conflict, the project 
puts forward a methodological and theoretical caveat concerning the political role of 
emotions in conflict, war, and violence. Shaul Kimhi and Shifra Sagi, Erella Grassiani 
or Matthew Zagor argue fear, boredom, tiredness, and anger determine the Israeli 
military to act violently against Palestinian civilians and to morally disengage from 
their responsibilities and duties under international law. 57  Although personal 
experiences of military service are a significant area of research that highlights the 
complexity of soldiering under the occupation, this thesis interrogates the political 
implications of circulating such an explanation for the IDF’s confined accountability 
for the violence pursued against Palestinians. Explicitly, this examination of military 
violence risks mitigating the Israeli military’s accountability for their actions both at 
the individual and collective levels while shifting the individual responsibility onto the 
military and the political apparatus of the occupation. In contrast, this thesis questions 
the causal relation between emotions and violence, and argues that emotions may, 
equally importantly, excuse, justify, and downplay the Israeli citizen-soldiers’ violence 
against Palestinians. If ethnographic investigations of the Israeli military life focus on 
the breadth of emotions that military forces experience during their service (what 
emotions are), this project studies the political function and implications of emotions 
(what they do and what are emotions for) in the context of the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
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Far from being the only answer for the Israeli tolerance for the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians, in this research, emotions are the problem that invites investigation and 
critical thinking. By studying the political trajectories of emotions embodied, 
distributed, and provoked by (self-)representations of conflict, violence, and 
(in)security, this thesis focuses on the prioritisation of emotions in cultivating military 
subjectivity, in their rhetorical instrumentality, in their political and social 
materialisation, and in their role in sustaining and disrupting dominant political orders. 
Despite referring specifically to the violence that takes place between the Israeli 
military forces and Palestinian civilians, this project advances a methodological 
roadmap for studying the confined accountability of other Western militaries for the 
violence pursued in other non-Western parts of the world. The thesis concludes by 
arguing the study of the productive role of emotions could be qualified by marrying 
governmentality studies with the scholarship on emotions. It suggests treating emotions 
as social and cultural practices, techniques, and modalities of governing the conduct of 
local and international audiences towards the Israeli military for the purposes of 
cultivating affinity towards the IDF, and respectively, hostility and opposition towards 
Palestinians. Therefore, through the study of the productive power of emotions, this 
project shows that emotions are part and parcel of power relations that nurture violence, 
conflict, and war in the Middle East.  
Second, the project contributes to feminist investigations of the Israeli military 
and its gendered practices of occupation. The feminist literature that studies the Israeli 
military criticises the sexualisation and objectification of women’s participation in the 
military and deplores the socio-economic, political, and cultural subordination of 
women in the Israeli society due to their unequal access to military service. 58 
Furthermore, the Israeli feminist literature studies the militarisation of the Israeli 
society by underlining the links between manhood, masculinity, and violence.59 This 
body of scholarship proposes an essentialist perspective on violence based on the causal 
link between masculinity and violence therefore carrying a limited explanatory power 
for the purposes of this project. In contrast, this research claims the militarisation of the 
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Israeli society takes place through a more nuanced process than the conventional 
association between violence and a martial military physical training. It studies military 
subjectivity beyond military personnel’s violent behaviour and physical training and 
investigates the pedagogical, aesthetic, rhetorical, commemoration, legal, bureaucratic, 
and forensic practices that nurture and cultivate the Israeli military persona. Crafting 
military subjectivity takes place not only during but also before and in the aftermath of 
military service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, especially since the Israeli 
military personnel travel between their civilian identity and reserve duty most of their 
adult life. Moreover, military subjectivity is cultivated through other social practices 
such as aesthetic representations of soldiering circulated on social media, forensic and 
commemoration practices through which the body of the Israeli citizen-soldier is 
provided with the utmost material and symbolic care, or rhetorical practices through 
which Israeli military, political, and public figures highlight the uniqueness and the 
benign nature of the Israeli troops.  
Enriching the construction of the gendered identity of the IDF, the project 
argues didactic, aesthetic, rhetorical, bureaucratic, forensic, legal, and commemoration 
practices re-fashion the Israeli military identity by cultivating a professional, non-
threatening, and humanitarian military figure. Traditionally, the IDF have celebrated 
the socio-cultural symbol of the Sabra. The Sabras, the first native Jews living in Israel, 
were the quintessence of the Zionist dream of reimagining the Israeli identity that 
entailed a detachment from the assumed passivity of Diaspora Jews who died in 
pogroms and during the Holocaust. 60  Specifically, the creation of Israel was 
accompanied by the crafting of a new Jew, the Sabra, who was envisaged as the 
‘prototype of the hardened, strong, hygienic, and resolutely masculine warrior’.61 If the 
official narrative has celebrated this figure as the embodiment of the victory associated 
with the war of 1967, the testimonies of veterans that have served in the Six-Day War 
offer an alternative representation. The Seventh Day: Soldiers’ Talk About the Six-Day 
War, one of the first Israeli anthologies of war experiences, is a collection of war stories 
recounted by a group of young kibbutzniks who had fought in the war of 1967. In the 
aftermath of the war, Avraham Shapira and Amos Oz met with war veterans and 
recorded their war experiences. In their audiotapes that were later transformed in a 
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compendium of war confessions, young Sabras disclose the traumatic experience of 
war and their effort to cope with the chaos and the disorder of combat.62 The image of 
a soldier who fought yet resents and feels remorse for his participation in violent acts 
gained a further dimension in the 1980s. The First Lebanon War (1982) was categorised 
as the first ‘war of choice’ and conscientious objectors and anti-war movements began 
to challenge the military. Furthermore, the media, critical of the military, started 
portraying the Israeli troops as ‘frightened, conflicted survivors’, who were unaware of 
their military purpose and who dreaded their prolonged stay in South Lebanon.63 The 
security situation in the 1990s, characterised by a protracted conflict and critiques 
against the leitmotif of individual sacrifice for the wellbeing of the nation, cultivated 
the image of an anxious, powerless, and traumatised soldier, a representation featured 
largely in the media and popular culture.64 Slowly, films and documentaries capitalised 
on the representation of a traumatised military figure. Studying film and documentaries 
produced in the aftermath of the Second Intifada, Raja Morag argues these cultural 
products capture the ‘perpetrator trauma’.65 Showing a vulnerable and confused soldier, 
these creative productions focus on female and male military personnel that disclose 
the atrocities they have perpetuated, and insist on the guilt and the trauma soldiers 
experience in the aftermath of the violence enacted against Palestinians. Although 
Morag salutes these artistic expressions as a sign of socio-cultural maturity 
accompanied by the Israeli troops’ willingness to assume responsibility for their 
actions, some scholars and journalists criticise this military representation. 66  For 
example, the ‘perpetrator trauma’ leitmotiv has become the main criticism against the 
activity of Breaking the Silence. Critics argue the image of a traumatised soldier 
portrays a conscientious and humane military figure that effaces Palestinian suffering 
by turning the conversation away from the Palestinian precarious existence under the 
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occupation and towards the Israeli citizen-soldiers’ soul searching experiences during 
and in the aftermath of their military service.67  
Against these images, this project argues local and international audiences 
witness the emergence of a new Israeli military image – a professional, non-threatening, 
and humanitarian military figure. Supported by the IDF’s growing access to media 
technology, one observers not only the Israeli military occupation of the digital media 
as Kuntsman and Stein eloquently have argued in their work on the IDF’s reliance on 
new technology, but also the emergence of a new Israeli military subjectivity that 
reduces the growing local and international criticism regarding the Israeli military’s 
violence against Palestinians. 68  Specifically, this novel image works through, yet 
ultimately, effaces any identity markers such as race, gender, class, ethnicity, and 
religion by cultivating a ‘tough and tender’ image of the Israeli military that ultimately 
alleviates local and international criticism.69 Far from feminising the IDF, this (self-
)representation provides the Israeli military with an appearance of faultlessness, equips 
it with the belief in the justness of its action, and conceals any violence the military 
personnel might pursue under the guise of an attractive, beautiful yet strong symbolic 
representation. This positive military image, the project concludes, hinders the 
strengthening of a conscientious objectors movement and of other left wing Israeli 
organisations that criticise the Israeli military and state authorities for their tolerance 
for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians.  
Equally significant, this benevolent and humane military figure confines 
international criticism against the Israeli military by situating the IDF alongside other 
Western militaries that imagine themselves as forces for good through the blending of 
humanitarian operations and combat missions. Eyal Weizman has already investigated 
the growing discourse that blends humanitarianism with military interventional 
practices when discussing cases such as the war in Bosnia, the war in Iraq (2003) or the 
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Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.70 The thesis enriches Weizman’s approach 
and argues the cultivation of an impeccable Israeli military image, which resembles to 
other Western forces, enables the creation of a fictive affective kinship between the 
Israeli military, local, and international audiences. Through this new representation, the 
Israeli military constructs an image that permits the IDF to associate themselves with 
other Western militaries and to situate themselves within the Western security alliance 
of fighting terror. The image of a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian 
citizen-soldier is not effacing the Sabra figure, nor the image of a remorseful, 
conflicted, and scared soldier. Coexisting and competing with them, this novel military 
representation is the product of the contemporary socio-political dynamic of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, that is characterised by the IDF’s reliance on modern 
technology, by the growing number of human rights actors and journalists in the region, 
and by the increasing international indignation regarding the Israeli military and the 
Israeli occupation of Palestinians. 
Third, the project contributes to the literature that studies the confined success 
of the Israeli left wing activism in eliciting change in the Israeli society. A small number 
of authors address the refusal of the Israeli society to criticise the military or to resist 
the occupation. They study the role of conscientious objectors in the Israeli society and 
the efforts of the Israeli Jews political activists against the occupation. For example, 
Ruth Linn believes the Israeli public opinion and the military tend to ignore 
conscientious objectors. In her study, the author reveals the Israeli conscientious 
objectors are challenged by the society’s ‘refusal to know’ about the Israeli forces’ 
violence against Palestinians thus determining the former to craft criticism against the 
occupation in a narrow manner in order to avoid accusations of lack of patriotism.71 
Similarly, in Refusenik!: Israel’s Soldiers of Conscience, the moderate left wing 
novelist Yizhar Smilansky criticises the refuseniks for being vocal only during the 
performance of their annual reserve duty.72 The novelist challenges recruits to fight the 
political and military leadership ‘throughout the other eleven months of the year when 
the citizen-soldier is free to attack, to raise hell, to recruit others for the great national 
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refusal’.73 Moreover, Katherine Natanel argues that the Israeli organisations that are 
affiliated with the left demonstrate a passive approach towards activism against the 
occupation while the activists’ lethargic and apathetic attitude towards anti-colonial 
crusading contributes to the sustenance of the Israeli domination of Palestinians.74 This 
body of literature recalls the hostile, right wing, and nationalist political environment 
in which left wing activists activate and condemns the latter’s lack of boldness in 
criticising the occupation and in rallying on Palestinians’ behalf. Although these 
scholars offer a valid criticism of the Israeli political environment, this thesis shows the 
Israeli military is not only well aware of the impact of local and international activism 
on the Israeli military, but it is also actively engaged in restraining the impact of dissent. 
The constitution of a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military image 
indicates the IDF’s effort to conceal the violence that is inherent in military service with 
the aim to cultivate public support and trust in the military, and to moderate local (and 
international) criticism against the military and the occupation. 
 
Project Structure 
The first chapter presents the theoretical framework that guides this research 
project. It brings together Michel Foucault’s concept of the regime of truth with Judith 
Butler’s frames of war in order to map out the pedagogical, aesthetic, rhetorical, 
commemoration, forensic, legal, and respectively, bureaucratic practices through which 
the professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military image is constructed and 
sustained as means to deter criticism against the IDF and its violent behaviour.75 With 
an interest in the political role of emotions in the Israel/Palestine conflict, the chapter 
builds on feminist and cultural studies interested in studying emotions, violence, and 
division. It uses Sara Ahmed’s cultural politics of emotions in order to complement 
Butler’s investigation of the regimes of mourning, loss and grievability that justify 
violence for the purposes of mapping out the repertoire of emotions that nurture the 
civil and military tolerance for the IDF’s violent behaviour against Palestinians.76 In 
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this regard, this research shows there is a gamut of emotions (doubt, pain, disgust, 
suspicion, revulsion, empathy or compassion), that nurtures and is nurtured by gendered 
and racialised structures of domination, privilege, and power that sanction, conceal, and 
depoliticise violence against Palestinians. Lastly, the chapter notes the importance of 
studying the embodied experiences of subjects within and beyond the power structures 
that shape their social actions. Since hierarchies that shape subjectivity are temporary, 
contingent, and open to contestation, the thesis enriches Foucault’s insights on 
subjectivity with Erving Goffman’s study of institutional underlife, and reveals 
practices, instances, and events through which the IDF’s idealised military figure is 
altered, moderated, and dislocated.77 
The second chapter analyses the cultivation of the Israeli military subjectivity 
by scrutinising the didactic practices through which the IDF’s Education and Youth 
Corps constructs a professional, non-threatening, and compassionate soldiering figure. 
Influenced by the power struggle between secular and religious actors to shape military 
culture and subjectivity, the Israeli pedagogical military practices rely on emotions in 
order to cultivate the Israeli military subjectivity. For instance, the IDF’s Education and 
Youth Corps organises trips to museums or to historical sights across Israel, workshops 
that introduce recruits to military and Jewish ethics during war and conflict, lectures 
about Zionism, talks about the Israel/Palestine conflict, or seminars about 
contemporary socio-political affairs in Israel. These pedagogical activities invite the 
Israeli young men and women to craft military subjectivity through an emotional 
engagement with the ideas, symbols, and narratives presented by themselves and their 
instructors/guides during military didactic programmes. The chapter shows the Israeli 
military uses these pedagogical practices in order to work with and through recruits’ 
emotions in order to imbue them with a sense of loyalty, a feeling of righteousness 
regarding military service, and a sentiment of devotion towards the military and the 
society. Presenting military service as a self-fulfilling practice of personal development 
that equips recruits with virtuous qualities that serve their civil and military lives alike, 
the IDF conceals the violence that is inherent in military service, and imagines the 
cultivation of a benign and compassionate military figure. This romanticised military 
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image equips recruits with a sense of moral superiority by imagining the Israeli military 
personnel as sensitive individuals that are affected by and concerned with Palestinian 
lives under the occupation. The chapter argues the cultivation and the presentation of 
military service as a self-development practice is important for deterring local and 
international criticism against the Israeli military’s violence in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. 
The third chapter explores the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit’s activity on social 
media. It investigates the IDF’s online photo archive that constitutes the military’s 
official Facebook account. Through the content analysis of these pictures, this chapter 
shows the Israeli military uses social media in order to cultivate and disseminate a 
happy, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian military subjectivity. Addressing both local and 
international audiences, these aesthetic practices present military service as a playful 
activity, that offers thrilling opportunities and moments of relaxation, and as an 
occasion to help Palestinians or people from abroad that find themselves in distressful 
situations. Similar to the pedagogical activities that introduce recruits to the Israeli 
military life and culture, the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit cultivates a romanticised military 
subjectivity that shields the Israeli forces from accountability for the violence enacted 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This image appeals to both local and Western 
audiences insofar as it situates the Israeli forces alongside other Western troops that are 
engaged in combat and humanitarian missions alike. Through this appealing military 
representation, the IDF constrain the possibility to interpret military forces’ violence 
outside the confines of self-defence. The dissemination of an attractive, likeable, and 
modern military subjectivity invites local and international kinship and affinity towards 
military personnel and respectively, the condemnation of Palestinians who are 
constituted as threatening for these beautiful and young Israeli servicemen and women. 
The fourth chapter examines the debates, controversies, and ambivalences 
provoked by the circulation of visual representations of the Israeli forces’ violence 
against Palestinians. It investigates the rhetorical engagement with three episodes, 
which took place across the West Bank, and which showed the Israeli military and 
security forces harming, harassing, or killing Palestinian children and teenagers. 
Distributed in the local and international public sphere, these photographs and video 
recordings generated passionate discussions about the IDF’s violent behaviour in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, concerning the ubiquity of cameras and human rights 
activists in the region, and regarding the Israeli forces’ leeway to attack Palestinians at 
  30 
their own discretion. By examining the rhetorical engagement with these episodes of 
violence, the project maps out the emotional discursive practices through which Israeli 
servicemen and women, Israeli political and military authorities, members of the civil 
society, and segments of the Israeli population defend, justify, and downplay the 
military personnel’s violence against the Palestinian youth. Through expressions of 
doubt and suspicion concerning the authenticity of these video recordings, declarations 
of solidarity with the Israeli military personnel that were accused of harming 
Palestinians, and through discursive labelling of Palestinians as fearsome and 
dangerous figures, the Israeli military, political, and public figures imagine a vulnerable 
and benign soldiering persona. This image shifts the Israeli military’s responsibility for 
the violence pursued against Palestinians from the former to the latter. In this respect, 
the chapter indicates that visual representations of war and conflict are subjected to 
affective interpretations and debates that circulate doubt, suspicion, or disbelief towards 
Palestinians and empathy, solidarity, and support for the Israeli military personnel. By 
mapping out the passionate debates that accompany these images of violence, it 
cautions against interpreting visual practices solely as progressive instruments to 
contest violence, conflict, and war, and shows that visual representations might 
reinforce division and harm in the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
The fifth chapter investigates the commemoration and forensic practices 
through which the Israeli and Palestinian bodies are recovered, handled, buried, and 
commemorated in the aftermath of their violent interaction. It argues commemoration 
and forensic practices reinforce the heroic and sacrificial representation of the Israeli 
military, which enacts violence in order to defend the individual and collective Israeli 
Jewish body. The exceptionality of the Israeli military figure is strengthened through 
the forensic engagement with dead bodies within the Israel/Palestine conflict. Medical 
authorities indicate the utmost care and respect for the Israeli servicemen and women 
who have died, yet show disregard towards Palestinian dead bodies. Imbued with 
religious symbolism regarding the sanctity of the Jewish body, these practices 
constitute a sacred, impeccable, and distinctive Israeli soldiering figure. They reinforce 
the exceptionality and the flawlessness of the Israeli military subject, whose heroic 
status confines its representation as a figure capable of enacting violence against 
Palestinians. Moreover, this chapter shows that Israeli and Palestinians alike attempt to 
contest this romanticised military representation that confines the possibility to 
recognise Palestinian pain and loss within the context of the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
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Whereas local human rights organisations attempt to organise joint events in order to 
commemorate loss on both sides of the conflict, local Palestinians living in East 
Jerusalem encounter legal and bureaucratic difficulties in burying and honouring their 
dead relatives. Therefore, the chapter shows that mourning, pain, loss, grief, pain, 
animosity, and aversion hinder conflict resolution, and reinforce the affective divisions 
that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict. The thesis concludes by highlighting the 
political implications of circulating a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian 
military figure to local and international audiences.  
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Chapter 1: The Politics of Emotions and Violence within 
Civil-Military Relations in Israel 
 
                               ‘We see soldiers as our sons. In Israel, it is part of our collective ethos. 
                                           We don’t see soldiers as robot-like lines of buzz cuts and uniforms, but as 
the beautiful children that we have collectively given birth to and cared for.1 
 
The Israeli public perception towards the IDF is positive and most of the Israeli 
youth fulfil their compulsory military service in spite of the growing local and 
international criticism against the Israeli military. Roni Tiargan-Orr and Meytal Eran-
Jona, who work at the IDF’s Behavioural Sciences Center, have surveyed the Israeli 
public opinion towards the military between 2001 and 2010. They concluded that the 
Israeli society’s trust in the IDF has remained stable across times despite criticism 
against the military’s violence against Palestinians.2 Although the study could indicate 
bias due to authors’ affiliation with the IDF, their findings show that critical voices 
have a moderate influence on the public’s perception of the Israeli military. Similarly, 
in 2016, the media reported that the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics found that the 
IDF are the most trusted institution in Israel. According to the survey, 82% of 
respondents expressed confidence in the Israeli military forces. Unsurprisingly, the 
same report showed 92% of the Israeli Jews, and respectively, 32% of the Arab Israelis 
trust the military.3 In this regard, journalists, activists, and scholars alike deplore the 
continuous support and trust in the Israeli military despite the growing incriminatory 
evidence that illustrates its widespread violence against Palestinians.4  
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Furthermore, Yagil Levy argues that the IDF have avoided the emergence of a 
motivation crisis. Although the Israeli youth is obliged to perform a compulsory 
military service and an annual reserve duty, recruits occasionally refuse to perform their 
military service due to political or socio-economic reasons.5 The Israeli military have 
made significant efforts to accommodate draftees’ needs and grievances. For instance, 
the IDF have increased recruits’ financial remuneration and have accepted their 
reluctance to serve in politically contested missions in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories.6 The continuous trust and support for the Israeli military coupled with the 
IDF’s increasing effort to address local criticism indicate that the Israeli military enjoys 
and is interested in crafting a positive image in order to strengthen civil-military 
relations in Israel. In this regard, the IDF’s Chief of Staff, Gadi Eisenkot, argued in 
2016 that one of the greatest threats to the Israeli military is the erosion of the public 
trust in the IDF.7 
The civil, military, and political tolerance for the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians relates to the positive perception towards the Israeli military. This is 
illustrated by a violent episode that took place in Hebron, whose public debate 
reverberated in the local and international media. On March 24th, 2016, Sergeant Elor 
Azaria, a combat medic in the Shimshon Battalion (Kfir Brigade) shot in the head Abdel 
Fattah al-Sharif. Together with another assailant, Ramzi al-Kasrawi, al-Sharif had 
previously attacked an Israeli soldier and wounded him lightly. Lying on the ground, 
al-Sharif had already been incapacitated by the Israeli forces when the sergeant shot 
him.8 The combat medic was arrested immediately after the shooting and a trial in front 
of the military court ensued. At the beginning of January 2017, Azaria was convicted 
for manslaughter, and in February 2017, he was sentenced to eighteenth months in 
prison, twelve months on probation, and a demotion in rank.9  
                                                        
5 Levy, Y. ‘Is There a Motivation Crisis in Military Recruitment in Israel?’, Israel Affairs, 15 (2009) 
pp. 135-58. 
6 Levy, ‘Is There a Motivation Crisis?’, pp. 135-58.  
7 Ravid, B. ‘Chief of Staff Eisenkot: Greatest Threat to the IDF is Loss of Public Trust’. Haaretz, 26 
July 2016. Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.733429 [Accessed 1 
September 2017].  
8 Gross, J. A. and The Times of Israel Staff, ‘Soldier moderately hurt in Hebron stabbing; attackers 
killed’. The Times of Israel, 24 March 2016. Available at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-soldier-
stabbed-moderately-injured-in-hebron/ [Accessed 28 July 2017].  
9 Fisher, I. ‘Elor Azaria, Israeli Soldier Who Killed Wounded Assailant, Gets 18 Months in Prison’. 
The New York Times, 21 February 2017. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/21/world/middleeast/elor-azaria-israel-sentence.html [Accessed 28 
July 2017].  
  34 
This episode indicated the prevalent support that the military enjoys despite 
the circulation of incriminatory evidence that shows the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians. Political figures affiliated with the Israeli left and center argued the 
Hebron episode denoted a decline in the IDF’s morality while right wing politicians 
argued for safeguarding the Israeli troops’ lives at the detriment of the Palestinian 
attackers’ ones.10  Various political actors, including the Prime Minister, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, called for pardoning Azaria. Furthermore, the public opinion and the Israeli 
society were reserved in condemning the combat medic. In Tel Aviv, Azaria’s 
supporters organised a rally attended by 2,000 people, who called for his release and 
hailed him as a hero.11 Facebook groups circulated profile pictures with messages of 
support for the combat medic.12 A supermarket sold shopping bags with his figure and 
some children dressed as Azaria during the Purim festival.13 Moreover, the support for 
the combat medic was apparent in a number of opinion polls. Around half of those 
interviewed condemned the sergeant’s arrest and supported the killing of assailants who 
attack Israeli civilians and military personnel.14 In the aftermath of his conviction, polls 
suggested that almost seventy percent of Israeli Jews supported the pardoning of the 
combat medic.15 Finally, yet significantly, Imad Abu Shamsyeh, the activist that filmed 
and disseminated the violent episode, received death threats, his house was attacked 
with stones, and his photo was uploaded on right wing websites together with calls to 
murder him and his family. 16  The affective debates that surrounded Azaria’s case 
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illustrate that, despite the circulation of incriminatory evidence, the Israeli society 
fosters a relatively stable positive attitude towards the IDF. Equally, the emotional 
investment in the military nurtured by a variety of Israeli individual and collective 
figures show the role of emotions in justifying, sanctioning, and downplaying the IDF’s 
violence against Palestinians. This chapter highlights that the tolerance for the Israeli 
military’s violent behaviour in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is informed by the 
emergence of a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military figure. This 
image, that played an important role in constituting Azaria as a vulnerable military 
figure, is constructed at the intersection between the civil and military spheres. Its 
prevalence within civil-military relations in Israel carries serious political implication 
for the Israel/Palestine conflict because this image enhances support for the Israeli 
military, confines criticism against its violent practices, and sanctions the IDF’s 
widespread violence against Palestinians. 
In order to support this claim, the chapter argues that the IDF’s positive 
soldierly image – a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military – 
represents an affective frame of soldiering that nurtures the civil, military, and political 
tolerance for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians by justifying and depoliticising the 
military’s violent behaviour in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For the purposes of 
this project, depoliticisation is defined as an ‘ongoing, always incomplete processes by 
which the political, structural nature of a given issue is disguised, and, therefore, (…) 
the potential for and necessity of political moves to counter that issue are to some degree 
obscured’.17 Furthermore, it claims that the emotions that arise from this affective frame 
of soldiering reveal gendered and racialised readings of Palestinians and Israeli Jewish 
military bodies that determine affinity for the later and animosity towards the former 
thus moderating the IDF’s accountability for the violence pursued against Palestinians. 
Similarly, Carole Nagengast warns that violence may be ‘tolerated or encouraged by 
states in order to create, justify, excuse, explain, or enforce hierarchies of difference or 
relations of inequality’.18  
The chapter divides in two sections with the following one blending Michel 
Foucault’s insights regarding a regime of truth with Judith Butler’s frames of war. It 
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highlights the IDF’s benign soldiering figure represents a discursive system that defines 
the emotional relation between the Israeli society and the military thus nurturing the 
public, political, and military tolerance for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. 
Furthermore, it introduces Sarah Ahmed’s remarks regarding the cultural politics of 
emotions in order to underline the role of emotions in constructing the Israeli positive 
military image as an affective frame of soldiering that invites support for the IDF, and 
respectively, hostility towards Palestinians thus justifying the military’s violence in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.19 The final section discusses the construction of military 
subjectivity within the context of this affective frame and shows that the Israeli citizen-
soldiers appropriate, rehearse, contest, or trouble the military culture within which they 
are socialised. It emphasises that military subjectivity is constituted through a 
negotiation between individual desires, views, ideas, and the broader socio-political 
context in which they are embedded. To this end, it broadens Michel Foucault’s 
discussions about power and subjectivity with Erving Goffman’s dramaturgic theory.20 
Nevertheless, the chapter insists emotions define the socialisation of the Israeli recruits 
in the military culture and stresses that ‘we should never assume that soldiers agree 
with the state policies they are tasked with enforcing nor should we assume complete 
separations between “official” ideologies of the state and vernacular logics’. 21 
Therefore, the constitution of the Israeli military subjectivity indicates that ‘not only 
are emotions central to subjectification and meaning-making, but they also cannot be 
dissociated from the materiality of bodies, whose very signification or “readability” 
hangs on [the] emotional meaning’ of the Palestinian and Israeli Jewish bodies alike.22 
 
The Affective Frame of Israeli Soldiering  
Regime of Truth/Frames of War 
The chapter makes the case that the image of a professional, non-threatening, 
and humanitarian military reinforces a positive attitude towards the IDF and leniency 
for the Israeli military personnel’s violence against Palestinians. Due to its political, 
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social, and military significance, this romanticised military image represents a regime 
of truth/frame of war that defines civil-military relations in Israel, that cultivates the 
emotional links between the civil and military sphere, and that moderates the IDF’s 
accountability for the violence enacted in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Michel 
Foucault believes every society is characterised by a regime of truth that includes the 
modalities through which a particular truth is accepted or rejected, incorporates the 
instruments through which truth is determined, and features the techniques through 
which individuals are granted social capital to say and to be credited with saying true 
statements. From this perspective, a regime of truth is defined through the lens that: 
 
‘Each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: 
that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as 
true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish 
true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
[and] the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true’.23 
 
Truth refers less to certainty, accuracy, precision or veracity. It signifies what 
counts as true and what is the political role of truth in a particular society. To this end, 
a society rarely faces ‘a battle on ‘behalf of’ the truth but (…) a battle about the status 
of truth and the economic and political role it plays’ in it.24 There are a few criteria that 
define a regime of truth. It is produced by a diversity of institutions, carries a techno-
scientific trait, and corresponds to political demands from a particular society. Truth 
circulates under diverse forms and through a multiplicity of venues in order to be widely 
diffused and consumed. Nevertheless, its production is confined to the power 
apparatuses that exist in a society be it army, media or educational institutions. Lastly, 
it is likely that truth is caught in struggles of power and domination in that society.25  
This chapter departs from Foucault’s insights by showing that the construction 
of a regime of truth encompasses a diversity of actors and social practices apart from 
the media, the military, or other educational institutions. Azaria’s case has revealed the 
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permeability between civil-military relations and the role of a variety of political, 
public, or individual actors in presenting the sergeant as a victim who deserves leniency 
and support despite his violent actions. Through their discursive practices, individual 
and collective Israeli actors tried to establish his innocence and vulnerability as a 
discursive system that would organise individual and collective attitudes towards the 
combat medic and, by extension, towards the Israeli military. Furthermore, the 
reverberation of this case in the public sphere, from public demonstrations on Azaria’s 
behalf to his use as an aesthetic symbol during the Purim festival, indicate the variety 
of practices that constitute and reinforce the IDF’s positive military image as a 
dominant discursive system within the Israeli society. Therefore, this chapter stresses 
that the Israeli benign military figure is constituted at the intersection between civil-
military relations through a gamut of practices and a diversity of actors. Due to its 
prevalence and circulation between the civil and military spheres, this image levies on 
civil-military relations as a discursive system that governs individual and collective 
emotions, attitudes, desires, and views towards the IDF. Similarly, Lorna Weir 
highlights that the concept of the regime of truth demands examination beyond its 
confessionary/techno-scientific features since truth gains different forms and means of 
expression in the contemporary world. Truth practices and manifestations emerge at 
different historical moments in time, and gain multiple forms of expression in different 
areas such as politics, governance or common culture.26  
Two branches of the Israeli military carry a significant influence in cultivating 
a romanticised Israeli military image and in distributing it within the civil and military 
spheres. Through educational practices, the IDF’s Education and Youth Corps presents 
military service as an opportunity to develop one’s individual and professional skills, 
which are important for being a good citizen-soldier that both builds and defends the 
Israeli nation.27 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit strengthens this positive image by using 
social media to circulate the image of a happy, multicultural, and humanitarian military 
subject.28 It also cultivates and disseminates grief, pain, and mourning through online 
military obituaries that praise the remarkable qualities of the Israeli servicemen and 
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women. These affective commemoration practices remind the Israeli and international 
public (and the Jewish Diaspora) of the bodily sacrifice made by extraordinary Israeli 
forces in order to defend Israel.29 Both the IDF’s Education and Youth Corps and the 
IDF Spokesperson’s Unit forward an appealing military image that aims to enhance the 
Israeli recruits’ desire to join the military, and to deter criticism against the IDF’s 
violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
Likewise, various institutions affiliated with the state contribute to the 
construction of a flawless Israeli military subjectivity. Pre-military academies support 
the activity of the IDF’s Education and Youth Corps. By organising field trips through 
Israel or by equipping the Israeli recruits with knowledge about military and Jewish 
ethics, pre-military academies remind young Israeli men and women of their duty to 
contribute to nation building and to defend Israel’s collective body.30 Moreover, two 
institutions affiliated with the state, ZAKA (Disaster Victim Identification) and the 
Israeli Institute of Forensic Medicine construct an impeccable military subjectivity. 31 
These institutions conduct medical and forensic practices on Israeli Jewish and 
Palestinian bodies. Their activities are guided by a symbolic discourse that invites the 
utmost care for the sacred body of the Israeli citizen-soldier and the exclusion of the 
(contaminating) Palestinian body from the Israeli body politic. 32  Furthermore, the 
Israeli Supreme Court’s decisions hinder the burying and mourning of Palestinian 
bodies from East Jerusalem in Israel thus indicating the reluctance of the Israeli public 
and authorities to accept Palestinian narratives of mourning and loss.33  
Finally, yet significantly, a number of individual actors contribute to the 
strengthening of a benign military figure. The passionate debates provoked by the 
Azaria episode showed military and political authorities, public figures, or Israeli 
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citizen-soldiers reinterpret and justify the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. Through 
their discursive practices, they imagine the Israeli military subject as a vulnerable and 
defenceless individual and present Palestinians as dangerous individuals that harm 
Israeli citizen-soldiers. This antagonistic representation is enhanced by these actors’ 
expressions of solidarity, support, and empathy for the Israeli citizen-soldiers, and 
respectively, suspicion, hate, fear, and animosity towards Palestinians. Therefore, a 
broader examination of the variety of the actors and social practices through which the 
idealised military subjectivity is constructed shows that ‘truth [regarding the IDF’s 
violence against Palestinians] is not so much hidden as partially revealed in measured 
and calculated unveilings that blur truth and falsity’. 34 Through its imposition and 
circulation as a regime of truth regarding the IDF within the Israeli society, the 
professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military figure nurtures the civil, 
military, and political tolerance for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians, and enables 
the legitimisation, reinterpretation, and concealment of violence for the purposes of 
moderating the military’s accountability. The variety of practices and actors that 
reinforce the IDF’s benign image reveals that the constitution of the Israeli military 
subjectivity depends on the ‘operation [of] an entire machinery for producing true 
discourses concerning it’ that sanctions, rationalises, and disguises the military’s 
violent behaviour against Palestinians.35  
The role of this positive military image in inviting affinity with the IDF and 
opposition to Palestinians indicates that emotions, affective dispositions, passionate 
engagements, and affective investments are part and parcel of the constitution of the 
Israeli military’s benign soldiering figure as a defining feature of civil-military relations 
in Israel. In this regard, the emergence of this positive military image shows that ‘the 
“truths” [about the IDF’s violence against Palestinians] are dependent on emotions, on 
how they move subjects, and how they attach or stick subjects together in forms of 
social adherence and coherence’.36 Therefore, the emotions that constitute the Israeli 
professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military figure as a discursive system 
reveal affinity with the IDF and respectively, hostility against Palestinians. They 
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distinguish between who should be included and who should be excluded from the 
Israeli body politic. By imposing affective boundaries within the Israel/Palestine 
conflict, this romanticised military figure restricts criticism against the IDF’s violence 
against Palestinians, moderates the military forces’ accountability regarding their 
violent behaviour in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and enhances the leniency 
for military personnel during their investigation, prosecution, and condemnation for 
their violent practices.  
The role of emotions in constituting a benign military image for the purposes 
of justifying violence within the Israel/Palestine conflict recalls Judith Butler’s 
perspective on the frames of war, which highlights that a discursive system that 
characterises a society enables particular affective dispositions towards the socio-
political events that implicate it. By studying the instrumentalisation of technology, 
senses, and war photography for the purposes of justifying violence, the author believes 
that ‘[a] frame [of war] works both to preclude certain kinds of questions, certain kinds 
of historical inquiries, and to function as a moral justification for retaliation’.37 This 
approach comes with the warning that ‘efforts to control the visual and narrative 
dimensions of war delimit public discourse by establishing and disposing the sensuous 
parameters of reality itself – including what can be seen and what can be heard’.38 In 
this respect, a frame of war imposes a hierarchical political order by distinguishing 
between who should and who should not be grieved, between who is a victim and who 
is a perpetrator, between who should be included and who should be excluded from the 
Israeli public sphere and body politic.  
This chapter enriches Butler’s approach on the role of emotions in sanctioning 
violence by highlighting there is a variety of practices that constitute the (affective) 
frames that justify it. Originally, frames of war refer to the use of visual, and to a lesser 
extent, of bureaucratic practices in legitimising violence. In contrast, this chapter shows 
that didactic military practices, rhetorical practices, commemoration practices, and 
legal practices are part and parcel of the (affective) frames of war that justify violence 
in the Israel/Palestine conflict. Equally significant, the engagement with the repertoire 
of emotions that constitute a romanticised Israeli military subjectivity for the purposes 
of justifying violence requires a deeper understanding of the role of emotions in the 
                                                        
37 Butler, Frames of War, p. xiii. 
38 Butler, Frames of War, pp. xi-xii. 
  42 
social world. Nonetheless, Butler’s work does not provide a conceptual toolkit to study 
the role of emotions in sanctioning war, violence, and conflict despite discussing the 
politicised nature of regimes of visibility and sayable in acting with and upon senses in 
justifying violence. Rather, the investigation of the frames of war is directed towards 
the development of ethical grounds for recognising the equal vulnerability and 
humanity of individuals.39 
Sara Ahmed’s theory of affective economies strengthens the significance of 
the frame of war in political affairs through its suggestions that emotions circulate in 
the public sphere and they differentiates between bodies, communities, and subjects.40 
It highlights that, through their movement and accumulation, emotions determine 
orientation towards some bodies and away from other bodies. Nevertheless, difference 
and division is informed by historical and symbolical affective dispositions that define 
social interactions between subjects, objects, and bodies. Since social relations are 
marked by affective encounters, emotions do not emerge solely from the spatial 
proximity of bodies but also from the images, narratives, symbols, and histories that 
nurture these interactions.41 In this respect, emotions should not only be perceived as 
psychological states of mind but also as ‘social and cultural practices’ that align 
subjects with each others and against some others.42 Since emotions constitute the 
boundaries of a political community, they identify and differentiate between ‘those that 
can be loved, those that can be grieved, that is, by constituting some other as the 
legitimate objects of emotion [while disavowing others]’.43 Consequently, Ahmed’s 
research investigates the productive power of emotions by blending emotions, 
language, and bodies with intersections between race, gender, class, sexuality and 
nation.44 The concept of affective economies reinforces the argument that ‘politics [in 
the Middle East] revolves around what can be seen, felt, sensed’ while affective 
dispositions produce Palestinian and Israeli Jewish subjects in antagonistic terms for 
the purposes of legitimising and depoliticising the IDF’s violence in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.45  
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Emotions, Difference, and Violence 
The professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military figure invites 
affinity with the IDF and hostility towards Palestinians. It indicates the role of emotions 
in producing the boundaries, divisions, and differences that justify war, violence, and 
conflict within the Middle East. Constituted through didactic, aesthetic, rhetorical, 
forensic, commemoration, legal, and bureaucratic practices that embody, circulate, and 
elicits emotions, this benign military figure sustains the affective ties between the 
military and the society, nurtures tolerance towards the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians, and cultivates trust in and a positive attitude towards the Israeli military. 
The role of emotions in constituting this figure shows that although ‘emotions do not 
positively reside in a subject or figure, they still work to bind [Israeli] subjects together’ 
because they ‘they align individuals with communities – or bodily space with social 
space – through the very intensity of their attachments’.46 However, the constitution of 
this affective bond between Israeli citizen-soldiers, the military, and the society 
involves as well the cultivation of hostility and opposition between Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians since emotions ‘align some subjects with some others and against other 
others’.47 In this regard, emotions determines identification with a group, a community, 
or a nation by ‘moving [us] towards and away from others and objects that we feel are 
causing us pleasure or pain’.48  
The constitution of a benign military subjectivity is informed by social 
practices that constitute ‘specific [Israeli] bodies, lives and forms of life (…) as lovable, 
grievable and available to the normative culture of affective engagement’ while 
Palestinians are ‘transformed into objects of hate and aversion’.49 Since individual and 
collective identification with the Israeli nation takes place through affective 
dispositions such as hate, love, anger, or solidarity, emotional investment in a collective 
body involves the exclusion of and violence against Palestinians that are considered as 
threatening to a community. Therefore, the study of the affective dispositions and 
engagements through which the Israeli and Palestinian subjectivities are constituted for 
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the purposes of justifying the IDF’s violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
recall that  
‘emotions are complicit in a normative violence that circumscribes 
who or what can appear as a recognizable human subject. Emotions 
in this respect do not refer to a particular state or disposition but are 
part of an exclusionary process that produces certain subjects to the 
detriment of others, re-inscribing the boundary between the human 
and the non-human, the loved and the unloved, and the terrorized and 
the terrorist’.50 
The role of emotions in constructing antagonistic Israeli Jewish and 
Palestinian subjectivities is revealed through a variety of Israeli (self-)images circulated 
in the public sphere from policy documents, to newspapers and social media 
representations. In this regard, the examination of the emotionality of different forms 
of texts – their capacity to both perform and provoke emotions – is important for 
studying the productive power of emotions in the Israel/Palestine conflict. For instance, 
Adi Kuntsman suggests that the growing presence of digital media in contemporary 
lives and its daily use require the investigation of the circulation of feelings, affect, and 
emotional estates in and between online and offline public spheres.51 Emotions are not 
only embedded within their (online) representations but, equally significant, they move 
between online and offline sites because ‘feelings and affective states can reverberate 
in and out of cyberspace, intensified (or muffled) and transformed through digital 
circulation and repetition’.52 Their circulation and accumulation create ‘communities of 
feeling and as well as objects and subjects of feeling: love, hate, mourning or 
nostalgia’.53 The movement and intensification of emotions becomes ‘a prism through 
which various discourses of the [Israel/Palestine] conflict and notions of politics, 
victimhood and humanness can be mapped and documented’.54 Therefore, emotions 
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constitute boundaries, division, and difference in the Middle East because they ‘can 
sometimes transgress violent regimes, but it can also reinforce and appropriate existing 
racial, national and colonial formations’.55  
This chapter broadens Kuntsman’s insights regarding the circulation of 
emotions in a variety of online and offline spaces. It shows a diversity of social 
practices, apart from the Israeli military online media representation, circulates, 
embodies, and provokes emotions in order to impose affective boundaries within the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. For example, military pedagogical practices such as field trips, 
workshops, or lectures work through the Israeli recruits’ emotions in order to instil in 
them devotion and commitment towards building and defending the Israeli nation.56 
Forensic practices cultivate and disseminate respect and veneration towards the Israeli 
Jewish body and respectively, disgust and aversion towards the Palestinian one.57 
Rhetorical practices nurture distrust, fear, hate, and disbelief towards the Palestinian 
pain, and respectively, solidarity, compassion, and empathy for the Israeli military 
forces. Commemoration practices highlight the grief and pain regarding the death of 
Israeli citizen-soldiers and invite support for the military for present and future violent 
actions against Palestinians.58 The role of these practices in promoting kinship with the 
IDF and hostility towards Palestinians show that emotions are ‘embodying and 
productive of shifting demarcations along lines of race, gender, and sexuality’. 59 They 
determine affective readings that differentiate between Israeli Jews and Palestinians 
and sanction the enactment of violence. In this regard, Ahmed highlights that ‘affective 
responses are readings that not only create the borders between selves and others’ but 
also attach subjects with emotional meaning and value through that separation. 60  
 The prevalence of emotions in constituting subjectivities by imposing 
racialised and gendered readings of the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian bodies determines 
the continuous tolerance for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians, and the dominance 
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of a positive view and attitude towards the Israeli military. Similarly, Claire Hemmings 
cautions there are ‘affective responses that strengthen rather than challenge a dominant 
social order’.61 As a consequence, the strong affective investment in Israel’s benign 
military figure that underpins the reluctance to investigate, prosecute, and condemn the 
IDF’s violent behaviour shows that affect and emotions are not always contingent with 
ethics and morality. As Natalie Kouri-Towe believes,  
 
‘affect offers us a language for thinking about how injustices are 
perpetuated and circulated, that do not simply dismiss these moments 
as “bad” or “evil” but instead attends to how these kinds of intensities 
also lead to the production of privileged and hegemonic 
subjectivities’.62  
 
The role of emotions in mobilising gendered and racialised differences in the 
Israel/Palestine conflict show that ‘violence is not only something that is done to an 
already established body – rather, various forms of violence are part and parcel of the 
production of the various bodies that are subjected to violence’.63 Therefore, the study 
the IDF’s violence against Palestinians takes account of ‘how bodies are killed and 
injured, but also formed, re-formed, gendered, and racialized through the bodily 
relations of war’ in the Israel/Palestine conflict. 64  This approach highlights that 
educational, aesthetic, rhetorical, forensic, legal, bureaucratic, and commemoration 
practices constitute not only the Israeli Jewish military subjectivities but also 
Palestinian ones through affective ‘cultural memories and shared social norms that have 
marked them as dangerous’.65 These affective readings ‘strengthen the notion that they 
[Palestinians] are a group that should be approached with caution’, if not with violence 
thus reinforcing the affective boundaries that mark the Israel/Palestine conflict and that 
legitimise the Israeli forces’ violence against Palestinians. 66  Therefore, political, 
military, and public leniency for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians is generated by 
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‘history and power’ whereas ‘violence and the feelings that animate it are products of 
history and social relations that have marginalized’ Palestinian bodies against Israeli 
Jewish ones.67  
The productive power of emotions shows the professional, non-threatening, 
and humanitarian military figure functions as an affective frame of soldiering that 
nurtures tolerance for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians by sanctioning, 
neutralising, and downplaying injury, harm, and aggression in the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. This benign military image defines civil-military relations in Israel, governs 
the emotions, views, ideas, beliefs, and dispositions towards the IDF, and moderates 
the military’s accountability for the violence enacted against Palestinians. As social 
constructs that delineate between Israeli Jewish and Palestinian bodies and subjects, 
‘emotions cannot be uncoupled from relations of power that characterise and permeate 
the social [and political] field’ that defines the Middle East conflict.68 In this respect, 
the study of the tolerance for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians takes into account 
the way in which the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian subjectivities are constituted 
through  
 
‘[the] discursive density around issues of sentiments and their 
subversive tendencies, around ‘‘private’’ feelings, ‘‘public moods,’’ 
and their political consequences, around the racial distribution of 
sensibilities, around assessments of affective dispositions and their 
beneficent and dangerous political effects [in the Israel/Palestine 
conflict]’.69  
Affective Military Subjectivity 
Affective military subjectivity examines the role of emotions in constituting 
the professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military figure through practices of 
military socialisation. It refers to recruits’ emotional investment in the military culture 
to which they are introduced and captures their readiness to reiterate, contest, and alter 
the Israeli military culture. Since emotions are socio-cultural and relational practices 
that describ[e] ‘relationships between individuals and institutions, ideas or ideology, 
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and social structures’, emotional relations between the Israeli citizen-soldiers and their 
military ‘are not given but political; they must be learned and can be contested’.70 As 
socio-cultural and relational practices, emotions show that the Israeli military ‘subject 
is passionately attached to the norms on which it depends and against which it might 
rebel – in an endless spiral of subjection and subjectivation, resignification and 
subversion, and power and pleasure’.71 Therefore, the study of the role of emotions in 
cultivating the Israeli military subjectivity departs from Foucauldian-inspired studies 
of subjectivity that downplays the role of emotions in constituting military subjects. 
Michel Foucault’s investigation of military subjectivity focuses on the 
disciplinary techniques – training, drilling, and confinement to barracks – that are used 
in order to graft the soldiers’ bodies with the necessary skills, aptitudes, and abilities to 
carry out violent tasks at the highest standards.72  Both an object and a subject of 
disciplinary power, the soldier’s body is ‘subjected, used, transformed and improved’ 
in order to serve the wellbeing of the society. 73 Furthermore, subjectivity is produced 
not only through disciplinary techniques but also through self-governing practices 
through which subjects engage in order to act as expected from them.74 In this respect, 
disciplinary power classifies ‘the individual, marks him by his own individuality, 
attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize 
and which others have to recognize in him’. 75  To this end, subjectivity dovetails 
between two definitions: ‘subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied 
to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form 
of power which subjugates and makes subject to’.76 According to Foucault, military 
subjectivity is produced through disciplinary practices that are grafted on subjects and 
that ultimately require them to engage in self-discipline practices under the continuous 
gaze of authority. Taking a cue from Foucauldian investigations of military 
subjectivity, Orna Sasson-Levy shows that physical instruction is part and parcel of the 
Israeli recruits’ socialisation in the Israeli military culture and equips them with the 
bodily and psychological strength to conduct successful military missions. As a 
consequence, combat instruction in the Israeli military reinforces gendered assumptions 
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of masculinity, teaches emotional restraint, and consolidates recruits’ antagonistic 
views regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict.77  
This chapter extends Foucault’s insights regarding military instruction in 
Israel and highlights that the power that imposes on the Israeli military subject is 
exercised and reproduced through emotions. It shows that military subjectivity is 
cultivated not only through physical training as the scholar highlights, but also through 
pedagogical programmes that insist on shaping military ethos through lectures, trips, 
workshops or seminars. Within this context, emotions play a significant role in didactic 
military practices insofar as they invite recruits to work with and through their emotions 
in order to cultivate military subjectivity. Pedagogical practices permit recruits to 
acquire knowledge regarding military and Jewish ethics, concerning the history of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, or about contemporary socio-political problems such the 
precarious situation of African immigrants in Israel.78 These educational programmes 
involve visits to Yad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial site, in order to mourn the loss 
of Jewish life and to express sorrow for the Holocaust tragedy.79 They are important for 
strengthening recruits’ desire to contribute to nation building and to defend Israel. Some 
other activities invite the Israeli recruits to openly discuss the affective dispositions and 
experiences that characterise their military service in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories.80 Since educational practices invite the Israeli recruits to work with and 
through their emotions of loyalty, devotion, sorrow, pain, fear, or hate, they represent 
(self-) governing disciplinary techniques of constituting military subjectivity. 
Servicemen and women rely on their emotional experiences in order to acquire skills, 
views, and ideas for the purposes of (self-)cultivating a remarkable civilian and military 
subjectivity. Therefore, an emphasis on the role of emotions in the Israeli military 
socialisation practices challenges the assumptions that emotional restraint is 
quintessential in crafting military subjectivity. On the contrary, emotions constitute the 
Israeli military subjectivity insofar as military socialisation becomes a practice of 
naming, interpreting, managing, negotiating, and thinking about emotions.  
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The Israeli military forces learn, appropriate, rehearse, trouble, or change the 
military culture in which they are embedded. Servicemen and women appropriate and 
perform the Israeli military culture by consenting to military’s use and circulation of 
their names and photos in order to create a playful, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian 
military image on social media for the purposes of public consumption.81 Moreover, 
recruits use social media in order to alter the Israeli military culture by using the online 
public sphere as means to defend their violent actions and to invite solidarity and 
support for the Israeli military personnel in the aftermath of the disclosure of their 
violent behaviour against Palestinians. In this respect, the growing access of the Israeli 
recruits to social media determine military commanders to rethink the relation between 
the military and respectively, digital culture.82  Educational practices that introduce 
recruits to the Israeli military ethos show that young Israeli recruits may question the 
absence of Palestinian figures and narratives during the lectures that accompany field 
trips in Jerusalem.83 Furthermore, the Israeli pedagogical military practices show that 
recruits actively contest the sacrificial narratives that accompany military service by 
disrespecting their commanders or by avoiding to join military combat positions. 
Finally, yet significantly, former Israeli troops, veterans or bereaved Israeli citizen-
soldiers contest the affective boundaries that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict 
for the purposes of conflict by calling for the recognition of Palestinian narratives of 
war, violence, pain, and loss.84 Therefore, the variety of practices through which the 
Israeli recruits appropriate, perform, and alter the Israeli military culture shows that 
‘power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. By this 
we mean individuals or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in 
which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be 
realized’.85 In this respect, the social context in which the Israeli military subjects and 
their practices are embedded serves both as a reservoir and as an outcome of those 
practices. Military subjects do not operate in a deterministic manner since social 
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practices are both informed by and constitute the social context in which they are 
embedded. While stressing that bodies are subjected to particular historical and social 
processes, the Israeli military subjects are more than passive entities awaiting 
inscription. To this end,  
 
‘the [military] subject is at once a product and an agent of history; an 
agent of knowing as much as of action. Modes of subjection are 
indeed determined by the vagaries of the state, family and community 
hierarchies. Yet subjectivity is not just the outcome of social control 
or the unconscious; it also provides the ground for subjects to think 
through their circumstances and to feel through their 
contradictions’.86  
 
The Israeli military subjectivity is constructed at the intersection between 
respecting the weight of authority, accepting one’s position in the socio-political order, 
and reinterpreting and appropriating the social, political, and military context in which 
the subject is embedded. Although servicemen and women might distance themselves 
from the military culture in which they are socialised, this process does not involve a 
fundamental contestation insofar as ‘the personal and the moral framing (…) of 
experience deriv[e] from the military subculture in which he [or she] functions’.87 
Therefore, ‘the beliefs, goals, values, and ethical codes which characterize that 
[military] subculture’ constitute a psychological, educational, and affective reservoir 
through which the Israeli recruits relate to military service, recount their experiences of 
military service, justify the enactment of violence, or alter the military culture within 
which they rooted.88 In this respect, the chapter highlights that the Israeli military 
‘subjectivity does not merely speak as resistance, nor is it simply spoken (or silenced) 
by power’ relations that envisage the military as a professional, non-threatening, and 
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humanitarian institution.89 This approach is similar to Erving Goffman’s argument that 
individuals are embedded in a particular social situation do not act in an automatic 
manner neither are they detached from the wider societal context in which they are 
embedded. 90 His research regarding the underlife of ‘total institutions’ is particularly 
insightful for the study of military subjectivity insofar as it shows that, although 
confined to particular contexts, individuals manoeuvre through the social rules that are 
imposed on them by completely or partially challenging the symbolic order in which 
they are situated.91 Goffman regarded asylums, hospitals, prisons, and other similar 
establishments as total institutions. These are ‘defined as a place of residence and work 
where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an 
appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of 
life’.92 This definition echoes the characteristics of a military insofar recruits spend a 
considerable amount of time with their peers, are confined to their barracks, and are 
subjected to their superiors’ orders and instructions for the purposes of achieving their 
tasks. In his work, the author dwelled extensively on the ways in which both inmates 
and staff members depart from fixed and scripted patterns of behaviours in order to 
show that every institution hosts an underlife, the assembly of social practices that do 
not conform to official expectations of behaviour in an organisation.  
This research draws upon and extends Goffman’s insights regarding the 
possibility of actors to manoeuvre within the social context in which they are embedded 
and highlights that affective dispositions, emotional investments, and embodied 
experiences reveal the processes through which military recruits accept, reiterate, 
modify, and contest the military culture in which they are socialised. It envisages the 
Israeli soldiering figure as an affective military subjectivity that is constituted through 
embodied experiences, emotional links between citizen-subjects and the military, and 
the affective perceptions regarding military subjectivity in Israel. In this regard, the 
constitution of a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military figure relates 
individual and bodily experiences with the power structures that define military service 
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by emphasising that ‘emotions as clues about the ways that structural violence operates 
and shapes political subjectivities’ in the Israel/Palestine conflict.93  
The Israeli recruits’ readiness to appropriate and perform the official military 
narrative according to which the IDF is professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian 
figure reveals the political implications of circulating personalised military 
representations within the context of the Israel/Palestine conflict. The distribution of 
individualised military representations is important both for the internal dynamic of the 
military and for securing sympathy towards and consent with IDF’s (violent) practices. 
Similarly, Ahmed cautions that ‘when emotions are seen as only personal, or about the 
person and how they feel, then the systematic nature of their effects is concealed’.94 
Therefore, the examination of embodied representations of military subjectivity and 
their circulation in the local and international sphere permits the understanding of ‘the 
continued seductions of war for those [Israeli citizen-subjects] who practise it’.95 For 
instance, the IDF use social media in order to circulate pictures with young male or 
female recruits while having fun, laughing, relaxing, and performing humanitarian 
actions. Through an intimate introduction to military service through the lens of digital 
military representations, the IDF indicate that military service is a pleasant and 
rewarding activity, and show their readiness to permit recruits to keep in touch with 
their closed ones. Therefore, the circulation of individualised representations of 
military service enables the Israeli military to appeal to the attractive nature of military 
service in order to foster support, appreciation, and respect for their practices while 
silencing criticism against their war fighting roles and their presence in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. Despite that the IDF’s use of social media in order to invite 
support for the Israeli military shows that ‘emotions are often institutionalised, 
incorporated and, eventually, deeply embedded in the processes and structures of world 
politics’, the military personnel negotiate the construction of their subjectivity by 
troubling and altering the military culture within which they are socialised.96 Since 
emotions reveal ‘links between the subjective and the cultural, individual and social, 
self and other, inside and outside’, the constitution the Israeli military subjectivity 
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shows recruits manoeuvre between their affective investment in idealised 
representations of military subjectivity, and their passionate efforts to question the 
socialisation processes within which they are embedded.97 
 
Conclusion 
With a focus on the productive power of emotions in the Israel/Palestine 
conflict, the chapter builds on feminist investigations of war, violence, and emotions. 
It argues the professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military figure represents 
an affective frame of soldiering that informs tolerance for the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians by sanctioning, concealing, and depoliticising the military’s violent 
behaviour in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It shows military subjectivity is 
constructed through a variety of social practices (educational, aesthetic, rhetorical, 
commemoration, forensic, legal and respectively, bureaucratic ones) that embody, 
disseminate, and invite emotions for the purposes of constituting a romanticised 
military (self-)image. This benign military (self-)representation defines the Israeli civil-
military relations and governs the Israeli citizen-solders’ emotions, attitudes, ideas, 
views, and desires towards the military. Due to its role in nurturing trust in and a 
positive public perception towards the IDF, this idealised military subjectivity confines 
the investigation, prosecution, and condemnation of the Israeli forces’ violent 
behaviour in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In order to support this claim, Michel 
Foucault’s remarks regarding regimes of truth are reinforced with Judith Butler’s 
insights concerning frames of war in order to show a romanticised military figure 
defines civil-military relations in Israel by sustaining an emotional link between the 
society and the military. Within this context, this idealised military representation 
permits the manifestation of violence as ‘justifiable ways of warring’, enables the 
shifting of responsibilities between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, allows the 
downplaying of the political implications of violence, and naturalises the harmful 
manifestation of violence. 98  Therefore, the chapter highlights certain Israeli 
institutions, actors, and figures possess social and political capital to define the 
dominant socio-political order of the Israeli society. They construct and disseminate a 
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romanticised military subjectivity by imposing ‘hierarchies of credibility’ that ‘are 
undoing facile distinctions between reliable and conjured information, between fact and 
fantasy, between mad paranoia and political reality’ regarding the Israeli military’s 
violence against Palestinians.99   
Furthermore, this positive military figure nurtures tolerance towards the IDF’s 
violence against Palestinians by securing affinity for the Israeli military and 
respectively, hostility towards Palestinians. Sara Ahmed’s remarks that emotions define 
exclusion from and belonging to a particular political community highlight the claim 
that Israel’s idealised military image is constructed through emotional readings of 
Palestinian and Israeli Jewish subjects. These affective engagements envisage the 
Israeli Jewish and Palestinian bodies through racialised and gendered hierarchies that 
legitimise the Israeli military’s violence against Palestinians. In this respect, the chapter 
stresses that emotions are ‘entangled with discourse, meaning making, and practice’, 
and imbue bodies with emotional readings by distinguishing between who should be 
admired, mourned, desired and who should be opposed, feared, and excluded from the 
Israeli socio-political order.100  
Finally, yet significantly, this chapter emphasises that the Israeli military 
‘subject is both formative and forming’ and ‘it both embraces and resist the norms that 
subject it’.101 While detaching from a traditional understanding of military subjectivity 
in terms of self-restraint, it emphasises that emotions define military socialisation 
processes and presents the constitution of a professional, non-threatening, and 
humanitarian military figure as an affective military subjectivity. It shows that feelings, 
affective dispositions, and emotional attachments that underline the socialisation of 
citizen-subjects in the Israeli military culture reveal a complex relation between recruits 
and the military, a link that involves acceptance, reiteration, and alteration of the 
military ethos. The following chapter studies the pedagogical practices pursued by the 
IDF’s Education and Youth Corps and by its affiliated institutions in order to craft the 
Israeli military subjectivity. Influenced by the power struggle between secular and 
religious actors to shape military education, didactic activities work with and through 
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recruits’ affective dispositions for the purposes of envisaging military service as an 
opportunity to develop remarkable skills that serve their civil and military lives alike. 
In this regard, military education constitutes an idealised Israeli military subject by 
presenting military service as a medium of becoming a proficient, competent, and 
skilled citizen-soldier. 
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Chapter 2: From Yad Vashem to Serving at the Checkpoint: 
Military Education in Israel 
 
Military education plays an important role in the socio-construction of the 
Israeli military. The IDF’s Education and Youth Corps spearheads the didactic 
activities that socialise military personnel in the Israeli military culture. Founded in 
1957, the Education and Youth Corps emerged from the pre-state military units, 
Haganah, Palmach, and Irgun. Each of them had officers that were tasked with shaping 
unit members’ morale and political consciousness.1 The Education and Youth Corps 
organises workshops or seminars for commanders, prepares activities for the 
incorporation of minorities and immigrants in the Israeli military and society, or 
coordinates the organisation of seminars concerning the history of the IDF. 2  
Furthermore, it designs an array of pedagogical practices and activities meant to 
enhance the attachment of the Israeli military personnel to the Israeli state, and to teach 
them Israeli Jewish and universal values, norms, and beliefs that should serve their 
military and civilian identities alike. These didactic practices are important for the 
socialisation of recruits in the Israeli military culture because the IDF do not see any 
difference between inculcating values through pedagogical practices, educating 
citizens, and carrying combat operations. Avner Shalev, a former head of the Publishing 
Branch of the Education and Youth Corps, and later a chief officer for the Education 
and Youth Corps, stresses the significance of the Israeli military service in the following 
manner: 
 
‘The soldier needs a sense of purpose, which arouses in him the 
willingness to fight, and the willingness to give his most precious 
thing – his life…[E]ducation is aimed to bring the soldier to 
willingness, which means a willing decision, resulted from knowing 
and identifying with the purpose’.3 
                                                        
1 Perko, F. M. ‘Education, Socialization, and Development of National Identity: The American 
Common School and Israel Defense Forces in Transnational Perspective’, Shofar: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Jewish Studies, 21 (2003) p. 109. 
2 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Education and Youth Corps’, IDF Blog. 
3 Avner Shalev quoted in Nets-Zehngut, R. ‘The Israeli Army’s Official Memory of the 1948 
Palestinian Exodus, 1949-2004’, War in History, 22 (2015) p. 218.  
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This chapter examines the pedagogical practices pursued by the IDF’s 
Education and Youth Corps in order to socialise (future) military personnel in the Israeli 
military culture. It argues didactic practices such as seminars about the Israeli Jewish 
identity, lectures about Zionism and social responsibility, sessions about military ethics, 
or field trips to historical sites, Jerusalem or Tel Aviv encourage the Israeli (future) 
recruits to work with and through their emotions in order to create a virtuous military 
subjectivity. Influenced by the competition between secular and religious voices in 
shaping military ethos, these pedagogical practices nurture an exemplary military 
subjectivity that sustains the belief that the IDF is ‘the most moral army in the world’, 
and restricts the possibility to hold the Israeli military personnel accountable for their 
violent behaviour against Palestinians.  
There is an emerging interest in the pedagogical practices through which 
young men and women are socialised in the Israeli military culture. For instance, James 
Eastwood argues didactic practices through which the Israeli (future) recruits are taught 
military ethics cultivate the IDF’s militaristic ethos, which reinforces aggressiveness, 
violence, and harm against Palestinians. 4  Udi Lebel suggests the Israeli military 
educational programmes are heavily influenced by religious authorities and expresses 
concerns regarding the possible emergence of a theocratic Israeli military.5 The chapter 
builds on this literature and claims pedagogical practices contribute to the emergence 
of an Israeli military subjectivity that limits criticism against the IDF’s violent 
practices, and that shields the Israeli military personnel from accountability for their 
violent behaviour against Palestinians. With a focus on the importance of emotions in 
shaping military subjectivity, it shows the IDF is constructed through pedagogical 
practices that invite the Israeli recruits to work with and through their affective 
dispositions in order to become exemplary citizen-soldiers. Didactic military practices 
nurture an idealised military subjectivity that is characterised by heroism, vulnerability, 
and care for the self and others while envisaging military service as an opportunity of 
personal growth that equips recruits with competences that serve both their military and 
civilian careers. Nevertheless, the cultivation and circulation of this romanticised 
military image carries significant consequences for the Israel/Palestine conflict. It 
contributes to the emergence of a narrative that denies Palestinian history and suffering, 
                                                        
4 Eastwood, ‘ ‘Meaningful Service’: Pedagogy at Israeli pre-military academies’, pp. 671-95. 
5 Lebel, ‘Settling the Military’, pp. 361-90. 
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and elevates the exemplary and irreproachable qualities of the Israeli military personnel 
at the detriment of Palestinians, who are considered the source of the Israeli forces’ 
violent behaviour in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 6  The constitution and 
distribution of this idealised military figure between civil and military spheres limits 
criticism against the Israeli military personnel’s violent practices, and masks their 
violent behaviour under the guise of exceptionality, recklessness, and ordinary breaches 
of military discipline.  
The chapter is organised in three sections with the first studying a number of 
pedagogical practices through which the Education and Youth Corps teaches history 
and memory to the Israeli recruits. These didactic practices work with recruits’ affective 
dispositions of devotion, patriotism, and readiness to defend the Israeli collective body 
in order to cultivate an affective connection between the Israeli military personnel and 
the State of Israel. The following section continues the study of the efforts pursued by 
the Israeli military to enhance the affective attachment between recruits and the state 
by presenting the pedagogical practices organised by BINA: The Jewish Movement for 
Social Change (hereafter BINA). This is a secular pre-military academy that offers 
educational programmes to the (future) Israeli military personnel under the umbrella of 
the IDF’s Education and Youth Corps. Its educational activities aim to endow the Israeli 
recruits with a pluralistic understanding of the Israeli Jewish identity. The final section 
reinforces the presentation of military service as a practice of personal development by 
examining the pedagogical practices pursued by Beit Morasha of Jerusalem: The 
Center for Advanced Judaic Studies and Leadership (hereafter Beit Morasha). This pre-
military academy offers ethical military training to the Israeli units engaged in urban 
operations in the West Bank. The chapter concludes by arguing the cultivation and 
dissemination of a virtuous military subjectivity confines the investigation, prosecution, 
and condemnation of the IDF’s violent behaviour against Palestinians and intervenes 
in the Israel/Palestine conflict by denying Palestinians a connection with land, by 
situating them in the position of a fearsome enemy, and by imagining them as objects 
of the Israeli forces’ compassion.   
 
                                                        
6 Grassiani, E. ‘Moral othering at the checkpoint: The case of Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians’, 
Critique of Anthropology, 35 (2015) pp. 373-88. 
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Teaching Memory and History in the IDF 
A number of activities that fall under the umbrella of the IDF’s Education and 
Youth Corps are outsourced to civilian institutions, associations and organisations with 
significant implications for the Israel/Palestine conflict and the education of the Israeli 
citizen-soldiers. The Education and Youth Corps collaborates with state institutions like 
Yad Vashem (The Holocaust Remembrance Authority), with Yitzhak Rabin Center or 
with military museums that function under the authority of the Ministry of Defence in 
order to conduct pedagogical activities for military units and future recruits. 7  For 
instance, thousands of soldiers visit Yad Vashem every year in order to learn about the 
Holocaust and about the history of the Jewish people. Visits to the Holocaust 
remembrance site (re)create a community of feeling between the Israeli soldier-citizens, 
and remind them of their responsibility to defend the Israeli Jewish nation in order to 
avoid the reiteration of the painful Jewish past. Sergeant Roni Tzach, a soldier-guide 
that conducts tours for military units at Yad Vashem, observes tours for Israeli recruits 
enhance the emotional link between citizen-soldiers and the Israeli Jewish nation. Thus 
visits at the Holocaust remembrance site: 
 
‘[C]onnect soldiers to the history of their nation. The moment 
soldiers understand what happened in the past, their feelings to 
protect the nation strengthen. The connection between the soldiers 
and Yad Vashem is not always innate – some have little connection 
to the Holocaust – but at the moment they see their history, they are 
reminded of their duty’.8  
 
The experiential trips to Yad Vashem represent an affective memory practice 
that enables military personnel to be ‘transported from the present to an earlier time 
through sight, smell, perception of their own bodies and the touching of certain objects’ 
while being physically and emotionally present at the Holocaust memorial site. 9 
Sergeant Tal Hagey’s description of the significance of visiting the Hall of Names 
highlights the significance of the affective experience of visiting the Holocaust 
                                                        
7 Blau, ‘Inside the IDF’. 
8 Sergeant Roni Tzach quoted in the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘The soldier-guides of the Holocaust 
Museum’.   
9 Sepúlveda dos Santos, M. ‘Museums and Memory: The Enchanted Modernity’, Journal for Cultural 
Research, 7 (2003) p. 37.  
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memorial: ‘All the names and the details of all the people who were murdered are inside 
that hall. The gallery is painful but extends responsibility to all those who have been 
there. It’s the place that touches me the most’.10 These words recall that memory is a 
political project that informs collective identity and that works through emotions in 
order to recreate and transform the present. Likewise, Susan Sontag argues that:  
 
‘Collective memory is not a remembering but a stipulating: that this 
is important, and this is the story about how it happened, with the 
pictures that lock the story in our minds. Ideologies create 
substantiating archives of images, representative images, which 
encapsulate common ideas of significance and trigger predictable 
thoughts, feelings’.11  
 
These visits insist on the collective memory of Israel in order to reiterate the 
soldier-citizens’ responsibility for defending Israel. The affective significance of Yad 
Vashem is related not only to its presentation as a landscape of memorialisation, but 
also to its role in reminding recruits that the Holocaust informed the creation of the state 
they should serve, defend, and possibly sacrifice for. Purposely, visits at the Holocaust 
remembrance site provide citizen-soldiers with ‘an understanding of what happened in 
the past by artificially causing insecurity in the present’.12 Therefore, visits at Yad 
Vashem invite service personnel to think about himself or herself  
 
‘as a potential victim, not an actual one. It is that request that enables 
the possibility of a transformation, of action to prevent future 
Holocausts. The model works by activating the expression of 
empathy in the present, rather than for past victims. Rather than 
offering an unrealistic claim to experience the past or, even more 
simply, information about the past, this model provides a glimpse into 
                                                        
10 Sergeant Tal Hagey quoted in the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘The soldier-guides of the Holocaust 
Museum’ [emphasis added]. 
11 Sontag, S. Regarding the Pain of Others (New York, Picador, 2004), [emphasis in original] p. 86.  
12 Sepúlveda dos Santos, ‘Museums and Memory’, p. 38. 
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ongoing grief. The past is not, therefore, disconnected from 
present’.13 
 
Through its pedagogical purpose in encouraging the Israeli servicemen and 
women to think of themselves as victims, Yad Vashem shows that ‘as part of 
educational system (…) museums are not just places where emotions have been 
controlled: they have become institutions specialized in promoting certain types of 
emotion’.14 However, the prevalence of the collective memory of the Holocaust in 
Israel situates Palestinians behind an emotional barrier that perpetuates conflict in the 
Middle East. The former Knesset Speaker, Avraham Burg, bitterly remarks that: 
 
‘Few people in Israel are willing to try to perceive reality through a 
different set of conceptual lenses other than those of extermination 
and defensive isolation. Few are willing to try on the glasses of 
understanding and of hope for dialogue. Instead, the question is 
always: Is a second Shoah on the way?’.15  
 
Burg’s words liken the antagonism between Israeli Jews and Palestinians with 
the profound psychological legacy of the Holocaust in Israel. Nevertheless, a variety of 
other emotional, social, and political constraints prevent the majority of Israelis from 
acknowledging Palestinians and their history. The helplessness of the Diaspora Jews in 
front of the Nazi genocide, the Arab resistance to Jewish emigration in the 1930, the 
myth of the David and Goliath or the discourses that liken Israel’s Arab enemies with 
Adolf Hitler hinder the Israeli recognition of Palestinian narratives of war, loss, and 
violence.16 These historical and political symbols echo during the continuous cycle of 
mutual harm and violence between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, and have contributed 
to presenting any threat as a new Holocaust in the Israeli socio-political narrative. More 
significantly, Ruth Linn has studied the role of the Holocaust symbol in cultivating 
                                                        
13 Witcomb, A. ‘Remembering the dead by affecting the living: the case of a miniature model of 
Treblinka’, in Museum Materialities: Objects, Engagements, Interpretations, edited by Sandra H. 
Dudley (London and New York, Routledge, 2010), [emphasis in original] p. 47.  
14 Sepúlveda dos Santos, ‘Museums and Memory’, p. 37. 
15 Burg, A. ‘Holocaust’s unholy hold’. Los Angeles Times, 16 November 2008. Available at: 
http://www.latimes.com/la-oe-burg16-2008nov16-story.html [Accessed 5 June 2017]. 
16 Fierke, K. M. ‘Who is my neighbour? Memories of the Holocaust/al Nakba and a global ethic of 
care’, European Journal of International Relations, 20 (2014) pp. 787-809. 
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military subjectivity and shows the Israeli soldiers resort to its collective memory in 
weighing on their consent or refusal to serve in the IDF. Some Israeli soldiers and 
officers express their concern about dying in vain during combat by likening this 
possible event to the image of the passive Diaspora Jew that died during the Holocaust. 
Other soldiers draw parallels between their experiences in Lebanon and life in the 
extermination camps. Some others have refused to serve in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip by associating military service with guarding camps in Poland. 17  Soldiers’ 
references to the Holocaust that accompany personal narratives of military service and 
the experiential visits organised by the Education and Youth Corps show the Holocaust 
functions as a symbolic and affective archive that helps the Israeli military personnel 
to negotiate, perform, and validate their military service.   
Nonetheless, the role of the Education and Youth Corps in educating the Israeli 
citizen-soldiers came under attack in 2012, in the aftermath of an investigation pursued 
by journalists from the newspaper Haaretz.18 They discovered this unit cooperates not 
only with state institutions but also with right wing, religious organisations such as Ir 
David Foundation – Elad (which advocates the building of settlements in Silwan – a 
neighbourhood located in East Jerusalem in the proximity of the Old City) or Ascent 
(established in Safed in order to reconnect people with the Jewish spiritual 
experience).19 Ascent of Safed, founded in 1983, pursues a vast amount of activities in 
three languages: Hebrew, English and Russian. It conducts hikes, Kabbalistic studies 
and meditations or hosts Shabbat dinners. This organisation proudly emphasises that 
‘the latest addition is seminars (…) tailored specially to the needs of Israeli soldiers, at 
the request of the IDF itself! [emphasis in original]’.20 Ir David − Elad Foundation was 
established in 1986 by a former commander of an elite military unit in order to 
safeguard, promote, and disseminate the legacy of the biblical past of the City of David. 
According to the website of the Foundation, its ‘educational programming geared 
towards Israeli students, adults and soldiers reconnects them with their history and 
heritage’.21  
                                                        
17 Linn, R. ‘Holocaust Metaphors and Symbols in the Moral Dilemmas of Contemporary Israeli 
Soldiers’, Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 6 (1991) pp. 61-86. 
18 Blau, ‘Inside the IDF’. 
19 Ir David (City of David) Foundation, The Ir David Foundation.  Available at: 
http://www.cityofdavid.org.il/en/The-Ir-David-Foundation [Accessed 5 June 2017]; Ascent, Ascent 
Today. Available at: http://ascentofsafed.com/cgi-bin/ascent.cgi?Name=Hostel [Accessed 5 June 
2017]. 
20 Ascent, Ascent Today. 
21 Ir David (City of David) Foundation, About Ir David Foundation. 
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Ir Amim (City of Peoples), a left wing non-profit organisation that promotes 
socio-economic, political, and cultural equality amongst all the inhabitants of 
Jerusalem, discovered that Ir David – Elad distorts the presentation of the history of the 
City of David by refusing to include insights regarding the Byzantine and the early 
Muslim periods when the city experienced a prosperous life.22 One of the officers cited 
in Ir Amim’s report about Ir David – Elad’s activities disclosed that during his 
participation at a tour in Jerusalem, the guide ‘talked only about the Jewish narrative. 
They didn’t mention the Palestinian residents; as if they jumped over 2000 years of 
history’.23 Furthermore, one of the guides that conducts these tours for the Israeli 
military personnel stressed that ‘it is important for me to emphasize that we have to be 
here. On one of the tours I said that it was a village of terrorists and murderers until we 
settled here, and then an Arab neighbor started yelling at me’.24 Another infantry officer 
that participated at a tour in Jerusalem disclosed that ‘when the discussion touched on 
Arabs − not necessarily even Palestinians − it was stopped’.25 During other field trips 
organised by Ir David – Elad, soldiers are asked to observe the settlement of Silwan 
during their itinerary in Jerusalem. However, they are not told this is a site of continuous 
violent tension between Jewish settlers and Palestinian inhabitants.26  
The involvement of Ir David – Elad in didactic military practices indicates the 
politicisation of military education in Israel and the efforts pursued by right wing 
religious organisations to define the Israeli forces’ relation with Israel and its history. 
The cooperation of the IDF’s Education and Youth Corps with organisations that 
promote nationalistic and religious views that exclude Palestinians contradicts the 
military’s official support for pluralism and shows its dislike for controversial topics 
that might lead to military dissent.27  The field trips organised by Ir David – Elad 
resignify, naturalise, and de-historicises the Palestinian presence in and beyond 
Jerusalem thus equipping military personnel with a truncated historical knowledge that 
serves the conventional Israeli perspectives on the Israel/Palestine conflict. By 
presenting the Israeli military personnel with an abridged history of the region, 
institutions like Ir David – Elad deny the attachment of the Palestinian collective body 
                                                        
22 Ir Amim, ‘Shady Dealings in Silwan’.  
23 Ir Amim, ‘Shady Dealings in Silwan’, p. 29.  
24 Ir Amim, ‘Shady Dealings in Silwan’, p. 29. 
25 Infantry officer quoted in Blau, ‘Inside the IDF’. 
26 Blau, ‘Inside the IDF’. 
27 Haaretz Editorial, ‘The Education of the Settlers’ Army’. Haaretz, 6 June 2013. Available at: 
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.528063 [Accessed 2 September 2017]. 
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to the region and try to ‘affect [citizen-soldiers’] chains of associations of memory 
related to who legitimately “belongs” and “does not belong” in and to the land’.28 In 
this regard, the pedagogical military practices that erase Palestinian narrative and 
subjectivity illustrate the significance of memory in constituting the Israeli military 
subjectivity that serves both as an instrument for national building and a tool for 
national defence. The use of memory in constituting the Israeli soldiering figure shows 
that: 
 
‘social groups construct their own images of the world by constantly 
shaping and reshaping versions of the past. This process defines 
groups and enables them to create boundaries that separate them from 
other groups that share different memories of the past, or perhaps, 
different interpretations of the same occurrences’.29 
 
Furthermore, the efforts pursued by Ir David – Elad to equip the Israeli 
servicemen and women with a Jewish narrative represents an encouragement for them 
to cultivate affiliation and attachment towards Eretz Israel, the biblical, religious, 
historical, and cultural name for the Land of Israel. The endowment of servicemen and 
women with Jewish values, narratives, and principles is important for the IDF because 
the Israeli military is perceived as the army of the Jewish people. The ‘Spirit of IDF’, a 
document distributed to recruits and discussed at length during their training, is a brief 
summary of the Israeli military principles, values, and beliefs. It also represents the 
moral compass that should guide the Israeli military personnel’s behaviour during their 
service. Among values such as ‘Comradeship’, ‘Purity of arms’, ‘Discipline’, or 
‘Professionalism’, the document emphasises three main principles that should guide 
recruits’ behaviour: ‘Defense of the State, its Citizens and Residents’, ‘Patriotism and 
Loyalty to the State’, and ‘Human Dignity’.30 Within this document, ‘Patriotism and 
Loyalty to the State’ requires the Israeli recruits to recognise that military ‘service in 
the IDF is based on patriotism and on commitment and devotion to the State of Israel – 
                                                        
28 Curti, G. H. ‘From a wall of bodies to a body of walls: Politics of affect | Politics of memory | 
Politics of war’, Emotion, Space and Society, 1 (2008) p. 110. 
29 Neiger, M., Meyers, O. and Zandberg, E. ‘On Media Memory: Editors’ Introduction’, in On Media 
Memory: Collective Memory in a New Media Age, edited by Motti Neiger, Oren Meyers and Eyal 
Zandberg (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 3. 
30 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Ten Fundamental Values: The Spirit of IDF’, IDF Blog, 2 November 
2011, Available at: https://www.idfblog.com/2011/11/02/the-spirit-of-the-idf/ [Accessed 5 June 2017].  
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a democratic state which is the national home of the Jewish people – and to its citizens 
and residents’.31 Setting aside the tensions between presenting Israel as a Jewish and 
democratic state alike, the principle that asks recruits to show loyalty and to act with 
patriotism depends on equipping Israeli military personnel with a Jewish belief system 
and narrative.  
Research shows the Israeli recruits are ready to accept and use the Jewish 
belief system and narrative in justifying military service thus indicating serious 
consequences for the Israel/Palestine conflict. Hanne Eggen Røslien has studied the 
Israeli forces’ narratives of military service and argues that some recruits rely on a 
Jewish narrative in order to recount their military experiences. For instance, they justify 
their presence in Bethlehem, Hebron, or Nablus on the basis of Jewish religious 
narratives that identify these places as rightfully belonging to the Israeli Jewish 
people.32 Similarly, Nir Gazit’s examination of soldiers’ presence in Hebron shows the 
efforts pursued by the military to cultivate an affective relation between military 
personnel and the places in which they serve. According to this research, the Israeli 
soldiers explore the city of Hebron, during their first days of military service, in order 
to familiarise themselves with the area and to assert a de facto sovereignty over Hebron. 
Through their patrolling, soldiers are encouraged to develop an affective affiliation 
between themselves and Hebron, a city that, beyond its specific security needs, carries 
religious and political significance for Israel.33 The infusion of military service with 
religious symbolism in order to cultivate the Israeli military personnel’s attachment 
towards Eretz Israel contradicts the military’s support for pluralism and 
multiculturalism, justifies the IDF’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as 
a means to defend Israel’s land, and poses a significant threat in the eventuality of a 
conflict resolution in the region. Having to confront a possible departure from the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, military personnel might refuse to follow orders by 
asserting their religious affiliation with the territories occupied.  
Finally, yet significantly, the educational practices proposed by the IDF’s 
Education and Youth Corps equip recruits with a conventional and abridged narrative 
                                                        
31 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Ten Fundamental Values’. 
32 Røslien, H. E. ‘Where is the State of Israel? Testimonies from IDF Nachal soldiers on Israel’s 
territorial integrity’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 44 (2017) pp. 130-45.  
33 Gazit, N. ‘Social Agency, Spatial Practices, and Power: The Micro-foundations of Fragmented 
Sovereignty in the Occupied Territories’, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 22 
(2009) p. 91. 
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regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict. Rafi Nets-Zehngut has investigated the 
publications disseminated between 1950s and 2000s to the Israeli military personnel. 
He concluded that the Israeli military has circulated material illustrating the Palestinian 
voluntary flight during the 1948 Nakba despite awareness that in various instances, 
Palestinians were expelled from their villages and houses by the IDF.34 These findings 
highlight the production of a self-serving historical narrative as a means to shield the 
Israeli military from internal and external criticism and to cultivate among the Israeli 
recruits attachment, belonging, and patriotism towards the Israeli state. Criticising the 
practices of the Education and Youth Corps, Yagil Levy stresses the unit rarely 
appreciates post-Zionist critical accounts and highlights that, during tours in Jerusalem, 
‘[t]he army does not take officers to Deir Yassin [in West Jerusalem, a site of a massacre 
of civilians by Jewish forces in 1948], or to Arab villages whose inhabitants were 
expelled and then repopulated by Jews’.35 Furthermore, he deplores that a ‘visit to the 
Etzion Bloc allows a stop at a [West Bank] settlement which enjoys relatively broad 
public support, but of course nothing is said about the local Palestinians’.36  
The didactic activities organised by the Education and Youth Corps cultivate 
an affective connection between the military personnel and the Israeli Jewish nation 
that enhances their desire and readiness to defend Israel. A reiteration of the importance 
of the Holocaust in the history of Israel, an abridged historical discourse regarding the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, and religious symbolism show the Israeli military pedagogical 
practices carry important implications for the Middle East conflict. The pedagogical 
practices that teach history and memory imbue the Israeli recruits and military 
personnel with a historical and socio-cultural narrative that denies Palestinian 
attachment to the land, positions them as aliens, and defends the justness of the Israeli 
rhetoric regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict. The Education and Youth Corps 
complements its educational practices by collaborating with the Israeli pre-military 
academies tasked with organising seminars, lectures, and field trips through which 
(future) recruits and military personnel cultivate their Israeli Jewish identities as part of 
their military ethos. 
 
                                                        
34 Nets-Zehngut, ‘The Israeli Army’s Official Memory’, p. 221.  
35 Blau, ‘Inside the IDF’.  
36 Blau, ‘Inside the IDF’. 
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BINA’s Struggle for Recognition: Teaching Pluralism in the Military 
amid National Religious Influence  
The Israeli pre-military academies prepare high school students for military 
service in a similar way with military academies in the United States of America. By 
attending these institutions, young Israeli men and women defer their military service 
for twelve to eighteen months to pursue a preparatory programme that entails physical 
and intellectual training during which they enhance their cultural heritage knowledge, 
pursue combat preparation, and attend seminars about history and military ethics.37 Pre-
military academies are categorised according to their profile: secular (emphasising 
pluralism), religious (highlighting the study of the Torah) and respectively, mixed ones 
(bringing together religious and non-religious students). At the time of writing, there 
were twenty-four mixed and secular pre-military academies and twenty-two religious 
ones. 38  In spite of their eclectic profile, all pre-military academies endeavor to 
contribute to the integration of recruits in the military and to enhance their socio-
cultural and military skills in order to serve the Israeli society as exemplary citizens and 
soldiers.  
 The pedagogical activities pursued by pre-military academies reflect the 
beliefs of the Education and Youth Corps that military service should endow recruits 
with national values and skills to debate and reflect upon the society and the world in 
which they live. Among the array of pre-military academies that collaborate with the 
Education and Youth Corp, Beit Morasha and BINA occupy very significant places. 
First, both institutions advance pluralist and inclusive vision through the blending of 
Jewish and multicultural values. Second, they distinguish themselves from their 
religious counterparts and stress the importance of listening to a multiplicity of voices 
during their seminars and workshops. Third, these pre-military academies offer 
educational programmes both to the Israeli future recruits and active military personnel. 
Finally, yet significantly, both organisations pride themselves for their unique features 
and contribution to the educational activities pursued by the Israeli military personnel. 
BINA claims to be the only organisation that offers educational programmes for majors 
in the IDF, whereas Beit Morasha of Jerusalem has supported the military in drafting 
‘Identity and Purpose – Israel Defense Forces’. This is the core document that provides 
                                                        
37 Lebel, ‘Settling the Military’, pp. 365-66. 
38 Eastwood, ‘ ‘Meaningful Service’: Pedagogy at Israeli pre-military academies’, pp. 677-9. 
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the Education and Youth Corps with guidelines for designing military pedagogical 
activities. This section studies the functioning of BINA and its struggle to assert 
authority against religious pre-military academies, and the final one investigates the 
ethical pedagogical activities offered by Beit Morasha. 
 
Pluralism, Social Responsibility, and Valuable Professional Skills at BINA 
BINA presents itself as a socio-cultural space that promotes dialogue and 
pluralism regarding the Israeli Jewish identity. It emerged in the aftermath of Yitzhak 
Rabin’s assassination, an event that indicated a growing societal division in Israel.39 A 
staff member associated BINA’s establishment, and its interest in developing 
educational programmes for the (future) Israeli military personnel, with the secular 
Israeli Jews’ disenchantment with military service:  
 
‘There was a feeling in the army twenty years ago, there was a sense 
that secular Israelis became disconnected from their purpose: “Why 
am I here?”, “Why I am defending this country?”, “Why I am 
defending the Jewish people?”, “Why am I defending the Jewish 
state?”, “What does it mean to be Jewish?”, “What does it mean to be 
a Jewish State?” ’.40 
 
The disillusionment with military service is associated with the Ashkenazi 
Jews’ relative reluctance to serve in the IDF. Ashkenazi Jews are Jews of European 
origin, who have emigrated from Jewish communities from Germany and the Central 
and Eastern Europe during the late 1800s and early 1900s. They have played an 
important role in the founding of Israel, have become the embodiment of the Sabra in 
the aftermath of the establishment of the Israeli state, and they are associated with the 
secular, liberal, middle and upper classes in Israel. Publicly presented as a ‘motivation 
crisis’, this disappointment with military service is rooted in the circumstances that 
surrounded the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the First War in Lebanon in 1982, and 
has been accentuated throughout time by the military’s prolonged stay in Southern 
                                                        
39 BINA: The Jewish Movement for Social Change, About BINA. Available at: 
https://bina.org.il/en/about-bina/ [Accessed 5 June 2017].  
40 Public outreach staff member, BINA, May 2015.  
  70 
Lebanon, by the Oslo Peace Process, and by the continued military occupation of 
Palestinian people. Equally significant, due to their privileged position in the Israeli 
society and to Israel’s adjustment to the requirements of a market economy, Ashkenazi 
Jews have found other means of developing their professional careers that do not 
require them to perform their compulsory military service. 41  More significantly, 
Ashkenazi Jews privileged position has situated the Mizrahi Jews into a lower socio-
economic and political condition. The latter origin from today’s Iraq, Iran, Egypt, 
Algeria or Morocco and their emigration to Israel started in the aftermath of the Arab-
Israeli War of the 1948, when they were either expelled or left voluntarily from their 
country of origin. Nevertheless, their integration in the Israeli society situated them in 
an inferior position partly because of the Zionist movement’s roots in European and 
Enlightenment values that placed Ashkenazi Jews at the forefront of a civilising process 
in the Middle East. Confronted with this discourse, the arrival of the Mizrahi Jews was 
met with discrimination and intolerance, whose legacy continues today. They have been 
allocated housing on the margins of their communities, they have been relegated to 
performing low-skilled jobs, and have been assigned to less prestigious brigades or to 
performing menial tasks in the military.42 Finally, yet significantly, the reluctance of 
the Ashkenazi Jews determined their Mizrahi counterparts to fill in the places vacated 
by the former, especially combat positions, for the purposes of enhancing their socio-
economic perspectives.43   
Witnessing the reluctance of the Ashkenazi Jews to serve in the military, 
Major General Elazar Stern, a former commander of the officer-training base (1993-
96), played an important role in designing educational activities that would help 
servicemen and women to develop a sense of identity and to reconnect them with the 
purpose of military service. His argument was very simple: 
 
‘A Jewish officer who disinclines to say ‘I’m proud to be a Jew, and 
cannot explain the reason for the pride he takes in [his identity] to his 
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subordinates for at least 20 minutes will fail to win the war ... I have 
no doubt that it is our job to complement this by teaching them to be 
proud of their Jewish identity, even if sometimes it lacks religious 
faith’.44  
 
Elazar believed Israeli officers are pivotal in strengthening the Israeli Jewish 
identity of their units insofar as they serve as examples whose beliefs and behaviours 
should be emulated by soldiers across the military. For him, the cultivation of an Israeli 
Jewish identity was more important than teaching officers military strategy. He 
adamantly stressed, ‘I am not convinced that it is necessary to have read General von 
Clausewitz. Instead, I would teach poetry written by [Israeli poets] Rachel, Naomi 
Shemer and Alterman. They will have sufficient time to study Clausewitz’.45 However, 
BINA’s staff members insist that the Israeli military is not only educating soldiers but 
also citizens who will contribute to the development of the Israeli society. This pre-
military academy is committed to sustaining the IDF’s role in nation building by 
equipping the Israeli recruits with a socio-cultural baggage that would enable citizen-
soldiers to have a positive impact upon the Israeli society. BINA is aware nation 
building depends on nurturing an affective connection between the young recruits and 
the society they defend and live in: 
 
‘And it’s important for the people, even when they leave the army, to 
feel a connection. We know the people who go into the army are 
young people who are going into all different positions in the Israeli 
society, and we want to influence them and how they approach the 
society, their Jewish identity, or their civil responsibility in the Israeli 
society’.46 
 
Staff members at this pre-military academy are aware the military is the last 
public institution that can influence Israeli citizens due to its educational features. 
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Specifically, influencing recruits represents a way to shape more broadly the Israeli 
society due to military personnel’s continuous journey between their civilian and 
military lives. In this respect, BINA advances a pluralistic understanding of Judaism 
and Jewish values amongst its students by organising field trips to Jerusalem and Tel 
Aviv, and by designing various educational programmes that teach Zionism, Jewish 
identity, or societal values. It believes ‘military ethos [functions] as a flexible text with 
multiple interpretations that can be deployed in the construction of a range of identities’ 
that would serve the purposes of nation building and state defence in Israel.47 For 
instance, BINA addresses young men and women through the ‘Garin Nahal – military 
track’ and through its pre-military programme. The pre-military programme either 
combines community service with military service or permits recruits to defer their 
military service in order to pursue educational activities that enhance their preparation 
for serving in the IDF.48 A staff member from BINA explained that the pre-military 
program gathers  
 
‘young adults who get permission to defer army service and study 
with us. [The programme includes] three and a half day a week of 
studying Jewish sources, identity, leadership, Jewish values in the 
army, military ethics. In this manner [participants] grow a strong 
social, moral, and emotional preparation for serving in the army. This 
programme is funded in part by the Ministry of Defence and by the 
Ministry of Education’.49 
 
Moreover, ‘Garin Nahal – military track’ permits Israeli young men and 
women to enhance their social responsibility ethos. It enables recruits to develop skills 
that would help them contribute to the wellbeing of the Israeli society by inviting young 
men and women to 
 
‘volunteer and study in underprivileged neighborhoods for a period 
of 6 months to one year and afterwards throughout their military 
                                                        
47 Levy, Y., Lomsky-Feder, E. and Harel, N. ‘From “Obligatory Militarism” to “Contractual 
Militarism” – Competing Models of Citizenship’, Israel Studies, 12 (2007) p. 143. 
48 Public outreach staff member, BINA, May 2015. 
49 Public outreach staff member, BINA, May 2015. 
  73 
service (“garin nahal” military service). They engage in social action 
in the neighborhood and participate in weekly study sessions which 
expose participants to ancient and modern Jewish texts and issues of 
Jewish culture, Zionism, social justice and identity. This program 
fosters a Jewish context for understanding and grounding social 
action and nurtures young leaders with a stronger sense of both 
Jewish identity and social responsibility’.50 
 
Finally, yet significantly, BINA organises seminars and workshop that advance 
a pluralistic understanding of Jewish values and the Israeli society for the purposes of 
educating unit commanders. It hopes to influence not only the IDF’s command level 
but also the soldiers from their unit. According to this pre-military academy,  
 
‘service in the IDF represents a central and influential juncture in the 
lives of most Israelis which, to a great extent, shapes [the] Israeli 
society. BINA seeks to cultivate [a] discourse that fosters inquiry into 
the shared identity in Israeli society as well as contributing its 
perspective to the IDF’s soldiers understanding of Jewish identity 
through various formal and experiential educational activities. 
BINA’s programs are particularly focused on the command level: 
The understanding of officers’ awareness of and connection to 
Judaism as a rich expression of cultural identity in their own lives, 
can have a significant effect on the soldiers under their command, 
during their IDF service and in their lives after discharge’.51 
 
BINA’s activities and guiding philosophy highlight the military’s continuous 
contribution to the process of nation building in Israel. They illustrate David Ben 
Gurion’s vision of ‘good citizenship’ for the purposes of building the State of Israel.52 
His view involved taking ‘root in the homeland, in the history of the nation, its culture 
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and language, its creative efforts and the vision of its future’.53 Thus the educational 
programmes of the Israeli military indicate that the IDF are a site of education that 
teaches young Israelis both to defend the state and to contribute to the realisation of the 
collective goals of the society. 
The role of pre-military academies like BINA in inculcating values, beliefs, 
and ideas that would serve the Israeli military personnel in their civilian lives likens the 
IDF with other Western militaries who envisage military service as an opportunity for 
personal growth. This discourse represents not only a technique to attract further 
recruits to enrol in the military but also a means to enhance the public’s support for the 
Israeli military. For instance, research shows that both Sweden and the United Kingdom 
pursue campaigns of military recruitment that portray the military as site of producing 
‘an enterprising soldier’, according to which military service is a self-regulatory 
practice through which the military subject invests in his or her personal growth.54 
While any comparison between Israel with Sweden and respectively, the United 
Kingdom should take into account that the Israeli army is based on compulsory 
conscription, the British military is an all-volunteer force, and the Swedish government 
has decided to restore a partial compulsory conscription from January 2018, all three 
militaries share the belief that military service represents a social practice of personal 
development.55  
The presentation of military service as a self-growth practice is important not 
only for the purposes of nation building but also for restricting Israelis’ tendency to 
refuse or avoid military service. The decision of the Israeli military to present military 
service as a technique of personal growth relates to the IDF’s concern regarding the 
Israeli Jews’ refusal to serve in the military. The Israeli military has become open to a 
bargaining process during which recruits negotiate the features and restrictions of the 
military service they are to pursue. For instance, the IDF might permit recruits, who 
express moral objections, to serve in rear military positions or to avoid military service 
in politically contentious missions altogether. Furthermore, the military has become 
attentive to parents’ grievances, has improved the conditions of military service, and 
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has increasingly permitted families to contact their children and unit commanders at 
their own convenience.56  
The envisaging of military service as a practice of individual development has 
also increased recruits’ desire to serve in elite combat units or in intelligence units 
because they offer the Israeli youth the possibility to access lucrative professional 
careers in their civilian lives. For example, high school students have perceived their 
participation at pre-military preparatory programmes such as Gadna (a five-day course 
coordinated by the Education and Youth Corps that prepares young Israelis for military 
service) as a waste of time because it cultivates the self-sacrifice model of soldiering 
and exposes the Israeli teenagers to the complexity of regular combat. 57  This military 
representation is hardly of interest for those young Israelis that seek admission in elite 
military units that might not require combat missions. Unsurprisingly, these high-
school students refused to acquiesce to the military discipline imposed during this 
programme and openly defied their course leaders.58 The changing nature of military 
service – from self-sacrifice to self-development – shows not only the Israeli recruits’ 
possibility to shape the purpose and the image of the military according to their own 
interests, but also the readiness of the military to adjust itself to the grievances of its 
(future) members. Within this dynamic civil-military relation, BINA tries to meet 
recruits’ interests to acquire skills that would serve them during their civilian lives. It 
provides them with the opportunity to acquire a set of competences and a socio-cultural 
baggage that maximises recruits’ military and civilian potential alike. BINA’s emphasis 
on social responsibility and on the multicultural feature of the Israeli society cultivates 
a virtuous military subjectivity, which respects societal pluralism and heterogeneity, 
and is devoted to and cares for the Israeli society and state. 
 
BINA’s Pluralism and the Emergence of a National Religious Soldiering Figure  
As a pluralistic military academy, BINA presents itself as a military 
educational alternative to the growing influence of the Military Rabbinate upon the 
IDF’s educational activities. Until 2000s, the Military Rabbinate was in charge of 
administrative issues such as organising military funerals or the observation of dietary 
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laws in the military. Partly influenced by the disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 
2005, the Military Rabbinate established the Jewish Awareness Branch and became 
involved in military educational programmes by organising tours and seminars for 
military personnel. As a consequence, secular voices in the military grew more and 
more worried regarding the influence of national religious authorities within the Israeli 
military. 59  The religious influence over the military materialised in a series of 
controversial episodes. The Military Rabbinate distributed to troops pamphlets 
justifying cruelty against the enemy serving in the Gaza Strip (2008-9).60 Moreover, 
Colonel Ofer Winter was widely condemned by secular voices for his choice to prevent 
a female singer to entertain the Givati Brigade, and for his decision to circulate among 
his unit members a letter that assured the troops of their divine mission during the Israeli 
intervention in the Gaza Strip in 2014.61 As a proof of the growing concern regarding 
the influence of religious authorities within the IDF, the media reported in 2016 that 
under the pressure of secular voices, the Jewish Awareness Branch was moved to the 
military’s Personnel Wing in order to restrict the national religious impact on the 
military ethos.62  
Staff members at BINA disclosed that it was not only difficult to engage 
Orthodox commanders during workshops, but also shared their frustration with the 
availability of state funds for religious pre-military academies at the detriment of the 
secular ones. Concerning teaching Orthodox commanders, an educational officer 
revealed: 
 
‘For people in the army, it is not voluntarily to come here. So some 
of them are happily coming here and they want to study more about 
what we are doing here. Some of them object to what we do, and they 
don’t like what they hear, mostly Orthodox people. For lots of them 
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it’s the first time when they get to study about Judaism in a non-
Orthodox way and that is difficult for them to listen to other 
perspectives. It’s something new what they hear at BINA’.63  
 
Since its establishment, BINA has fought for recognition and for financial 
resources because secular pre-military academies are not subsidised by the state as 
religious pre-military academies are. An educational officer highlighted that ‘when we 
started doing our work with the Education and Youth Corps, there were mainly 
orthodox pre-military organisations working with the army. So we had to fight really 
hard to be legitimised by and work with them’.64 BINA’s fight for recognition and for 
financial resources are interlinked since the Education and Youth Corps takes into 
account the financial cost of the programme offered by these institutions when signing 
a contract of collaboration. Budget limitations determine the Education and Youth 
Corps to collaborate mainly with religious institutions since their educational offer is 
less expensive due to the state subsidies that they receive. Writing for Haaretz, Or 
Kashti investigated the influence of religious pre-military academies in the military. In 
his article, former Education and Youth Corps officers expressed their dismay 
regarding the military’s choice to work with religious institutions because ‘the IDF 
insists that the organizations that want to work with find their own donors. This is why 
most of the activities are run by Orthodox groups, some of them bordering on 
missionary work’.65 Another officer explicitly condemned the Education and Youth 
Corps for its choice to work with religious organisations: ‘It’s troubling that the IDF is 
willing to pay for tanks and food, but when it comes to education it’s all based on 
contributions. Does anyone really believe Ir David’s activities aren’t ideological?’.66 
BINA’s efforts and continuous appeal for donations indicate a growing anxiety 
regarding the role of the religious authorities in the military, and show there is a 
competition between secular and religious voices in defining military ethos and 
subjectivity in Israel.  
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The growing influence of the religious figures in the military is related as well 
with the secular Jews’ disenchantment with military service. Noticing their reluctance 
to serve in the military, the IDF invited religious figures to persuade national religious 
Jews to enlist in the military and to fill in the spaces vacated by secular Jews. National 
religious actors seized the moment and saw the reluctance of secular Jews to serve as 
an opportunity to assert their own influence over the military and the society. By 
equipping recruits with religious beliefs and by providing them with a faith-based 
education, national religious figures perceived the establishment of religious pre-
military academies as an opportunity to impact on the ethos of the military and on the 
overall Israeli society. Religious pre-military academies aim to prepare recruits to 
access the most coveted positions in the military and to reach leadership roles in the 
IDF therefore paving their way to access privileged positions in the Israeli society for 
having performed their service in key roles in the military.67  
Religious pre-military academies teach recruits Zionism, Jewish and Israeli 
values, or military ethics yet infused with religious beliefs. Religious pre-military 
academies are successful in integrating the study of the Talmud and Torah with a 
military ethos that hails the importance of physical strength, leadership values, and 
individual contribution to the collective goals of the military and the society. Moreover, 
religious pre-military academies share with their secular counterparts an emphasis on 
personal growth as a means for (future) military personnel to acquire leadership 
positions in the military and the society.68 By teaching (future) recruits faith-based 
values, religious pre-military academies actively encourage their students to enrol in 
units populated by secular Jews and to compete with their non-religious peers in order 
to climb the ranks of the military.69 Udi Lebel believes religious pre-military academies 
cultivate a novel model of heroism and self-sacrifice, according to which bravery and 
courageousness are infused with spiritual beliefs. Secular Jews, largely of Ashkenazi 
origins, have traditionally represented a model of heroism based on the image of the 
‘New Jew/ess’ who relinquished their religious belief in order to distance 
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himself/herself from the image of the Diaspora Jew. 70 In contrast, religious pre-military 
academies craft a military subjectivity that presents national religious recruits as 
morally superior to the liberal, non-religious, draft-dodgers Ashkenazi Jews and to the 
ultra-orthodox Jews who are largely exempted from military service. Criticising the 
emotional detachment of Ashkenazi Jews from their connection to the Israeli Jewish 
nation and their lack of commitment to defend the nation, religious pre-military 
academies cultivate a new heroic model that is devoted to Israel while its religious 
beliefs are rounded by ‘masculinity, militarism, and prowess’.71  
A scene in Ron Leshem’s bestselling novel Beaufort demonstrates the appeal 
of the religious heroic model for the contemporary Israeli military personnel.72 Real 
events and characters inspired the novel. Leshem wrote it after meeting a former officer 
who recounted the demanding nature of his military service in Southern Lebanon, and 
after performing detailed interviews with (former) military personnel regarding their 
personal military experiences.73 The success of the novel shows its portrayal of military 
service has resonated with the Israeli public and indicates the latter’s interest to read, 
accept, and to a certain degree, to identify with personal and distressing narratives of 
military service. In this particular scene, the novel’s narrator, Liraz Librati, recounts his 
astonishment regarding Mickey Bayliss’s decision (a national religious soldier) to 
renounce to wearing the kippa. According to Librati, Bayliss was the poster child of the 
unit, who embodied the peculiar features of the new (religious) military heroic model 
proposed by the religious pre-military academies. Librati’s reflection, infused with 
admiration and respect, is worth quoting at length in order to offer a portrayal of the 
place that national religious soldiers seem to enjoy in the military: 
 
‘He [Bayliss] was no fanatic, not bigoted or blind to other opinions 
and lifestyles, but we all saw him as the star of the religious Zionist 
world, our hope and pride. The knitted kippa guys of the religious 
Zionist camp had become the backbone of our brigade – in fact, of all 
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the Infantry brigades. They were the best fighters and were growing 
in numbers and strength. They were a new generation, not like their 
settler fathers, not anything that the state religious schools had 
produced in the past. They dressed like us and wore their hair like us, 
they talked like us, liked the same films, the same music. They knew 
how to party like the best of us. They didn’t even always have a kippa 
on their heads. They were determined not to be prejudiced against, 
told that they weren’t good enough, or didn’t keep the 
commandments strictly enough to call themselves as card carrying 
members of the religious Zionist club. They call themselves ‘pocket-
kippa boys’ and some of them screw as many girls as we do. Really, 
I swear it, this generation actually fucks, because they know how to 
bend their religious obligations since those rules are no longer the 
centre of their lives. But when it comes to loving the Land of Israel, 
patriotism, to sacrifice, even to friendship, they’re the best, the most 
‘religious’ of all us, and often the most extreme. With body building 
too, nobody can compete with their enthusiasm and determination to 
succeed. Sometimes it seemed as though to be one of them, part of 
that perfect world was the sexiest thing possible; those boys were the 
army’s most poplar brand name’.74   
 
Librati’s extensive portrayal shows national religious military personnel 
embody a new model of heroism by revitalising the mythical heroic figure of the ‘New 
Jew’ – self-sacrifice, toughness, camaraderie – yet imbuing it with religious symbolism. 
Despite carrying religious beliefs, these new national religious fighters are the 
military’s finest examples of virtuosity, physical strength, erotic appeal, patriotism, 
devotion, fearlessness, and determination. Librati’s fascination with national religious 
Jews discloses they are less inclined to follow the religious commandments in a strict 
manner, yet they rely on religious symbolism in order to build and defend the nation in 
an exemplary way. Similarly to secular Jews, national religious soldiers perceive 
military service as an opportunity for personal development that would give them the 
possibility to shape the military and the society according to their beliefs. In fact, 
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Bayliss’s decision to renounce to wearing the kippa is related to his perceived personal 
failure to use military service as a means to become a virtuous citizen-soldier. 
According to Librati, 
 
‘[h]e [Bayliss] no longer had the spiritual willpower, didn’t feel 
strong enough, wasn’t worthy of representing us. And if he wasn’t 
worthy, then there was no need for him to continue wearing the kippa. 
On the contrary, he said he would be putting the religious Zionists to 
shame if he kept it on’.75 
 
Bayliss feels he has disappointed himself and the religious Zionist movement 
due to his belief that military service is morally corrupting religious men and women. 
In retrospect, he believes he has failed to become an example of virtuosity for his peers:  
 
‘I could try to become more religious, improve myself, be less 
despicable, strengthen my resolve. But I don’t have the spiritual 
fortitude to spend time doing it, work out what really happening to 
me. Not me, I am not strong enough, not up to the challenge. I set 
myself a mission and failed’.76  
 
Upon hearing Bayliss’s explanation, Librati acknowledges that military 
service is likely to challenge national religious’ conservative beliefs: 
 
‘It wasn’t easy to stay religious, to keep the commandments, in our 
squad. I’d seen it often enough: good guys cutting corners. On the 
Sabbath, smoking a cigarette they claimed had been lit by someone 
else. On a holy day, keeping one eye on the television they insisted 
had been turned on by someone else. In the end, they’re even 
watching porn videos’.77   
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By portraying the place of national religious servicemen and women in the 
Israeli military, Leshem’s scene shows the potential discrepancy between the idealised 
military figure circulated by the Military Rabbinate and pre-military academies, and the 
reality of military service (combat) since the latter might weaken the national religious 
soldiers’ belief system rather than improve it. Similarly, Udi Lebel found that the Israeli 
servicemen and women, although educated at religious pre-military academies, are 
likely to guide themselves according to universal values in performing their military 
service, to display secular beliefs, and to rarely ask their rabbis for advice during their 
military service.78 More significantly, media and scholars are suspicious about the 
potential of national religious soldiers to transform the Israeli military and society. For 
instance, Maayan Lubell and Yagil Levy show that national religious Jews make up ten 
per cent of the combat force, and respectively, ten per cent of the total of the Israeli 
population therefore they carry little possibility to impose their ideology upon the 
Israeli society and military alike.79  
Pre-military academies try to define military service and the meaning of the 
Israeli Jewish identity for the purposes of influencing both the military and the society 
by proposing either a pluralist or a religious model of military ethos. By cultivating an 
exemplary and virtuous military subjectivity, both pluralistic and religious pre-military 
academies present military service as an appealing social practice that is first and 
foremost a site of personal growth that prepares military personnel to contribute to the 
collective goals of the military and society. However, the envisaging of military service 
as a self-fulfilment practice carries significant implications for the (future) citizen-
soldiers. Specifically, the presentation of military service as a means of personal 
development conceals the violence that is inherent in military service and provides 
further justification for war and conflict. By presenting military service as a personal 
growth practice, pre-academies fail to recognise the physical and the psychological 
damage that the Israeli young men and women might experience once confronted with 
the reality of military service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Equally 
significant, this representation of military service conceals the violence enacted by the 
Israeli military personnel against Palestinians. In this respect, the cultivation of a 
virtuous military subjectivity ‘attribute[s] an inherent value and irreproachability to [the 
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Israeli] soldiers and the military, and prevent[s] them from being fully evaluated in 
connection with what they do – which remains, in significant part, war fighting’.80 
Therefore, the cultivation of a virtuous military subjectivity does not only strengthen 
the belief that the ‘IDF is the most moral army in the world’, but it also masks the 
injury, harm, and violence that accompany soldiering life. Furthermore, the cultivation 
of an exemplary military subjectivity enhances the Israeli public support for the military 
and confines criticism against its violent practices. In this respect, BINA’s pedagogical 
practices and its comparison with national religious institutions indicate that pre-
military academies cultivate an affective connection between recruits and the Israeli 
society by insisting that military service is a stepping stone in recruits’ lives and is an 
opportunity to develop skills that would serve their individual growth. 
These insights show that it is easy to exaggerate the influence of national 
religious figures on the Israeli military since the general military command remains 
largely secular and the civilian control of the military is stable. However, there are 
serious political implications concerning the association of military service and the 
Israel/Palestine conflict with religious symbolism. A religious narrative envisages 
Palestinians as enemies of God and complicates a possible resolution of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict since military personnel, driven by ideology and faith, could 
refuse to evacuate settlements if required to do so.81 Nonetheless, didactic practices 
pursued by pre-military academies influence the Israel/Palestine conflict beyond their 
religious symbolism. The following section studies Beit Morasha, a pre-military 
academy from Jerusalem that conducts ‘experiential seminars’ during which military 
personnel discuss the ethical and moral baggage that should guide their behaviour in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It argues the constitution of an ethical military 
subjectivity intervenes in the Middle East conflict by presenting the Israeli military 
personnel as morally superior to Palestinians and by justifying violence against 
Palestinians as a self-defence practice of the vulnerable Israeli individual and collective 
body. 
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Beit Morasha of Jerusalem: Teaching Military Ethics 
Beit Morasha is a pluralistic pre-military academy that leads a number of 
activities that promote leadership, Jewish ethics, and Israeli Jewish identity. Its most 
valuable programme is ‘Identity and Purpose: Jewish Values in the Military’. 82 
According to its website, this educational activity 
 
‘has reached over 230,000 IDF officers and soldiers to date, 
deepening their knowledge of Jewish history, tradition and values; 
challenging their assumptions about war, peace, coexistence and 
identity; and revitalizing their identification with Jewish values and 
ethics’.83 
 
This organisation praises itself for providing the Education and Youth Corps 
with one of its most important documents. In 2002, the founder and President of the 
institute, Professor Benjamin Ish-Shalom, drafted the ‘Identity and Purpose – Israel 
Defense Forces’ document. According to a staff member at Beit Morasha, 
 
‘a lot of people come to get his [Benjamin Ish-Shalom’s] advice about 
education, [about] topics of identity, Jewish, Israeli, multicultural 
identity here in Israel. Twelve years ago, the head of the army, 
[Moshe] ‘Boogie’ Ya’alon, that now is the Minister of Defence, asked 
Professor Benjamin Ish-Shalom to write the philosophy of the army. 
So this document, since twelve years ago, has become the official 
paper the Education Corps runs the programmes with. They 
[Education and Youth Corps] asked us not only to write it but also to 
work with them and to create programmes for soldiers and units 
according to this vision.84 
 
This document is available in the public realm and carefully stresses that: 
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‘ “A nation that builds an army in turn builds a nation” – As a result 
of the make-up of the IDF, the nature of military service, the duration 
of service, and the place that the IDF holds in public consciousness, 
military service has a formative impact on the personalities, attitudes, 
and behaviors of the IDF soldiers and commanders. Accordingly, the 
army is one of the institutions that influence the nature of Israeli 
society and the State of Israel. Young people serve in the IDF at a 
critical stage in their lives, which impacts their development as 
people and as citizens of the State’.85 
 
Informed by this document, the thrust of the activities coordinated by Beit 
Morasha is represented by ‘experiential workshops’ and seminars on ethical conduct 
during combat operations. The trademark of their institutional activity is a workshop 
entitled ‘Ethical Drills’, that addresses the military personnel that serve in West Bank. 
These military training sessions are described as following: 
 
‘The premise of the Ethical Drills program is that soldiers need 
“ethical target practice” no less than they need “military target 
practice.” The Ethical Drills focus on ethical dilemmas that emerge 
during the course of the IDF service and take place within the IDF 
units. The program utilizes experiential education techniques and the 
Beit Morasha staff prepares the unit commanders to create programs 
of intervention that are tailored to the needs of their units. Following 
this preparatory stage, the unit commanders implement the program 
in the field. The Ethical Drills ha[ve] now become standard operating 
procedure for companies that are charged with patrolling civilian 
areas as well as checkpoints in sensitive areas in Judea and 
Samaria’.86 
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‘Ethical Drills’ help soldiers to manage their private feelings, to assess their 
affective states, and to develop emotional control skills. An official video produced by 
Beit Morasha and disseminated on the YouTube social platform offers a first-hand 
experience into the organisation of ethical drills. In this recording, a few paratroopers 
discuss with the workshop convenor about their emotions and the perils of serving in 
the occupied West Bank. The workshop leader asks paratroopers to voice their concerns 
and opinions about the complexity of their military service by having to negotiate 
between obedience to their superiors and independent thinking when conducting a 
mission. One participant at the workshop highlights the moral dilemma that he 
experiences when returning fire towards a building that houses both suspects and non-
combatants while facing the possibility to harm the latter. Another paratrooper 
expresses unequivocal support for restraining emotions and for respecting the ‘Purity 
of Arms’ principle. Other participants express their frustration of seeing and 
reprimanding fellow soldiers that destroy the personal belongings of Palestinians, and 
recount their shame in arresting a suspect in front of his family. Finally, a paratrooper 
stresses the need to block any emotions of rage and fury when arresting a suspect.87 
The activities conducted by Beit Morasha and its involvement in ethical training nuance 
Orna Sasson-Levy’s argument that processes of training and military socialisation fail 
to address the moral and the political consequences of the Israeli militaristic ethos. She 
denounces the IDF’s attempts to construct military service as a masculine rite of 
passage since they confine soldiers’ opportunity to question military service.88   
In contrast to Sasson-Levy, this chapter argues that ethical drills are less about 
controlling emotions and rather about crafting citizen-soldiers’ subjectivity to 
experience appropriate emotions. The YouTube video shows the Israeli military 
situates emotions at the center of the training of the Israeli recruits thus favouring the 
production of a military subject that works through his or her emotions in order to 
perform one’s military responsibilities in an exemplary way. By working with and 
through affective dispositions, ‘Ethical Drills’ craft a military subject that is aware of 
his/her responsibilities, talks about his/her military experience, and recognises his/her 
obligation to act and to determine his/her peers to act in a responsible manner. The 
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cultivation of military subjectivity through workshops represents a military practice 
through which troops are equipped not only with ‘the ability to control [their] emotions, 
[but also] to experience the ‘appropriate’ emotions at different times and places’.89 
These experiential seminars expose the Israeli military personnel to a process of self-
formation through which they learn to act in a virtuous and appropriate manner. They 
recall Alasdair MacIntyre’s view regarding virtues since ‘dispositions not only to act in 
particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways. To act virtuously is not to act against 
inclination; it is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues. Moral 
education is an ‘éducation sentimentale’ ’.90  
More significantly, the (affective) moral education of the Israeli military 
personnel carries serious political implications. Affective practices of military 
education both enhance one’s military skills and contribute to the positioning of the 
military recruit in the role of a moral(ising) subject when confronting Palestinian 
civilians. Beit Morasha’s video shows the Israeli military subject from the standpoint 
of the witness that holds universal and humanistic values, who is the only one that 
understands difficult situations, and who is able to ‘mark out the terrain of what is good 
and what is evil’.91  Equally, ‘Ethical Drills’ contribute to the reconstruction of an 
antagonistic narrative between the Israeli military personnel and Palestinian civilians 
by presenting the latter as a source of soldiers’ inappropriate feelings during their 
military service. In this regard, ‘Ethical Drills’ echo Sara Ahmed remarks that the 
experience of pain functions through the attribution of feelings to others since ‘those 
who ‘are ‘other’ to me or us, or those that threaten to make us other, remain the source 
of bad feeling’.92  
A staff member from Beit Morasha insisted that ‘Ethical Drills’ are very 
important for preparing military personnel insofar as they are experiential practices that 
imbue recruits with the values of the Israeli military: 
 
‘When they [soldiers] come to us for the workshop, sometimes it’s 
the first time when they talk about these things [ethical dilemmas] 
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with the unit and the commander. The most difficult thing is that there 
is no right and wrong answer. But I can tell you, as someone who was 
in the army: the army and the commanders know what is right and 
they work with values’.93 
 
When asked for further explanations about the values that Israeli soldiers carry 
with them during military service in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the educational 
instructor stressed that the Israeli military personnel are prepared and expected to 
perform a ‘meaningful service’. The staff member characterised the significance of 
military service in Israel in the following way: 
 
‘Values’ refer to values in war and how values help soldiers perform 
as a team during the mission. This means that soldiers learn the values 
of being a soldier in a particular unit, in a particular situation, in a 
particular country. One is religious and one is not religious. One is a 
Muslim and one can be a Christian. One is a Jew. You have to 
understand that military service is never only about myself. It is about 
my team, and then about the community, then about my country and 
then about the world too. The Israeli army is not only the army of 
Israel but it is the army of the Jewish nation from all around the world. 
If someone gets hurt for instance in Nepal, the Israeli army goes there 
and helps. That’s the Israeli army! One of the purposes of going to 
Nepal is not because we think we are the best ones there but because 
we want to show our soldiers here the significance [of military 
service]. 94  
 
Similarly, Brigadier-General Eran Niv stresses the importance of enhancing 
recruits’ desire to invest in their military service, and highlights the necessity to equip 
them with the belief they contribute to the wellbeing of the Israeli collective body. 
Discussing the challenges that the Israeli military experiences in 2017, Niv believes 
that: 
                                                        
93 Educational officer, Beit Morasha of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, May 2015. 
94 Educational officer, Beit Morasha of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, May 2015. 
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‘The soldier must understand that he’s doing something meaningful, 
something that makes a contribution − not wasting his time. I want 
him to have a challenge that he must invest all his energy in to meet 
and to build an environment that he’ll want to belong to’.95 
 
The characterisation of ‘meaningful service’ shows the military is not only a 
site that trains military personnel, but also an institution in which (future) recruits are 
educated to develop themselves in order to make a positive contribution to the Israeli 
society and the world. Staff members at Beit Morasha highlight the importance of 
organising didactic activities that permit the (future) Israeli military personnel to work 
with themselves in order to become exemplary and virtuous citizen-soldiers. According 
to this pre-military academy, the pedagogical military practices teach recruits to 
celebrate pluralism and remind them of the importance of the tikkun olam principle. 
Accordingly, the Jewish nation is envisaged as ‘a light for nations’ while military 
personnel are sent to perform humanitarian tasks around the world in order to help 
others. As a consequence, the emphasis on IDF’s interest in the wellbeing of those that 
find themselves in difficult situations constrains local and international criticism 
against the Israeli military and its violent practices in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. 
Beit Morasha stresses that caring for those less fortunate applies also within 
the context of the Israel/Palestine. For instance, the educational officer insisted on the 
moral dilemmas that the Israeli forces experience while manning checkpoints when 
they encounter Palestinians that need to cross to Israel for medical reasons: 
 
‘What do you do when you see a pregnant woman that needs to go to 
the hospital and you close the gate [checkpoint]? What do you do? 
The commander told you that there is a terrorist threat and you need 
to close the gate? And she needs to go to the hospital here in Israel!’.96 
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The soldiers’ moral dilemmas that depict Palestinians as subjects that depend 
on the Israeli forces’ assistance show that the constitution of ethical subjectivity 
envisages the IDF as a benign presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
However, the Israeli military subjects’ expressions of compassion for Palestinians and 
their readiness to help them disregard the IDF’s fundamental role in imposing a 
regulatory, arbitrary, and harsh system of checkpoints that restricts the Palestinians’ 
movement within the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Elizabeth Spelman denounces 
feelings of compassion and pity insofar as ‘feeling for others in their suffering can 
simply be a way of asserting authority over them to the extent that such feeling leaves 
no room for them to have a view about what their suffering means, or what the most 
appropriated response to it is’.97 Thus IDF’s feelings of compassion and their moral 
dilemmas directs the conversation towards military forces’ anguished experiences 
during military service in the West Bank and away from Palestinians’ precarious lives 
under the occupation. Likewise, Sherene Razack stresses that expressions of 
compassion represent a dangerous narrative because they involve ‘stealing the pain of 
others’.98 Informed by Susan Sontag’s oft-quoted phrase ‘regarding the pain of others’, 
Razack recalls that the theft of pain ‘is an act supported by a racial logic and 
underpinned by a material system of white privilege’.99 The insistence on the IDF’s 
difficult experience of military service constitutes them as morally superior to 
Palestinians. In this regard, conversations about the Israeli moral dilemmas of military 
service during pedagogical military practices represent ‘an expression of privilege (…) 
which ultimately only perpetuate their self-centered experience of [the Israeli] society 
without seriously compromising this hierarchical structure’.100  
The feeling of moral superiority that constructs ethical subjectivity is 
reinforced through the presentation of Palestinians as despicable individuals that hide 
in civilian houses and whose children are future terrorists: 
 
‘If you go inside a house… usually terrorists go where kids are in 
order to hide. Terrorists do that! Kids grow up as terrorists. I am not 
sure, but almost positive. They hate us. They want to kill us! They 
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want to kill me! They would do anything to kill… even the kids [are 
involved]. They throw stones and cocktails Molotov. Let’s not call 
them terrorists, but dangerous civilians!’.101  
 
The presentation of children as enemies and as future criminals is a recurring 
theme in the Israeli public discourse beginning with the First Intifada, when children 
and young Palestinians threw stones at the Israeli soldiers.102 Through this kind of 
discursive practices, Palestinian children are denied both the position of the victim and 
the premise of innocence that is generally associated with the notion of childhood.103 
Without denying the potential harm that stone throwing has against the Israeli military 
forces, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian argues the Israeli ‘state’s security discourse and 
law enforcement regime constructs each Palestinian child as a “potential terrorist” ’ 
thus permitting the securitisation of children as potential threats.104  Therefore, the 
construction of the Israeli military subjectivity depends on the constitution of an 
antagonistic representation that envisages Palestinians (including children) as enemies 
that disregard the value of life.  
Finally, yet significantly, the insistence on fear, anxiety, and exposure to 
Palestinian threat during military service at checkpoints and during house arrests and 
searches shows the role of emotions in constituting the Israeli military forces as 
vulnerable figures. This (self-)representation of defencelessness is important for the 
justification of violence against Palestinians because the discourse of 
 
‘fear works to create a sense of being overwhelmed: rather than being 
contained in an object, fear is intensified by the impossibility of 
containment. If the others who are feared “pass by,” then the others 
might pass their way into the community, and could be anywhere and 
everywhere’.105  
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This pervasive vulnerability infuses civil-military relations in Israel and 
imposes an emotional reading of the Palestinian and Israeli Jewish bodies that present 
the former as vulnerable and the latter as fearsome. The discourse of vulnerability 
constructs both the Israeli military individual and collective bodies because 
vulnerability ‘spreads outwards from the soldier to the persons and institutions linked 
to him in the form a sense of risk and endangerment, as a sort of productive 
contamination’ therefore this pervasive discourse of vulnerability enhances the public 
support for the military and their tolerance for the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians.106 Since the Israeli military forces might not be able to tell the difference 
between who is and who is not dangerous whereas Palestinians might pass unnoticed 
and unremarked, military personnel ‘keep looking for signs of difference and justif[y] 
violent forms of intrusion into the bodies of others’.107 Therefore, the presentation of 
Palestinians as threatening subjects, and the inability to distinguish between a genuine 
motive and a deceptive reason of passing through checkpoints determine the reading of 
Palestinian bodies ‘in advance of their arrival’ as potential ‘cause of an injury to the 
[Israeli] national [and individual] body’.108 By presenting social encounters between 
the Israeli citizen-soldiers and Palestinians through the lens of the emotions that 
accompany them, the pre-military academies present violence as a self-defence 
endeavour thus concealing the political complexity of the IDF’s presence in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. In this way, the IDF strengthens the public’s trust in 
the Israeli military, and confines the investigation, prosecution, and condemnation of 
the Israeli forces’ violent behaviour against Palestinians.  
The constitution of the Israeli military subjectivity shows the importance of 
emotions in sanctioning, concealing, and depoliticising the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians. The pedagogical practices pursued at Beit Morasha indicate that military 
subjectivity is constituted through the circulation and imposition of fear, anxiety, 
compassion or moral superiority on different Israeli Jewish and Palestinians figures 
through the alignment of some subjects with others and against some others across 
‘relationships of difference and displacement’.109 In Beit Morasha’s imaginary, the 
Israeli military subject is imbued with affective dispositions that envisage it as ethically 
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and morally superior. Palestinians are the source of Israeli forces’ physical and moral 
vulnerability since they threaten the lives of Israeli military personnel and their desire 
to practice universal values. The Israeli military personnel are committed to 
humanitarian values during their military service and to act with compassion but they 
cannot trust the Palestinians’ good-willing nature due to their alleged proneness to 
violence. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explores the role of emotions in educational activities that nurture 
the Israeli military subjectivity and presents the actors, institutions, and the discourses 
that shape the socio-cultural, historical, and military background of the Israeli forces. 
It highlights emotions play an important role in processes of military socialisation and 
in concealing, justifying, and depoliticising the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. 
Didactic programmes work with and through the emotions of military recruits and 
personnel in order to determine them to acquire and feel certain dispositions towards 
the military and the society. Military socialisation through emotional education shows 
that pedagogical programmes shape the affective and bodily dispositions of the Israeli 
military personnel by equipping them with an emotional repertoire that helps them to 
decide how to approach military service, its aims, and its challenges. The examination 
of didactic practices through which the Israeli military personnel learn the history of 
Israel and of the Israel/Palestine conflict, develop an awareness of the Israeli Jewish 
identity, and acquire ethical knowledge in order to perform their military service in an 
exemplary way indicates the IDF insist on cultivating a virtuous individual and 
collective military image. This representation provides a romanticised view on the 
Israeli military service by envisaging the servicemen and women as exemplary citizen-
soldiers that care for themselves, for the others, and for the wellbeing of those further 
away who are less fortunate than themselves. The examination of the role of emotions 
in cultivating military subjectivity indicates the cultivation and dissemination of a novel 
military subjectivity that blends heroism, vulnerability, and devotion to Israel with 
humanitarian behaviour towards Palestinians and foreigners that need aid. Therefore, 
through its emphasis on ‘values of self-realization’, the IDF nurture and circulate a new 
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military ‘ethos based on professionalism, rationality, achievement, and nurturing the 
body and soul’.110  
However, recruits do not always consent to the official narrative cultivated and 
disseminated by the Education and Youth Corps and by its affiliated institutions thus 
showing that ‘the body [of the soldier] is not just clay for social forces to mold, it is a 
dynamic system of its own with its own energy and drives’.111 Episodes during which 
the (future) Israeli military personnel question the abridged narratives forwarded by 
tour guides in Jerusalem, disobey and criticise course leaders’ pedagogical practices, 
question the role of religious discourse in the military or determine the military to pay 
attention to their personal grievances show the readiness of recruits to alter, modify, 
and question the Israeli socialisation processes. The educational practices that ask the 
Israeli servicemen and women to work through their emotions in order to develop an 
outstanding military persona highlight that ‘subjectivity and identification emerge and 
are reconfigured through affective relations. How we belong, and how we desire to 
belong, are not fixed notions in space and time’.112 The socialisation of the Israeli 
military personnel is a dynamic process through which they negotiate military 
subjectivity at the intersection between their personal background and their exposure 
to official military narratives. Therefore, the constitution of the Israeli military 
subjectivity shows recruits 
 
‘are clearly not only passive victims to the relations of rule to which 
they are subjected. They chose alternatives and act within (and even 
peek beyond?) the conditions of possibility that governing discourses 
define and that material circumstances dictate. In short, human beings 
surely exercise agency and enjoy some extent of freedom. Yet, they 
are also (self-)governed in the very exercising of the freedoms that 
they enjoy’.113 
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The readiness to the Israeli military personnel to question the military culture 
in which they are socialised illustrates the political implications of promoting and 
disseminating a virtuous military image within the geopolitical complexity of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. By cultivating and circulating the image of an exemplary 
citizen-soldier, the IDF constrain the possibility to hold the Israeli military personnel 
accountable for their violent practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The 
Israeli (future) recruits are offered abridged version of history that disregards 
Palestinian history and their contemporary ramifications. This allows the Israeli 
military to reiterate the image of a defensive army and to dismiss post-Zionist 
perspectives regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict. Equally significant, the pedagogical 
activities coordinated by the Education and Youth Corps craft the image of a soldier 
who carries appropriate ethical baggage to perform his or her tasks in an exemplary 
way when meeting Palestinian civilians. Implicitly, this representation conceals the 
violence that is inherent to military service, masks the purpose of the Israeli military’s 
presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, elevates its moral standing, and 
deflects criticism against the military personnel’s violent behaviour. The following 
chapter continues the study of the cultivation of the Israeli military subjectivity at the 
intersection between civil and military spheres. It investigates the (self-)representations 
of virtuous Israeli servicemen and women on social media. The survey of the emotions 
captured, circulated, and provoked by the (self-) representations of servicemen and 
women in the digital sphere shows the IDF’s official Facebook account disseminates 
the image of a tough yet compassionate and gentle military figure. This digital 
illustration of military subjectivity addresses both local and international audiences and 
has serious political implications for the Israel/Palestine conflict. It highlights the 
impeccability of the Israeli military at the detriment of a fearsome and vile Palestinians, 
and reduces internal and external criticism against the military by likening the IDF with 
other Western militaries engaged in the global alliance against radical forces. Through 
this representation, the complexity of the Israel/Palestine conflict is moderated and the 
Palestinian population grievances are ignored while the Israeli military maintains an 
irreproachable individual and collective image. 
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Chapter 3: Digital Camouflage: A Happy, Cosmopolitan, 
and Humanitarian Military 
 
There is only one truth. IDF soldiers, our sons and our  
                                                                             daughters, are the most moral and cutest in the world.1 
 
Passing through a checkpoint, together with friends, in their way to a picnic 
venue outside Ramallah, Raja Shehadeh describes their interaction with Israeli soldiers 
as following: 
 
‘The female Israeli soldiers wore tight khaki trousers, the low waist 
emphasizing the contours of their hips, and were bedecked with 
mobile phones. They looked at us through their dark sunglasses, 
giving orders with their hands while exchanging flirty looks and 
sexual innuendos with the male soldiers, with whom they conversed 
in loud Hebrew. To them we were mere specks on the terrain that 
belonged exclusively to them and they could move us around with a 
flick of their little finger like pieces on a chequerboard. They lived in 
their own world, operating the highly technical security apparatus that 
they seemed to believe entitled them to an exclusive place in the 
advanced modern world’.2  
 
This description provides a fascinating representation of the modern Israeli 
military subjectivity and a bitter assessment of the socio-political reality of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. Informed by Shehadeh’s description of contemporary 
soldiering that combines femininity, masculinity, desire, power, and technology, this 
chapter studies the Israeli military (self-)representations on social media. Taking a cue 
from Adi Kuntsman’s belief that ‘digital media technologies (…) can be objects, 
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mediators and repositories of affect’, it argues the Israeli digital military (self-)images 
represent aesthetic practices that embody, disseminate, and elicit emotions in order to 
craft a happy, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian military subjectivity. Engaging 
embodied emotions and emotional readings of the Israeli military bodies alike, these 
military (self-)representations nurture the conviction that the ‘IDF is the most moral 
army in the world’ and shield the Israeli forces from accountability for their violent 
behaviour against Palestinians. Specifically, the Israeli military (self-)images on social 
media craft a positive soldiering representation showing that military service is not an 
unpleasant activity. Rather, it gives military personnel the opportunity to develop their 
skills and to provide humanitarian help to Palestinians and to other populations that 
find themselves under distress. Inevitably, the impeccability of the Israeli military 
subjectivity is contrasted with the gendered and racialised representations of 
Palestinians as violent, vile, and threatening (young) men who are willing to sacrifice 
their lives in order to kill Israeli citizen-soldiers. Therefore, the IDF use social media 
in order to disseminate an idealised military image that justifies the military’s violence 
against Palestinians, and that dismisses violent acts as breaches of military discipline, 
as reckless instances of violence, or as unfortunate events that take place during military 
service. 
This chapter divides in four sections in order to examine the role of emotions 
embedded, circulated, and provoked by the IDF’s digital (self-)images for the purposes 
of cultivating a happy, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian military figure. The first one 
studies the two-fold purpose of the Israeli military’s use of social media. It highlights 
social media is not only a public relations tool for the purposes of cultivating a positive 
military image, but it is also a social space in which the Israeli military personnel 
constitute their subjectivities by rehearsing the IDF’s benign representation for the 
purposes of inviting affinity with the Israeli military. The second section examines the 
(self-)representations that envisage military service as a peaceful and enjoyable activity 
that permits recruits to travel across the land that they protect. The following one 
addresses the symbolism through which digital (self-) images present military service 
along a symbolic continuum ranging from toughness and proficiency to gentleness and 
attractiveness. Through a varied representation of masculinity and femininity, the 
military’s digital presence moderates concerns regarding the militarisation of the Israeli 
society by imagining a strong and competent yet kind and gentle military subject. The 
fourth section shows the IDF insist on representing themselves as an institutional site 
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that gives military personnel, irrespective of their gender, ethnicity, class, or religion, 
the opportunity to develop their skills in order to excel in their military and civilian 
careers. Images that show Israeli servicemen and women who help Palestinians, who 
follow humanitarian laws during military interventions in the Gaza Strip, and who 
provide humanitarian aid in Nepal or Japan round the IDF’s professional military image 
and reinforce its admirable characteristics. The chapter concludes the IDF’s Facebook 
account represents an affective social space through which the Israeli military cultivates 
affinity between the IDF, local, and international audiences. The Israeli military takes 
advantage of digital technology in order to craft and circulate a romanticised military 
subjectivity that moderates criticism against its violent practices, and that constrains the 
possibility to hold the IDF accountable for their violent behaviour against Palestinian 
civilians.   
 
Social Media: A Public Relation Tool and a Space for Constituting 
Military Subjectivity 
Social media gives the IDF the opportunity to cultivate and disseminate a 
positive military image by inviting recruits to perform an idealised military figure that 
constrains the investigation, prosecution, and condemnation of the Israeli forces for 
their violent behaviour against Palestinians. Nevertheless, the Israeli military’s choice 
to maintain a presence on social media is not peculiar to Israel’s defence forces. The 
British, the American, and the Canadian armies host a growing presence on social 
media.3 Moreover, the Swedish military sanctioned the publication of military blogs 
(‘milblogs’) authored by military personnel who depict everyday life in the military, 
and linked them to the official website of the Swedish defence forces.4 The military’s 
use of social media suggests the increasing efforts made by defence forces to align 
themselves with modern technological developments, to build a positive domestic 
image, to foster public support for its existence, and to appeal to the public for the 
                                                        
3 The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, The Official Instagram 
Account of the Canadian Army / Compte Instagram Officiel de l’Armée Canadienne. Available at: 
https://www.instagram.com/armeecdnarmy/ [Accessed 25 June 2017]; United States Department of 
Defense, The Official Instagram Account of the American Army. Available at: 
https://www.instagram.com/usarmy/ [Accessed 25 June 2017]; United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, 
The Official Instagram Account of the British Army. Available at: 
https://www.instagram.com/britisharmy/ [Accessed 25 June 2017]. 
4 Hellman, M. ‘Milblogs and soldier representations of the Afghanistan War: The case of Sweden’, 
Media, War & Conflict, 9 (2016) pp. 48-9.   
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purposes of recruiting new volunteers. Finally, yet significantly, social media troubles 
the separation between different private and public spaces that soldiers’ bodies belong 
to. It rearticulates organisational and social hierarchies in the military, and restructures 
the links between the military, the wider public, and the society as a whole.  
The IDF’s official Facebook account was launched in 2011 and it is linked to 
the IDF’s Instagram account thus sharing most of the pictures. However, the former 
social media website offers a richer insight into the configuration of military service in 
Israel and into the way in which Palestinians are represented in the Israeli official 
military narrative.5  Oren Golan and Eyal Ben-Ari’s argue the IDF’s Official Blog 
functions as its official website that addresses a varied audience including Israeli 
English speakers, members of the Jewish Diaspora, and potential Jewish immigrants.6 
Catering to a similar audience, the IDF’s Facebook account targets especially young 
social media users. Updated almost daily, it is managed by the IDF Spokesperson’s 
Unit and represents an online image archive that collects military self-portraits, images 
of military training, graduation or active duty, pictures of landscape, images of soldiers 
with their loved ones, photos depicting interactions with Palestinians, and tributes to 
fallen soldiers or to civilians killed by Palestinian assailants. These aesthetic (self-
)representations are sometimes accompanied by servicemen and women’s personal 
reflections regarding their role in the military and the significance of military service 
in their lives. Moreover, in the ‘comment’ sections, these pictures gather messages of 
support and condemnation alike from local and international audiences in a variety of 
languages. The presence of messages of condemnation could be interpreted in a number 
of ways, from the lack of enough manpower to oversee the IDF’s Facebook account to 
the Spokesperson’s Unit mindfulness that an overly clean military image leads to 
further accusations against the Israeli military. Interestingly, this unit invites the Israeli 
military personnel to contribute to this account by uploading private pictures. This 
practice transforms military forces in subjects and objects of the gaze of the camera, 
and in producers, and consumers of the photos they upload on social media.  
Ayelet Kohn has investigated the (self-)representations of the Israeli military 
personnel on Instagram, and the comparison between official and private military (self-
                                                        
5 Stein, R. L. ‘StateTube: Anthropological Reflections on Social Media and the Israeli State’, 
Anthropological Quarterly, 85 (2012) p. 905. 
6 Golan, O. and Ben-Ari, E. ‘Armed Forces, Cyberspace, and Global Images: The Official Website of 
the Israeli Defense Forces 2007-2015’, Armed Forces & Society [online first] (2016) p. 8. 
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)images on social media has showed the readiness of the Israeli recruits to consent and 
conform to the official military narrative. The survey of the Israeli forces’ 
representations of nature and military weaponry in the digital sphere shows these (self-
)images symbolise individual and collective binding tools that build solidarity between 
recruits and the Israeli military.7 The chapter broadens Kohn’s evaluation of the IDF’s 
use of social media by addressing the role of emotions in constituting military 
subjectivity, and by examining the political role of circulating embodied 
representations of military subjectivity within the political context of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict.  
Social media represents a virtual space in which the Israeli military personnel 
constitute and imagine their military subjectivities by circulating embodied experiences 
for the purposes of public consumption. Representations of Israeli servicemen and 
women reflect ‘the digital mundane in military life’ because ‘social media and 
smartphone technologies within the military offer a unique environment in which to 
investigate the ways in which individuals position themselves within certain axes of 
institutional and cultural identities’. 8  On social media, the Israeli servicemen and 
women perform the institutional and cultural identity of the military by inhabiting and 
evoking ideas, values, beliefs, and assumptions that characterise the military institution. 
To this end, the IDF’s digital (self-)representation show that emotions are part and 
parcel of the production of individual and collective military identity. Similarly, Bleiker 
and Hutchison remark that personal affective experiences relate to the broader power 
relations that characterise political life: 
 
‘Emotions help us make sense of ourselves, and situate us in relation 
to others and the world that surrounds us. They frame forms of 
personal and social understanding, and are thus inclinations that lead 
individuals to locate their identity within a wider collective’.9 
 
                                                        
7 Kohn, A. ‘Instagram as a naturalized propaganda tool: The Israel Defence Forces Web site and 
phenomenon of shared values’, Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media 
Technologies, 23 (2017) pp. 197-213.  
8 Maltby, S. and Thornham, H. ‘The digital mundane: social media and the military’, Media, Culture & 
Society, 38 (2016) p. 1153. 
9 Bleiker and Hutchison, ‘Fear no more’, p. 123.  
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Nevertheless, the digital representation of Israeli soldiering contains a caveat. 
It represents a top-down, formal representation of military life that leaves out opposing 
and contrasting narratives. The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit enjoys the prerogative to 
select, disseminate, or forge pictures in order to construct a positive Israeli military 
image. Therefore, the IDF’s social media accounts represent a unique instance of 
‘hybridized participatory media productions, because they are produced and 
disseminated by a dominant military institution, using hegemonic images and 
narratives, yet are defined and visually presented as vernacular by the[ir] creators’.10 
Rather than assessing the power of the Israeli servicemen and women to shape the 
image of the Israeli military or examining the presence or absence of agency when 
discussing these (self-)representations, the chapter focuses on the ways in which agency 
is prioritised and reproduced in digital (self-)images in order to cultivate an exemplary 
military subjectivity. In this respect, the examination of the Israeli military’s digital 
(self-)representations offer ‘only speculative access to the interior life of the subject’ 
yet it is important to note that the Israeli ‘photographic [military] images speak volumes 
about the cultural context in which they were created’.11  
Equally significant, the readiness of the Israeli recruits to acquiesce to and 
support the official discourses cultivated by the IDF must not be ignored. For instance, 
Eyal Ben-Ari and Liora Sion show that civilians do not perceive Israel’s long tradition 
of compulsory conscription as a burden. Instead, reserve military service represents an 
opportunity of release from civilian responsibilities, a chance to reconnect with old 
friends, or an occasion to prove oneself through thrilling and risk-taking military 
practices. 12 Relatedly, the taking and uploading of military (self-) representations on 
the IDF’s Facebook account should not only be read as a military duty, but also as an 
indication of the Israeli military personnel’s support for and contribution to the official 
military narrative. Despite that photos circulated on the IDF’s official social media 
account could raise issues of authenticity, they are legitimate instruments for 
introducing viewers to the social, political, and symbolic order that defines the Israeli 
military culture. Therefore, this chapter situates digital (self-)images of military service 
                                                        
10 Smith, C. M. and McDonald. K. M. ‘The Mundane to the Memorial: Circulating and Deliberating the 
War in Iraq Through Vernacular Soldier-Produced Videos’, Critical Studies in Media Communication, 
28 (2011) p. 303.  
11 Adelman, R. A. ‘Sold(i)ering Masculinity Photographing the Coalition’s Male Soldiers’, Men and 
Masculinities, 11 (2009) p. 268. 
12 Sion, L. and Ben-Ari, E. ‘Imagined Masculinity: Body, Sexuality, and Family among Israeli Military 
Reserves’, Symbolic Interaction, 32 (2009) pp. 29-32. 
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within the broader power relations that define the Israel/Palestine, and assesses the 
political consequences of circulating embodied representations of military subjectivity 
within the political context of this conflict. It shows the Israeli military’s aesthetic 
representations on social media reflect ‘processes of identity production’ that introduce 
observers to the ‘discursive nature of [military] “experience” ’ and to the ‘the politics 
of its construction’.13 Thus the IDF’s digital (self-)representations provide insights with 
regard to the socio-political and historical processes that constitute the Israeli military 
subjectivity by recalling that ‘it is not individuals who have experience, but subjects 
who are constituted through experience’.14 
 The distribution of personalised representations of the Israeli military service 
carries significant implications for the Israel/Palestine conflict. They restrict local and 
international dissent against the military and the occupation, and confine the 
investigation, prosecution, and condemnation of the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians. Moreover, the representation of ‘an idealized [Israeli military] image, 
from which historical and political details, trauma or violence are stripped away’ 
depoliticise the Israel/Palestine conflict and denies the precariousness of Palestinian 
lives under the occupation. 15 The circulation of a happy, cosmopolitan, and 
humanitarian military presents the Israeli military personnel as ordinary, young 
individuals who seem incapable of harming anyone. These youthful and joyful (self-) 
representations reiterate the military personnel’s vulnerability and enhance, in advance, 
the sorrow for their possible death when confronting Palestinians. In addition, this 
positive military representation combines combat missions with humanitarian practices 
thus likening the IDF with other Western militaries that regard themselves as forces for 
good that are engaged in the global alliance against terrorism. Therefore, the 
distribution of the Israeli personalised representations of military service on social 
media cultivate an emotional link between civil and military spheres for the purposes 
of downplaying and concealing the IDF’s violence against Palestinians.  
The constitution of the Israeli benign military figure on social media that 
nurtures local and international affinity with the IDF shows the happy, cosmopolitan, 
and humanitarian military figure functions as ‘an affective vector’ that organises views, 
                                                        
13 Scott, J. W. ‘Experience’, in Feminists Theorize the Political, edited by Judith Butler and Joan W. 
Scott (New York, Routledge, 1992), p. 37. 
14 Scott, ‘Experience’, p. 26. 
15 Sakamoto, R. ‘Mobilizing Affect for Collective War Memory’, Cultural Studies, 29 (2015) p. 166. 
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desires, and attitudes of empathy and support for the military.16 Digital military (self-
)representations allow audiences to emotionally engage with the Israeli servicemen and 
women by inviting the former to express sympathy for the military. The investigation 
of the role of social media in building a sympathetic link indicate that individualised 
military images evacuate violence from military service by ‘collapsing the political and 
the personal into a world of public intimacy’ in order to cultivate consent for the IDF’s 
violent practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 17  Therefore, personalised 
representations of Israeli soldiering reduce the intelligibility of the Israel/Palestine 
conflict to the intimate experiences of military service by effacing the power structures 
that sanction military violence and that mask its instrumentality in occupying the 
Palestinian people. They direct the conversation towards Israeli individual experiences 
of military service and away from the Palestinian experience of living under the 
occupation. Moreover, these images invite those that view, comment, and circulate 
these digital images to situate themselves in the position of the Israeli military 
personnel, and to imagine them solely as victims of the political and military system 
that sustains the occupation. In this regard, the Israeli digital (self-)representations on 
social media show that,  
 
‘the filtration of war through soldiers’ feelings leads to a process of 
humanization that reduces the entire apparatus of war to the 
‘ordinary’ character and the good intentions of the soldier. As such, 
emotions do not open the road to a critical understanding of war only 
because they feed collective fear (as the literature on emotions rightly 
explains), but also because emotions anchors war in the banality of 
human feelings’.18 
 
The following section studies the personalised representations of the Israeli 
military subjectivity by examining the symbolism through which military service is 
constituted as an opportunity of release from the civilian responsibilities and as an 
occasion to travel across the land that deserves protection. 
                                                        
16 Sakamoto, ‘Mobilizing Affect’, p. 169. 
17 Berlant, L. The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship 
(Durham, NC and London, Duke University Press, 1997), p. 1.  
18 Pomarède, J. ‘Normalizing violence through front-line stories: the case of American Sniper’, Critical 
Military Studies [advanced online publication] (2016) p. 7.  
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Happy and Relaxed Servicemen and Women 
It is noteworthy that some pictures posted on the IDF’s Facebook account 
show young male and female soldiers who smile to the camera thus indicating, wittingly 
or unwittingly, that military service is an exciting, rewarding, and enjoyable activity. 
These images present Israeli military forces that exude happiness while illustrating core 
values of the military such as brotherhood in arms, camaraderie, and unity. For instance, 
the graduates of the Naval Officers course shared a group photo showing an all-male 
group of recruits forming a circle and smiling. One of the graduates disclosed his 
thoughts on finishing the course: ‘When we are at sea we depend on each other; 
brotherhood and unity are key for our success’.19 Another picture, without any caption, 
shows a group of servicemen posing with their weapons and an Israeli flag. They are 
dressed in their military uniforms and have paint on their faces suggesting they are 
preparing for or have finished a military drill.20 Whereas these (self-)representations 
provide a traditional illustration of military service since the camera focuses on 
conventional group pictures, other pictures depict camaraderie and brotherhood in a 
novel way by incorporating features that characterise (self-) representation on social 
media. Celebrating the interlinkage between camaraderie and unity with equality 
between sexes, Captain Teo Hiablochnik, an Operations Branch Officer in the Home 
Front Command, posted a selfie taken together with her cheerful peers, that is 
accompanied by the following caption: ‘I always get excited to see the new male and 
female soldiers. They don’t hesitate to show their love for the state and their 
commitment to Israel’s security and the security of its citizens’.21  
                                                        
19 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Timeline Photos’, The IDF’s Official Facebook Page, 11 March 
2016, Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/idfonline/photos/a.250335824989295.62131.125249070831305/112536502
7486366/?type=3&theater [Accessed 25 June 2017]. 
20 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Timeline Photos’, The IDF’s Official Facebook Page, 26 July 2016, 
Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/idfonline/photos/a.250335824989295.62131.125249070831305/121258709
2097492/?type=3&theater [Accessed 25 June 2017]. 
21 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Timeline Photos’, The IDF’s Official Facebook Page, 1 March 2016, 
Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/idfonline/photos/a.250335824989295.62131.125249070831305/111835528
4854007/?type=3&theater [Accessed 25 June 2017]. 
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© The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit 
Figure 2 Captain Theo Hiabochnik’s Group Selfie 
 
Similarly, a picture shows a mixed group of service men and women smiling, 
waving they hands, showing the ‘victory’ sign or their tongue to the photographer, 
while one servicewoman adopts a seductive pose for the camera. This aesthetic 
representation contests the traditional image of military forces by depicting them in a 
relaxed, humorous, and playful way thus indicating the growing links between youth, 
military, and respectively, digital culture. The readiness of the Israeli ‘soldiers [to] 
perform not only in front of the camera, but apparently even for the camera, often in 
playful, intimate, and humorous ways’ suggests the IDF aim to present military service 
in favourable terms in order to restrict dissenting practices. 22 These joyful and funny 
representations of military service permit recruits to reveal their individual 
characteristics, moderate the compulsory nature of military duty, and show that military 
enrolment does not cease the recruits’ relation with their civilian universe. The apparent 
readiness of the Israeli military to circulate images with casual representations of 
military service illustrates the IDF’s awareness that civilian support for the military 
                                                        
22 Andén-Papadopoulos, K. ‘US Soldiers Imagining the Iraq War on YouTube’, Popular 
Communication: The International Journal of Media and Culture, 7 (2009) [emphasis in original] p. 
22.  
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depends on the permeability between civil and military relations and on allowing 
military personnel to leave their imprint on the military culture. 
Furthermore, the infiltration of the digital culture in the military refashions the 
ideas of unity and brotherhood in arms by crafting the image of military service as a 
funny and amusing social experience. A number of pictures present military personnel 
enjoying themselves while re-enacting (famous) film scenes, dressing up for the Purim 
festival, or receiving the visit of pop culture icons. For example, one picture shows 
three soldiers re-enacting a scene from the famous franchise film Star Wars. The 
caption of the picture celebrates the release of the most recent part, ‘Episode VII: The 
Force Awakens: Today is the day. #ForceAwakens #StarWars’. 23  Another photo 
presents four female servicewomen who have posed for a picture while using the 
Snapchat app (that allows sending filtered pictures to a network of friends). It presents 
them dressed for winter accompanied by a snowman icon and the well-known line from 
the animated film Frozen: ‘The COLD never bothered me anyway!’. Significantly, the 
caption of the picture hints at the playfulness of military service yet indicates the 
objectification of female soldiers: ‘A cold and cute snap from our soldiers up north’.24 
Another picture disseminated on the IDF’s Instagram account shows two soldiers 
enjoying their spare time while playing soccer. Its caption reads: ‘Across #Israel, our 
#soldiers find time to take a #break and enjoy their #weekend. A little #soccer 
anyone?’.25 By forwarding pictures that illustrate moments of relaxation and respite, 
the IDF show that military life is marked by less intense moments during which 
servicemen and women ‘are alleviating boredom, releasing stress, and confirming their 
camaraderie’.26 Humour is important for the lives of the military forces insofar as jokes 
and banter contribute to the creation of a feeling of closeness and solidify their social 
bonds, which are necessary for the cohesion of the unit. An atmosphere of relaxation, 
joy, brotherhood, and harmony defines the Israeli military. Due to Israeli citizen-
                                                        
23 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Timeline Photos’, The IDF’s Official Facebook Page, 17 December 
2015, Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/idfonline/photos/a.250335824989295.62131.125249070831305/107779036
2243833/?type=3&theater [Accessed 25 June 2017]. 
24 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Timeline Photos’, The IDF’s Official Facebook Page, 26 January 
2016, Available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/idfonline/photos/a.250335824989295.62131.125249070831305/109956638
3399564/?type=3&theater [Accessed 25 June 2017].  
25 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, The IDF’s Official Instagram Page. Available at: 
https://www.instagram.com/p/yz8pEfDPvw/?hl=en [Accessed 25 June 2017]. 
26 Kennedy, L. ‘Soldiers’ photography: visualising the war in Iraq’, Review of International Studies, 35 
(2009) p. 828.  
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soldiers’ continuous transition between the civil and military spheres and the military’s 
reliance on reserve troops, the IDF favour an atmosphere of informality that preserves 
a ‘feel good’ atmosphere for the purposes of easing the burden associated with 
obligatory conscription.27  
 
 
© The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit 
Figure 3 Soldiers Re-enact a Star Wars Scene 
 
Nevertheless, the intertwining between military and popular culture references 
enables the IDF to conceal the violence of military service. Specifically, popular culture 
references such as Frozen or Star Wars (a violent film nonetheless) envisage military 
duty, war, and conflict as pleasurable and entertaining activities. Roger Stahl cautions 
against the interweaving between military and entertainment because these practices 
‘control public opinion by distancing, distracting, and disengaging the citizen from the 
realities of the war’.28 Similarly, the IDF’s (self-) representations permit local and 
international audiences ‘to plug in to the [Israeli] military publicity machine, not only 
through new media technologies but also through rhetorics that portray war as a 
“battlefield playground” ’.29  The representation of the Israeli military service as a 
                                                        
27 Sion and Ben-Ari, ‘Imagined Masculinity’, p. 24.  
28 Stahl, R. Militainment, Inc.: War, Media, and Popular Culture (New York & London, Routledge, 
2010), p. 3. 
29 Stahl, Militainment, Inc, pp. 6 & 16.  
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playful activity moderates the sacrifice of soldiers, conceals the violence to which they 
are exposed and to which they expose others, and obscures the suffering of the 
Palestinian civilians that are caught in the middle of conflict and war. Images that show 
the Israeli servicemen and women re-enacting famous scenes from films or while 
having fun with their peers ‘tend to downplay the militarized nature of the soldier’ by 
accentuating ‘instead the soldiers’ youth, playfulness, sexiness, and livelihood’. 30 
Through these cheerful digital military (self-) images, the IDF disseminate a positive 
and carefree soldiering image that disconnects the military from its violent practices, 
and moderates criticism against the militarisation of the Israeli society and against the 
military personnel’s violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Juxtaposed with 
the stereotypical image of a malevolent Palestinian young man (and woman) that 
throws stones and attacks citizens and military personnel with knifes or guns, these 
positive aesthetic representations enhance the vulnerability of the military service and 
limits the possibility to hold the IDF accountable for their violent behaviour. If violent 
episodes occur, a benign military image permits the justification of any kind of violence 
against Palestinians as self-defence, allows for imagining the Israeli military personnel 
as innocent victims, and enables shifting the responsibility of violence on Palestinians 
by assuming the latter are despicable individuals who harm young, beautiful, and happy 
citizen-soldiers.  
Finally, yet significantly, (self-)images  of Israeli soldiering in the middle of 
nature and pictures with military personnel that gaze at the landscape that rests in front 
of their eyes reinforce the representation of military service as an enjoyable activity. 
These aesthetic representations associate military service with tranquillity, relaxation, 
and reflection. Some pictures show Israeli servicemen and women carrying or being 
covered with the Israeli flag while gazing over an empty valley.31 These photos recall 
the symbolism of the pioneers, the first Jews that arrived in today’s Israel in order to 
cultivate, settle, and defend the land. This representation is linked with the well-
rehearsed narrative according to which this is an empty land without people that waits 
                                                        
30 Hochberg, Visual Occupations, p. 12.  
31 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘Timeline Photos’, The IDF’s Official Facebook Page, 26 August 
2016, Available at: 
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to be settled.32  Equally significant, Aylet Kohn emphasises that ‘photographing a 
landscape is an act of claiming ownership’ because the soldier-photographer ‘claims a 
piece of landscape, demarks it, and shares it with others’.33 Linking ownership of and 
admiration for the beauty of the nature, these pictures have a strong ideological 
significance. They represent unity between the soldier and the nature, and emphasise 
the symbolic and physical possession of the land depicted. Through these picturesque 
representations, military service becomes an opportunity to see and travel across the 
(occupied Palestinian) land thus generating ‘new cartographies of leisure rather than 
violence, thereby fictively denuding the occupation of its violence’.34 Similarly, Liam 
Kennedy recalls that pictures of landscape that present soldiers admiring or 
photographing nature denote the ‘imperial gaze of a victorious, occupying force’.35 
Through the intersection of the touristic gaze with the occupying one, the image of the 
Israeli soldier-tourist normalises the occupation, elides its violence, and sustains the 
official narrative about the occupation that envisages the Israeli military as a non-
threatening presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
The illustration of military service as a pleasant activity that allows for 
moments of playfulness and opportunity to know one’s land represents an aesthetic 
technique through which the Israeli military detaches itself from the violence that is 
inherent in military service. This image carries implications for the way in which local 
and international audiences perceive the Israeli military. It moderates the compulsory 
feature of military service by addressing the local public and the Jewish Diaspora alike. 
The circulation of a benign military representation constructs military duty less as a 
gruelling activity and more as a tranquil and enjoyable one that permits recruits to know 
the land they inhabit and defend. This image appeases recruits’ and their families’ fears 
regarding the injuries (even the death) that young men and women might experience 
during military service. Moreover, the representation of joyful, happy, and relaxed 
military personnel encourage those that access the IDF’s Facebook account to regret, 
in advance, the possible loss of these young and cheerful men and women in combat. 
Therefore, the circulation of a positive military image on social media enables the 
                                                        
32 Weissbrod, L. Israeli Identity: In Search of a Successor to the Pioneer, Tsabar and Settler (London, 
Frank Cass, 2002). 
33 Kohn, ‘Instagram as a naturalized propaganda tool’, pp. 204-5. 
34 Stein, R. L. ‘#StolenHomes: Israeli Tourism and/ as Military Occupation in Historical Perspective’, 
American Quarterly, 68 (2016) p. 551. 
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cultivation of an affective link between the IDF and the local and international 
audiences that view these digital representations. Implicitly, these aesthetic practices 
encourage those that navigate the IDF’s social media account to identify with the Israeli 
military, to sanction the legitimacy of the Israeli narrative regarding the Israel/Palestine 
conflict, and to condemn Palestinians for their readiness to injure young, happy, and 
harmless Israeli citizen-soldiers. 
 
Gender Roles in the Israeli Military 
Strong, Loving, and Protective Servicemen 
The pictures circulated on social media provide a contemporary representation 
of the figure of the ‘New Jew’, the cultural archetype of the Zionist movement. This 
image is informed by discourses of nationalism, colonialism, race, militarism, and 
Social Darwinism that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century. The ‘New Jew’ symbol represents the incarnation of the Zionist leaders’ belief 
that the process of nation building necessitated the rejuvenation of the Jewish individual 
and collective body as a remedy for the physical, psychical, and spiritual ailments of 
the Diaspora Jew.36 Its heroism, military masculinity, and fearlessness were grafted 
upon the body of the Sabras, the first generation of native Jews who were born between 
1930s and 1940s. They were the representative figures of the Six-Day War in 1967 and 
were celebrated for their courage, toughness, self-sacrifice, and dedication to defend 
the State of Israel during this war.37 More significantly, the image of the ‘new muscular 
Jew’ represents both a model of emulation for Israeli citizen-soldiers, and a political 
symbol that imposes a hierarchical view regarding the Israeli socio-political order by 
reinforcing ‘the racialized dream of the New Jew’s superiority over his Arab enemy’.38 
The Israeli military (self-)representations evoke the Sabra’s bravery, vigour, 
and masculinity in order to show the IDF provide exciting and thrilling moments during 
which recruits are expected to demonstrate their physical and mental strength. Thus 
pictures with Israeli male recruits that are engaged in exciting experiences such as 
parachuting or flying jets recall that ‘militaries (…) are quintessential sites of 
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hypermasculinity’.39 For instance, a picture illustrates servicemen (and servicewomen) 
practicing shooting, while another one shows a group of young Israeli males climbing 
ropes for the purposes of physical training.40 Another photo presents a pilot taking a 
selfie while jetting upside down above the Dead Sea. The caption of the picture appeals 
to those that view it by rhetorically asking: ‘Which is cooler: floating in the Dead Sea 
– the lowest point on earth – or flying past it upside down in an IDF fighter jet?’.41  
 
 
© IDF Spokesperson’s Unit 
Figure 4 Flying Above the Dead Sea 
Lastly, through the representation of tanks performing a military drill in the 
Golan Heights, the caption of a picture encourages recruits’ desire to join the military: 
‘Don’t you wish you could be there? IDF tank operators sum up their training period 
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with an exercise in the Golan Heights. Who wouldn’t want to ride with these guys?’.42 
These pictures recall the link between masculinity and war fighting as a rite of passage 
that transforms boys into men. The circulation of the traditional image of military 
masculinity is important for the IDF in order to nurture the fantasies of the Israeli young 
recruits who might be eager to enjoy the thrills of military service. These aesthetic 
representations envisage the Israeli military service as a site of ‘adventure and challenge 
– a modern analogue to frontier masculinity – that allow[s] a man to test his physical 
and mental abilities’.43 Therefore, representations of hypermasculinity help the IDF to 
disseminate a myth of invincibility, force, and victory over Palestinian enemies by 
showing that 
 
‘success in war is presumed to demand a constellation of qualities 
long considered the exclusive province of men: superior physical 
strength, incomparable male bonding, heroic risk taking, extremes of 
violence, and readiness to sacrifice one’s life for the cause’.44   
 
Furthermore, the Israeli representations of servicemen show that military 
masculinity is not fixed but contingent, and takes multiple forms, shapes, and 
representations concomitantly. The image of a strong and courageous male figure that 
tests himself is complemented by representations of soft masculinity in which Israeli 
male soldiers appear together with their families, especially spouses and children. For 
instance, a picture shows Private Ziv Shetrit before his draft in the Golani Brigade. 
Dressed in civilian clothes, he is hugging his wife and gazing at his baby boy.45 
Furthermore, a picture posted on Instagram is accompanied by Major Irad’s reflection 
on the relation between fatherhood and military service with the occasion of Father’s 
Day. Irad’s words stress the role of the husband and father as a patriarchal figure who 
is respected even throughout his absence: ‘The definition of #fatherhood as a military 
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person is not how much you are physically #home, but about the #quality of your 
presence. Being a good #father means that my presence is still felt even when I’m away 
from home’.46 Finally, some posts on social media celebrate the image of the future 
husband or father by forwarding pictures that depict marriage proposals. For example, 
a picture shows Sergeant First Class Y. proposing to his fiancée on the tarmac after a 
helicopter exercise. Pictured kneeling, he is offering an engagement ring to his future 
wife who is walking towards him while beaming with happiness.47  
 
 
© IDF Spokesperson’s Unit 
Figure 5 Sergeant First Class Y.’s Marriage Proposal 
  
The representation of  (heterosexual) families in these pictures ‘calls on the 
traditional theme of the masculine protector that has historically motivated men to 
fight’.48 The pictures that present the Israeli military servicemen coming home and 
meeting with their loved ones evoke idealised images of home, family, and community, 
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highlight the (potential) bodily sacrifice of the Israeli military figure, and suggest the 
emotional sacrifice of families and households who worry about their loved one’s 
safety. 49  Within the confines of this gendered representation of the military that 
celebrates the Israeli soldier as a protective figure, women appear in supporting roles 
as mothers, wives, and fiancées. Take, for instance, a picture that celebrates Mother’s 
Day by showing a male recruit who kisses and hugs his mother. The caption celebrates 
the permanent links between mothers and children and highlights the significant role 
that mothers play in the their sons’ lives:  
 
‘They watched over us as we learned to tie our shoelaces, cross the 
street, read and write. They cheered us on at our first soccer game. 
They offered a warm shoulder and a home-cooked meal on our first 
weekend back from basic training. Today, on International Mother’s 
Day, we salute all of our mothers for their unconditional love and 
support’.50 
 
The presentation of the Israeli male forces as protecting their families and 
loved ones echo Elshtain’s gendered representation of warfare as ‘just warriors’ that 
protect ‘beautiful souls’. 51  These pictures envisage the Israeli servicemen as ‘just 
warrior [who] are men of valour, protecting their homes, families, and homeland 
through warfare justly pursued’, while spouses, mothers, and fiancées appear as 
‘beautiful souls [who] are pure, naïve women who need protection and whose needs 
motivate men’s war’.52 In this context, the digital illustrations of fathers that protect 
their families through war fighting ‘domesticate’ the Israeli servicemen. Although 
almost always dressed in military uniform, the Israeli serviceman is less an individual 
that uses force and more a father, a husband, or a son. Therefore, the tropes of war, 
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conflict, and violence that accompany the image of Israeli servicemen are 
overshadowed by ‘apolitical, sentimental, patriarchal family values that function as 
modes of collective identification among civil spectators’. 53  Furthermore, these 
aesthetic military representations invite their viewers ‘to identify emotionally with the 
onscreen family’ and to create a sense of affinity with their military and civilian lives.54 
By encouraging identification with the families represented in these pictures, the IDF 
cultivate local and international support for their military practices and justify violent 
actions in the name of defending these happy and close-knit families against the 
Palestinian threat.  
Nonetheless, the absence of non-heterosexual families in these digital 
representations of the Israeli military is intriguing. The IDF present themselves as an 
inclusive military that successfully accommodates the LGBTQ recruits. For instance, 
in 2015, the Israeli military announced a change of policy that would permit same-sex 
couples to avoid a simultaneous reserve duty due to child-rearing responsibilities.55 
Moreover, the IDF revealed that they would not discriminate between same-sex couples 
and heterosexual couples with regard to either military pensions or bereavement 
military benefits.56  In spite of adopting a law in 1993 that forbade discrimination 
against the LGBTQ forces and being one of the first militaries that ended restrictions 
against openly gay forces, media reports indicate that the Israeli military personnel 
identifying as gay or lesbian are more likely to experience physical and verbal abuse 
during military service than their heterosexual peers. 57 More significantly, the 
representation of the IDF as a progressive military determined local and international 
voices to accuse Israel of pinkwashing, a practice of presenting itself as a liberal, 
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LGBTQ-friendly country for the purposes of deterring criticism against its violent 
military practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.58 
 
Competent, Domestic, and Beautiful Servicewomen 
The IDF’s Facebook account puts forward other images of femininity beyond 
the figure of the supportive mother, wife, and fiancée. Some pictures present 
professional servicewomen that serve as trailblazers for their peers or as career 
servicewomen that are happily blending military and domestic duties. Sergeant Elinoa, 
a combat soldier at the Sinai border, symbolises the archetype of a ‘professional, 
gender-neutral’ servicewoman who is integrated in the military and who is valued for 
her skills, competences, and abilities.59 The caption of her picture does not betray any 
gender stereotypes: ‘Being a soldier is about taking an oath to protect your people. 
That’s what we do’.60 Another photo shows Corporal Einav Karmi, a combat soldier in 
the Caracal Battalion (infantry combat battalion composed of servicemen and women 
alike). Pictured smiling, she reflects on the significance of serving as a female combat 
soldier: ‘I think every woman should turn the challenges in her life into experiences 
that will guide her. Let’s break the glass ceiling, so that women around the world will 
be able to pass through it’.61 Relatedly, these aesthetic representations of servicewomen 
celebrate their role as trailblazers for future generations and praise their path-breaking 
success. For instance, a picture revels the appointment of the first female naval 
commander, Captain Or Cohen. Part of the campaign #inspiringwomen, that celebrates 
the role and status of women in the Israeli military, Captain Cohen declares: ‘I am 
excited and thankful to have this opportunity. As a female officer in the IDF, I believe 
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in incorporating women in significant combat roles’. 62  Likewise, Major Oshrat 
Bachar’s picture was distributed on social media in order to celebrate her 
accomplishment as the first woman leading a combat battalion.63 The representations 
of ‘token women’ allow the Israeli military to present itself as a progressive institution 
and to dismiss any criticism against gender equality issues within the IDF. However, 
there is a suspicion that any representation that celebrates gender equality in military 
institutions carries the potential to masculinise women and to reinforce ‘the masculine 
givens of militaristic systems that restrict and repress many other women and devalue 
modes of behavior associated with femininity’.64   
Notwithstanding this scepticism, it is important to recognise the pictures 
circulated on the IDF’s Facebook account deflect this criticism by presenting the IDF 
as an institution that does not impede women from carrying traditional roles such as 
mothering and raising a family. For example, the caption of a photo that shows a 
servicewoman hugging her daughter illustrates the possibility of weaving military 
career with one’s domestic duties: ‘34% of our female career soldiers are mothers! Join 
us in saluting the dedicated moms who choose to raise a family while defending the 
State of Israel’.65 This picture nuances the ‘idealized model of femininity: pure, dutiful 
and maternal’ by showing the Israeli military gives servicewomen the possibility to 
pursue a successful military career without threatening their personal lives. 66 
Furthermore, in the Israeli military, being a mother is part and parcel of one’s military 
subjectivity and provides further qualification and justification for performing one’s 
service in an exemplary manner. A picture with Lieutenant Colonel Doctor Orly 
Weinstein highlights the links between her maternal figure and military persona. 
Presented while caring for a young girl left wounded and orphaned in the aftermath of 
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the 2011 earthquake in Japan, Weinstein reflects that ‘as a mother, doctor, and 
commander in the IDF, it was my duty to save lives’.67 
 
 
© The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit 
 
Figure 6 Lieutenant Colonel Doctor Orly Weinstein Caring For a Japanese Girl 
 
Other pictures inadvertently objectify and sexualise women in the Israeli 
military. For instance, a picture posted on the IDF’s Instagram account shows a 
servicewoman signalling an F-16 to take off. The camera focuses on the figure of the 
woman and foregrounds her bodily shape. The caption of the Instagram picture reads: 
‘Shining through the night, this #IDF signalwoman guides an F-16 to the runway for 
some #nighttime training! @israeliairforce’.68 This picture embodies the ‘male gaze’ 
trope, that implies a relation of power according to which the masculine viewer is 
powerful or empowered and the female viewed is powerless thus being subjected to the 
power of the male figure. The objectification of women in the IDF is clear in yet another 
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picture in which a servicewoman with face paint is photographed while smiling. The 
caption of the picture reads: ‘Our secret weapon’.69 
The sexualisation of female recruits is a long-standing practice in the Israeli 
military institution. Chava Brownfield-Stein has investigated early representations of 
women in the military and found that the Israeli military relies on a practice of ‘erotic 
militarization’. 70  This practice demands the circulation of sexualised images of 
servicewomen in order to deepen the appeal of military service and to foster the 
celebration of military norms and values in the Israeli society. The objectification of 
the Israeli servicewomen shows they ‘were constructed culturally as a modernist 
attraction and as a romantic attraction. Through them, hegemonic representations of the 
military were created as objects of desire, and military space appeared desirable’ for 
young Israeli men and women alike. 71  Thus the representation of the Israeli 
servicewomen as visual icons normalises the military in the Israeli society since it 
‘manages to simultaneously hide militarization behind a mask of feminine tropes – a 
light, pretty, and sexy version of war meant to conceal the violence these soldiers take 
part in’.72 Finally, yet relatedly, the femininity of servicewomen is manipulated in order 
to serve military objectives. For instance, the caption of a picture with Lieutenant Ada 
stresses that the Islamic State fighters are afraid of being defeated by women because 
this ‘completely contradicts their radical beliefs’. 73  Therefore, the diverse 
representation of servicewomen on social media shows the Israeli female military 
personnel ‘face conflicting expectations and manipulations of their femininity, 
masculinity, and sexuality’.74 It also indicates that the Israeli military is defined by a 
‘double standard, where women are required to exhibit the capabilities and the traits 
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associated with masculinity while maintaining [a] feminine appearance’, features, and 
social identities.75 
 
 
© The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit 
Figure 7 The IDF’s Secret Weapon 
 
The gendered representation of the Israeli military shows the efforts pursued 
by the IDF to present themselves as an appealing institution. (Self-)representations of 
servicemen and women on social media transform the soldiering persona in an ‘object 
of desire, not merely as a subject imposing violence’ in order to enhance the motivation 
of the Israeli recruits to serve.76  By presenting the Israeli servicemen and women 
alongside a continuum from toughness to gentleness, these aesthetic practices envision 
the IDF as an institution that accommodates recruits’ eclectic needs, fantasies, and 
desires. The military celebrates the traditional heroic and protective military figure in 
order to appeal to those recruits who are drawn to the symbolism of self-sacrifice and 
who are ready to give their lives to protect the Israeli body politic. This heroic image is 
important for the Israeli local audience and for the Jewish Diaspora alike in order to 
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reassure them of the IDF’s power to defend Israel. This is significant insofar as the 
Jewish Diaspora sees Israel as their second home, as a site of security in a hostile world, 
and as an important actor that would help Jews living outside Israel.77 Relatedly, these 
digital (self-)representations remind the Israeli citizen-soldiers that military service is 
an opportunity to test their abilities, and to prove their determination and strength. 
Aimed especially at male recruits, the pictures that objectify female military personnel, 
and that present military service as a thrilling opportunity to demonstrate one’s physical 
and mental capacities moderate the compulsory nature of military service and craft it 
as an attractive activity. These aesthetic practices transform military service into an 
appealing endeavour that extracts recruits from their mundane life and that exposes 
them to new physical, mental, and possibly sexual experiences. However, the 
presentation of military service as a desirable activity conceals not only the violence 
that is inherent in military service, but it also exposes ‘the role of desire, in sustaining 
and reinforcing the dominant material-discursive assemblages of masculinity and war’ 
that justify the enactment of violence against Palestinians in order to protect and defend 
Israel.78 
Furthermore, this gendered (self-)image of the military that illustrates 
servicemen and women with their families indicates the military’s effort to mitigate 
worries regarding the burden of military service with respect to recruits’ private lives. 
The circulation of photos that depicts the Israeli forces’ personal lives show the 
military’s acknowledgement and implicit responsibility to care for its servicemen and 
women. In this regard, the IDF temper the demanding nature of the compulsory nature 
of military service by showing they accommodate individual needs. Therefore, family 
responsibilities should not been seen as an impediment to performing one’s military 
duty. Moreover, by acknowledging the importance of family in recruits’ lives, these 
digital representations encourage families, and the broader public, to support the Israeli 
military personnel. For the IDF, it is important to present themselves as an appealing 
institution both in terms of its stimulating activities and in terms of accommodating 
family needs. This increases the readiness of recruits to serve, especially in combat 
positions where the risk for one’s life is higher than when performing one’s military 
service in auxiliary positions.  
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Finally, yet significantly, the representation of military service along a 
continuum of toughness, virtuosity, gentleness, and desirability evacuates the harm and 
injury that characterise military service and detaches recruits from the reality of military 
service. This idealised representation of military service conceals the injuries the Israeli 
military personnel might experience or perform against Palestinians, and moderates 
criticism against the military since the IDF present themselves as an institution that is 
attentive to recruits’ needs and desires. Therefore, the image of a tough and caring, 
competent, and attractive serviceman or woman detaches the IDF from their 
involvement in the Israel/Palestine conflict, and from its contribution to the occupation 
of Palestinians. The following section complements the presentation of Israeli military 
service as an appealing practice. It shows the IDF imagine themselves as a 
multicultural, professional, and humanitarian military that cares for the individual 
growth of its personnel, and that is ready to help both Palestinians and those populations 
from afar that need aid.  
 
A Multicultural, Professional, and Humanitarian Military 
An Equal Opportunity Military 
The pictures distributed on social media construct the Israeli military as a 
multicultural institution that celebrates equality and diversity across race, gender, class, 
ethnicity, or religion, despite its occasional yet alarming objectification of women. This 
is reflected in the social media campaign ‘#idfdiversityweek’ (2015), when the IDF’s 
Facebook account circulated photos of servicemen and women who shared their stories 
of moving to Israel. Having immigrated from Chicago in 1995, Captain Gur Green 
expressed his admiration for the Israeli military for giving servicemen and women the 
opportunity to grow as individuals: ‘The IDF is a place where equality is an important 
value and where each individual can utilize their skills to advance and succeed 
wherever they may serve’.79 Likewise, Private Sevilla left Cuba in order to build a new 
life in Israel: ‘Joining the IDF is the first step of the life I want to have here’.80 Other 
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pictures present stories of Ethiopian Jews that were brought to Israel during Operation 
Moses (evacuation of Ethiopian Jews in 1984) or Operation Solomon (evacuation of 
Ethiopian Jews in 1991).81 For example, a photo shows a beaming Sergeant Major Moti 
posing in front of an aircraft. Rescued as a child, he is proud to serve as an aircraft 
painter for a Hercules airplane, similar to the one that has brought him to Israel: ‘It’s 
closing an emotional circle. I’m proud to serve in the Air Force and proud to be working 
with this special plane’.82 The multicultural configuration of the military is captured by 
Sergeant Fhadi Kurani’s picture and its message: ‘In our battalion, there is no difference 
between Bedouins, Christian, Jews or Muslims. We all eat together, sleep together and 
celebrate together’. 83  These pictures evoke a sense of belonging and construct a 
narrative through which all soldier-citizens, irrespective of their roots, belong to the 
same military and nation.  
Even though the IDF are officially embracing and promoting multiculturalism, 
research shows immigrants’ integration in Israel is flawed insofar as it reinforces class 
and ethnic divisions within the military and society. For instance, a comparison between 
military experiences of middle-class Jews (Ashkenazi Jews) and of lower-class Jews 
(Mizrahi Jews) shows the former enjoy allocation in elite units, while the latter group 
is marginalised and is relegated to performing menial and lower-ranking jobs during 
their military service.84 Likewise, Dana Kachtan’s analysis of two brigades (Golani and 
respectively, the Paratroopers Brigade) shows the Israeli recruits produce, maintain, 
and reiterate ethnic and class differences through their behaviour, actions, and the ways 
in which they perceive their participation in the military.85 Furthermore, Russian Jews’ 
personal narratives of military service show they are keen on questioning the native 
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born Israeli Jews’ approach to military service, and to criticise the easiness with which 
they yield to the Israeli state narrative regarding military service and the Israel/Palestine 
conflict.86 Other Russian immigrants find it difficult to develop a network of friendship 
in the military, deplore their relegation to office work, and are at pains to feel any 
national or patriotic attachment to the army. Instead, they prefer to focus on economic 
and social benefits that result from being recruited in the military.87  
 
 
© The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit  
Figure 8 Sergeant Major Moti and His Aircraft 
 
Nevertheless, the presentation of military as an equal opportunity organisation 
is important for the Israeli military and the society since it envisages Israel as an 
enlightened and civilised actor that serves as an example for other states at the regional 
and global levels. The IDF appear as an institution that provides opportunities for 
servicemen and women to express their cultural differences and to contribute to the 
Israeli society. This idealised representation is important both for recruiting further 
Diaspora Jews to the IDF and for deflecting criticism against its violent presence in the 
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Occupied Palestinian Territories. Therefore, the presentation of the military as an 
inclusive organisation permits Israel to present itself ‘as a modern, democratic and 
normal society – a society dedicated to prosperity and life that faces an enemy with a 
so-called passion for death’. 88  Through this artificial image, the IDF adopt an 
exemplary and morally superior feature in order to limit dissent against military 
personnel while encouraging the condemnation of hostility against Palestinians who are 
believed to hold contradictory values, beliefs, and ideas.  
Moreover, the IDF’s (self-)representation as a tolerant and multicultural 
institution depends on presenting military service as an opportunity for self-realization. 
This is an image that normalises violence and contributes to the militarisation of the 
Israeli society. For instance, Corporal Colin, who posed for a traditional military 
portrait, reflects upon the responsibilities of being a commander: 
 
‘Being a commander is something that has really affected me. It made 
me see the army from both points of view, the soldier’s and the 
commander’s. For the year to come, I hope I will be a better 
commander to better help my soldiers in need, and maybe even coach 
others to be more caring and professional commanders’.89 
 
Likewise, First Sergeant Orr posted a selfie while reflecting on the skills he 
learnt during the Deputy course, abilities that will serve him in the future: ‘I learned 
how to be authoritative, resolve conflicts, and lead a team. Those qualities will stay 
with me forever’.90 Lastly, Lieutenant Amir reveals the personal satisfaction of serving 
in a commanding position. Dressed in his pilot uniform, in an illustration that reminds 
of Tom Cruise’s iconic role in Top Gun, Lieutenant Amir discloses that ‘even when my 
soldiers fail or make mistakes, I don’t leave them. They start out low and get to a high 
place, both professionally and personally. That’s what I love about this job – that I get 
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to help in the development of my soldiers’.91 This representation of military service 
contributes to the militarisation of the Israeli society and to the normalisation of 
violence among the Israeli citizen-soldiers by concealing the inescapable reality of 
military service – physical and mental injury that might accompany the Israeli military 
personnel throughout their lives. In this regard, the presentation of military service as a 
practice of individual growth enables the ‘potential use of lethal force [to] appear [as] 
rational and desirable to young individuals’.92 Moreover, the illustration of military 
service as an opportunity for personal development enhances young recruits’ desire to 
join the IDF, and nurtures the Israeli public’s support for the military and its practices 
by presenting military service as a useful endeavour for advancing the Israeli recruits’ 
professional careers. Likewise, Victoria Basham believes that the presentation of 
military service as a means of individual growth ‘promote[s] popular support for war 
by presenting the military, its practices, and its personnel as socially and economically 
productive’ thus concealing the violence that is inherent in military service. 93 
Nevertheless, the presentation of military service as a self-realisation practice carries 
significant implications for the Israel/Palestine conflict. It conceals the harm that the 
Israeli military personnel might enact therefore constraining the Israeli public’s dissent 
against the military and encouraging the cultivation of a positive attitude towards the 
IDF. This romanticised military representation strengthens the affective boundaries that 
characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict by contrasting between the Israeli military’s 
professionalism and the assumed image of vile, suspicious, and violence-prone 
Palestinians. Through this antagonistic representation, the IDF strengthen the official 
narratives according to which Israeli military’s violence against Palestinians is pursued 
solely for self-defence purposes.  
 
A Benign Military 
The positive image of the Israeli military is reinforced by the presentation of 
military personnel that carry humanitarian missions in countries affected by natural or 
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man-made disasters. The IDF’s Facebook account shows pictures with Israeli 
servicemen and women that travelled to Nepal, Haiti, or Japan in the aftermath of their 
respective natural catastrophes in order to help their populations to rebuild their lives. 
For instance, a picture shows Colonel Doctor Tarif Bader holding a baby in his arms 
while its caption praises his professional achievements for having led rescue and 
humanitarian missions in Syria, Nepal, and Haiti.94  Other photos present the IDF 
delivering aid or searching for survivors in the aftermath of the earthquake in Nepal.95 
This aesthetic representation enhances local and international support for the military 
by enabling ‘the discursive construction of the [Israeli] soldier as an ordinary rather 
than an exceptional professional engaged in aid and reconstruction work as much as in 
combat situations and fighting insurgency’.96 This image carries significant political 
implications. It reassures the Israeli public of the strength of the military to defend the 
Israeli nation, and guarantees the international community that the IDF are heroes and 
moral forces that are committed to helping those less fortunate rather than harming 
them. Aesthetic representations that present the humanitarian role of the IDF are 
‘reconstituting them as a matter of private affect and morality, thus naturalizing their 
existence as a normal, even laudable, aspect of the overall social order’.97 Therefore, 
the (self-)representation of the Israeli military as compassionate extracts the military 
personnel from the geopolitical complexity of the Israel/Palestine conflict, and situates 
them alongside other Western forces that pursue humanitarian and combat missions 
alike.  
Furthermore, the humanitarian image of the Israeli military positions the 
Israeli servicemen and women collectively and individually against Palestinians. The 
constitution of the Israeli military personnel as humanitarian forces creates further 
distance between Israeli recruits and Palestinians by presenting the former as 
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responsible, altruistic, and caring military figures during their military service in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. For instance, during the military intervention in the 
Gaza Strip in 2014, the IDF used access to digital technology in order to stress its 
commitment to humanitarian laws during military operations. Under the ‘Just so you 
know’ campaign that circulated on social media, the IDF’s official Facebook page 
distributed a series of pictograms with messages as the following: ‘During the 2014 
Israel-Gaza Conflict, the IDF warned the civilian population in Gaza of impending 
strikes in order to give them time to evacuate the area. The majority of missile fired by 
Hamas were directed at Israeli civilians’.98 Likewise, another pictogram indicated that 
the IDF pursued this military intervention according to the requirements of international 
law: ‘Before the 2014 Israel-Gaza Conflict, the IDF approved all potential targets with 
a Military Advocate-General officer in order to confirm their legality. Hamas 
disregarded international law and fired most of its missiles at Israeli population 
centers’.99 Finally, another picture circulated on social media, during the Operation 
Protective Edge in 2014, showed aid parcels accompanied by the following message: 
‘Hamas forces Palestinian civilians to suffer. Hamas is responsible for the humanitarian 
situation in Gaza’ while stressing that it ‘deprived Palestinian citizens of vital 
humanitarian aid’ by breaking the ceasefire on August 1st, 2014.100 The representation 
of the Israeli forces as a military that respects humanitarian values, and that shames 
Hamas for their contempt for human life and for their threatening potential to 
international security situate the Israeli servicemen and women along other Western 
forces who are imagined as leading a just fight against a greater evil. For instance, 
Simon Dalby stresses that Western forces ‘are key figures of the post September 11th 
era, physically securing the West, and simultaneously securing its identity as the 
repository of virtue against barbaric threats to civilization’. 101  Although there are 
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geopolitical nuances that situate the Israeli military in a different syntax of violence and 
conflict – mandatory conscription, occupation, political deadlock concerning peace 
progress, and Hamas actorness – the IDF draw on similar Western discourses and 
practices of security that characterise the post-9/11 socio-political order. Through its 
imaginary resemblance to the Western militaries, the IDF present themselves as an 
actor that protects and defends the Western collective values and security for the 
purposes of gaining international sympathy for its practices. For example, the IDF’s 
official Facebook page distributes a series of pictures in which the Israeli defence forces 
are performing joint training sessions with other Western troops in order to indicate the 
IDF’s readiness to be involved in international alliances against radical threats.102  
Other aesthetic representations show the Israeli military personnel as 
goodhearted individuals who help, care, and save Palestinians that experience difficult 
circumstances. A series of pictures shows medical officers caring for a Palestinian baby 
under the gaze of their mother.103 Another photo presents a couple of soldiers from Kfir 
Brigade helping a Palestinian ambulance caught in the snowstorm. The message that 
accompanies the picture distributed on Facebook reads: ‘A Palestinian ambulance 
carrying a very sick woman was stuck in the snow. Luckily, soldiers from the Kfir 
Brigade were there to help. In the chaos of the snowstorm, the IDF never lost track of 
its values. Share if you think the world should know’.104 Lastly, another picture shows 
Israeli servicemen and women cooperating with Palestinian paramedics to help a young 
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Palestinian man after being wounded in a car accident while a picture distributed on 
Instagram shows an Israeli soldier offering water to a Palestinian girl.105  
The emphasis on the Israeli military personnel’s kindness and sympathy for 
Palestinians discloses an Orientalising narrative that situates Palestinians in the position 
of victims who depend on the good willingness of the Israeli forces. Similarly, Sherene 
Razack has studied the (self-)representations of Canadian military personnel that served 
in Somalia and showed the saviour figure of Western peacekeepers reiterates national 
mythologies of racial superiority and discourses of advanced and civilised states.106 
Images in which Western militaries appear as if aiding victims of violence, war, and 
conflict reveal the former nurture ‘a simplistic and colonial understanding of their role 
as being about helping those less fortunate, a charitable act that requires properly 
grateful recipients who must be seen as deserving’. 107  Carrying similar racialising 
features, the digital (self-)representations of the IDF as committed to helping 
Palestinians mobilise support for the Israeli forces and discourage criticism against their 
violent presence and practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The images with 
the Israeli servicemen and women as kind-hearted and caring troops preclude a debate 
about their contribution and, in more general terms, Israel’s contribution to 
Palestinians’ suffering. 
This criticism is far from implying that the Israeli servicemen and women are 
not likely to act in a moral manner, with restraint or trying to prevent their peers from 
acting in a violent way. Equally significant, this criticism does not dismiss that the 
Israeli military personnel face life-and-death situations and that Palestinians might 
threaten their lives. Rather, this chapter highlights the political power and danger of the 
narrative that imagines the Israeli military personnel as subjects that carry, display and 
act according to universal values and respect for human life. Imbued with moral 
superiority, this idealised military subjectivity negates Palestinians’ hardship of living 
under the occupation and depicts them as subjects that depend on the Israeli servicemen 
and women’s assistance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Similarly, Erella 
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Grassini’s investigation of Israeli soldiers’ practices of ‘moral othering’ indicates that 
discourses of competence, professional skills, and desire to keep checkpoints ‘in order’ 
function construct Palestinian civilians as inferior and hostile individuals that threaten 
soldiers’ moral self-identity.108 By presenting itself as a humanitarian military that aids 
Palestinians and that is part of a global alliance of fighting radical forces, the IDF do 
not only depoliticise and moderate the complexity of the Israel/Palestine conflict, but 
they also devalue Palestinian claims to suffering by implying, through a benevolent 
image, the innocence of the Israeli military personnel.  
 
 
© The IDF’s Spokesperson’s Unit 
Figure 9 The IDF Provide Medical Help to a Palestinian Baby 
 
Palestinians on the IDF’s Facebook Account 
The construction of the IDF as a moral military institution is aided by the 
presentation of Palestinians as stereotypical villains that threaten and harm Israeli 
civilians and military personnel. A series of pictures shows young Palestinian males 
being recruited, trained, and indoctrinated by Hamas. Rather than disputing the source 
of and the authenticity of these pictures, this section concentrates on the political 
function of their distribution on the IDF’s social media account. Allegedly, these 
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photographs show Palestinian young boys waiting in a queue in front of masked men 
who are registering the boys’ details thus giving the impression these young 
Palestinians are future Hamas recruits. Some pictures show Palestinian male youth 
maneuvering weapons while others present them performing a grueling physical 
training.109 The distribution of pictures that show the greediness of Hamas to recruit 
young boys coupled with images of dangerous Palestinian youngsters articulate an 
imaginary that assumes the IDF have to confront a 
 
‘dangerous enemy, bound by different (or absent) moral codes and 
rules of engagement, and possessed of (simultaneously) known yet 
unknowable capabilities and a lethal capacity for violence. 
Constructions of the enemy Other conform to the ideas predicted by 
the concept: he (always he) is strange, foreign, different, bestial, 
unjustified and vicious’.110 
 
Likewise, Susan L. Carruthers highlights that contemporary representations of 
conflict are marked by an Orientalised and vilifying discourse of enemies within which 
‘almost never do we see insurgents as anything other than spectral, kaffiyeh-clad 
figures, slung with machine guns and ammunition belts’.111 Through this Orientalised 
perspective, the Israeli servicemen and women appear ‘in a moral and physical clash 
with an essentialised Palestinian body, designated primarily as terrorist and lacking 
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moral values’.112 This representation of Palestinian subjectivity is important for the 
formation of Israeli servicemen and women’s moral(ising) subjectivities since the latter 
are cultivated through the exclusion and marginalisation of any possible identification 
with Palestinians. As Wilcox argues, ‘in the subject’s process of becoming [Israeli 
citizen-soldier’s], it must attempt to delineate its body from others, and to create clear 
boundaries between the self’s inside and outside’. 113  The vilification and the 
hypermasculinisation of the Palestinian body permit the reinforcement of the image of 
the ‘tough and tender’ Israeli serviceman or woman as someone that is enacting just 
violence in order to defend the security of the state.114 Therefore, the cultivation of an 
antagonistic representation between the Israeli military personnel and Palestinians 
illustrate the significance of studying the gendered and racialised practices, symbols, 
and assumptions that justify the IDF’s violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
The (self-)representation of a cosmopolitan and humanitarian military 
personnel serves both the IDF’s internal and external images since it envisages the 
military as a force for good that helps others rather than as an instrument of force 
deployment in combat operations. By likening the IDF with other Western militaries 
engaged in combat and humanitarian practices, this military (self-)image depoliticises 
the Israel/Palestine conflict, moderates its complexity, and curbs the representation of 
the Israeli military personnel as subjects responsible for enforcing the occupation of 
Palestinian territories and people. Therefore, the circulation of this idealised military 
subjectivity permits the IDF to reject military personnel’s violence against Palestinians 
as a breach of military discipline or as an exceptional military behaviour that does not 
conform to the Israeli military’s moral standards. Confronted with this multicultural 
and humanitarian (self-)representation and coupled with their illustration as radical 
freedom fighters, Palestinians’ suffering under the occupation is not accepted in the 
Israeli public sphere since they are viewed as radical violent actors, as passive victims 
of radicalisation, or as victims of their political and military leaders. In this respect, the 
chapter highlights that the IDF’s violence against Palestinians is informed by ‘cultural 
practices and ideas, discourses, objects and materialities that shape the conditions of 
possibility in which violence takes place, but it is also animated by performances of 
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war and war preparedness in everyday life’ such as military (self-)representations on 
social media.115 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explores the contemporary (self-)representation of Israeli military 
subjectivity on the IDF’s official Facebook account. It claims these digital (self-
)representations represent aesthetic practices that capture, circulate, and invite emotions 
for the purposes of constituting a romanticised joyful, multicultural, and humanitarian 
military figure that shields the IDF from criticism and accountability for their violent 
practices. The photos examined reveal the socio-cultural and political context that 
characterises the Israeli military culture since ‘representations are not innocent, 
transparent, or true; they do not simply “reflect” reality. They help constitute it’.116 
With an awareness of the pitfalls of investigating the IDF’s official representation on 
social media, the chapter focuses on the affective baggage of the symbols, figures, 
motifs, and patterns through which the Israeli romanticised military subjectivity is 
constructed and studies the political implications of disseminating this exemplary 
image to local and international audiences. To this end, it stresses the IDF’s Facebook 
account functions as a social and affective space in which relations of difference and 
belonging, of solidarity and antagonism, of empathy and enmity are articulated and 
evoked for the purposes of moderating criticism against the Israeli military’s violent 
practices. Therefore, by highlighting that pictures distributed on social media ‘possess 
emotional power, which can contribute to defining and redefining public sentiment and 
perceptions’, the chapter stresses that the circulation of embodied representations of 
Israeli military subjectivity depoliticises, conceals, and justifies the IDF’s violence 
against Palestinians. 117  
First, the constitution of social media as an affective space indicates that 
personalised representations of the Israeli military service reinforce the perpetuation of 
violence within the Israel/Palestine conflict. Digital (self-)representations provide 
embodied portrayals of Israeli soldiering that are instrumental for disguising the 
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Talk, edited by Miriam G. Cooke and Angela Woollacott (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), 
p. 36. 
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violence of the occupation and for downplaying the public’s criticism against the 
military and the militarisation of the Israeli society. Therefore, the image of a happy, 
young, and kind-hearted military ‘neutralizes any critical sense as it de-contextualizes 
the violence of war’ because it directs our attention to the personal lives of the Israeli 
men and women that are performing their military duty rather than towards criticising 
their reasons behind their participation in conflict, war, and violence.118 Personalised 
representations of the Israeli military service normalise violence in the Israeli society 
by circulating photos that allow us ‘to see things that we love to see: images of soldiers 
that are equally poignant and exciting, sutured into a narrative of military skill that 
represents (…) competency and superiority’.119 Nevertheless, the seductive power of 
military profiles conceals the violence enacted or experienced by the Israeli servicemen 
and women since online ‘seduction counts on appearances, but that does not mean it 
cannot have real consequences. What is ‘just for fun’ for some people becomes deadly 
serious for others’. 120  Through personalised representation of military service, the 
IDF’s Facebook account invites social media users to think about the Israeli military 
personnel as vulnerable and innocent victims and to implicitly disregard their 
instrumentality in maintaining the occupation. 
Second, the constitution of the IDF’s social media account as an affective 
space shows the military’s efforts to cultivate support for its practices and to elicit 
hostility towards Palestinians. The IDF’s Facebook account distributes romanticised 
descriptions of military subjectivity, and photos that vilify Palestinians by constructing 
them as dangerous and fearsome individuals. Therefore, these digital self-
representations allow the IDF to disguise violence against Palestinians as a self-defence 
endeavour and to deter criticism against the military’s violent behaviour and presence 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In this regard, the dissemination of military 
representations reinforces not only feelings of affinity and belonging regarding the IDF, 
but it also excludes those views that do not support the military. The IDF’s digital (self-
)representations illustrate Parry and Thumim’s views regarding the role of military 
images in silencing criticism:  
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‘The undeniable efforts to increase portrayals which encourage 
empathy with soldiers, veterans and their families might offer an 
attractive and affective notion of ‘who we are’ as a nation for some 
people (along with an opportunity for soldiers or veterans to self-
identify in positive terms), but it can prompt unintended 
consequences as well: excluding those who would be politically 
resistant to what they see as a creeping militarisation or celebration 
of militarism’.121  
 
The digital distribution of images with virtuous, cosmopolitan, and 
humanitarian military personnel is important for shaping civil-military relations in 
Israel insofar as it crafts consent for the military and limits criticism against the IDF’s 
violent practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Social media is important for 
the Israeli military because it constructs an emotional link between the Israeli society 
and the military, it strengthens the attractiveness, desirability, and fascination with 
military service, and its circulation of its idealised military representation reinforce the 
justness of the IDF’s presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Therefore, the 
chapter shows that the Israeli military plays an active role in enhancing the permeability 
of civil-military relations in Israel. The IDF use the happy, cosmopolitan, and 
humanitarian military figure in order to manage the continuous support for and the 
positive public perception of the Israeli military personnel. In this regard, the 
constitution of this romanticised military figure for the purposes of confining criticism 
shows the role of social media in expanding the disciplinary features of the Israeli 
military beyond its institutional confinement. The Israeli military’s astute use of digital 
technology in order to build kinship and affinity with the IDF shows that social media 
ensures that ‘some bodies are regulated and trained to fight wars’ while ‘other bodies 
are disciplined or “militarized” to support them’.122 The following chapter continues 
the investigation of the social practices that construct and nurture a virtuous Israeli 
military subjectivity. It studies episodes of violent interaction between the Israeli 
military personnel and Palestinians, and maps out the emotions that accompany 
rhetorical practices through which the IDF’s violence against Palestinians is justified, 
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reinterpreted, and denied. The chapter examines both the emotions captured in 
narratives and representations of violence and their affective echoes and reverberations 
in the Israeli public sphere in order to reveal the role of a variety of actors, processes, 
and emotions in sustaining violence within the Israel/Palestine conflict.  
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Chapter 4: Responses, Allegations, and Controversies About 
the IDF’s Violence against Palestinians 
 
‘They are after us when we are alive, and even when we are dead’.1 
 
This chapter studies the construction of military subjectivity in the public 
sphere by investigating responses, allegations, and controversies regarding violent 
episodes that took place between Palestinians and the Israeli military personnel. 
Military subjectivity is constructed not only through educational practices or through 
(self-)representations on social media. It is also constituted through the discursive 
moves through which the Israeli media, public figures, military, and political 
authorities, or citizen-soldiers present and engage with military practices in the public 
sphere. Similarly, Christina S. Jarvis’s study of the construction of American 
masculinity during the Second World War indicates that bodies are ‘historically and 
culturally located entities shaped not only by institutions such as schools, the military, 
and the media, but also by the fields that study them’.2 By arguing that ‘bodies exist in 
complex fields of cultural discourses and practices’, the author examines the role of the 
American institutions in ‘enculturat[ing] bodies through the creation of regulatory 
medical and social norms as well as through disciplinary techniques’.3  
Since a myriad of discourses and practices shape and attach bodies with 
meanings, and implicitly, imbue them with subjectivity, this chapter engages with the 
rhetorical practices through which political and military authorities, journalists, Israeli 
citizen-soldiers or public figures construct the Israeli military and respectively, 
Palestinian subjectivities in the public sphere. Specifically, by studying the echoes and 
reactions to violent interactions between the Israeli military and Palestinians, it claims 
rhetorical practices are imbued with emotional meaning that enables the 
reinterpretation, justification, and depoliticisation of the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians.  
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In order to develop this argument, the chapter examines the affective responses 
and passionate debates provoked by the circulation of visual representations showing 
the Israeli military personnel’s violent behaviour against Palestinians. Corner and Parry 
stress that violations of military ethos and their reverberation in the public sphere 
provide insights about the social and political order within which the military 
functions.4 In this regard, the study of the reluctance to investigate, prosecute, and 
condemn the IDF for their violence against Palestinians focuses not only on ‘the initial 
news coverage, but [also on] the mediated public debates ignited by such events which 
offer key moments to explore the delineations of exceptionality, transgression, national 
identity, separateness and belonging in such expressions’.5 The examination of the 
emotional engagement with visual representations of the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians shows that rhetorical practices that address the military’s hostility against 
Palestinians capture, circulate, and elicit emotions that constitute a vulnerable and 
defenceless military subjectivity. This image informs the conviction that the ‘IDF is the 
most moral army in the world’, and nurtures the public, military, and political tolerance 
for the Israeli military’s violence pursued in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
To this end, the chapter investigates three violent episodes that took place 
across the West Bank, and whose visual illustrations were distributed in the local and 
international public sphere. They were chosen because they garnered attention from 
both local and international audiences, and because they resonate with the growing 
humanitarian and scholarly concerns regarding the IDF’s violence against Palestinian 
teenagers and children. For instance, authors like Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkin and 
human rights actors such as Defence for Children International - Palestine highlight 
the precarious existence of Palestinian children living under the occupation, and their 
exposure to military and judicial treatment that breaches their human rights.6 
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The first episode examined in this chapter took place in Nabi Saleh, when an 
unnamed masked Israeli soldier, and armed with an assault rifle, was photographed 
keeping Mohammed Tamimi, an 11-year-old Palestinian boy, in a headlock. The 
pictures, showing Mohammed’s female relatives trying to free him and to tear the 
soldier’s mask, provoked outrage in the international media. In order to alleviate the 
international criticism against the IDF, the Israeli military and political authorities 
presented the Israeli soldier as a victim of the Palestinian aggressiveness while arguing 
that the teenager and his family had provoked the incident and consequently attacked 
him. The second one discusses a violent event that took place in Hebron. David 
Adamov, a soldier in the Nahal Brigade, was filmed cocking his rifle at a couple of 
Palestinian teenagers. When he was allegedly jailed for his behaviour, his peers, 
members of the Israeli public, and political and military figures rallied behind David 
and launched an online campaign of solidarity with him. The reactions to Adamov’s 
violent behaviour were similar to the ones that accompanied the Nabi Saleh episode 
because they presented him as a defenceless victim who was provoked by the 
Palestinian youth to breach the military discipline. The final episode investigated here 
took place in Beitunia, near Ramallah. Cameras from a local shop filmed Ben Deri, an 
Israeli border policeman accompanied by military troops, while shooting at two 
teenagers with fire ammunition. The Israeli military and political reactions to the 
Beitunia episode were different from the first two cases of violence. Whereas the 
reactions to the first two episodes shifted the blame from the Israeli forces to the 
Palestinian teenagers, the events in Beitunia were presented as a fabricated episode of 
violence since a number of military, political, and public figures expressed suspicion 
regarding the reliability of the visual evidence circulated by the Palestinian shop owner.  
The examination of these episodes of violence shows the reverberations and 
responses that accompanied these episodes of violence reinforce the affective 
boundaries that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict by inviting sympathy, support, 
and compassion for Israeli Jewish citizen-soldiers and respectively, anger, doubt, fear, 
and aversion towards Palestinians. The circulation of emotions in the Israeli public 
sphere constitutes antagonistic subjectivities within the Israel/Palestine conflict while 
showing that Israeli and Palestinian ‘bodies are neither stable in themselves nor in 
relations to other bodies, but rather are produced through their relations’ with each 
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other.7 The reiteration of this antagonism between Israeli Jews and Palestinians is 
important for the consolidation of the benign image of the IDF, for the strengthening 
of the public’s positive perception of the Israeli military, and for the moderation of the 
IDF’s accountability for the violence enacted in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
Therefore, this chapter highlights that the tolerance for the Israeli military’s violent 
behaviour against Palestinians is informed by ‘the boundaries of who we can imagine 
to be close to, who is conceivable as lovable and mournable’ while these relations ‘are 
formed and maintained’ through the affective representation of subjects in the public 
sphere. 8  Specifically, it insists the rhetorical engagement with the IDF’s violence 
against Palestinians embodies, circulates, and elicits emotions that construct a 
vulnerable and defenceless military figure and imagine Palestinians as threatening and 
cunning individuals. This emotional investment in debates about the violent encounters 
between Israeli Jews and Palestinians indicates the role of rhetorical practices in 
reinforcing the exemplarity of the latter, and in restricting the possibility to perceive the 
Israeli military as enacting violence outside the confines of self-defence. The chapter 
concludes by highlighting the importance of studying violence in the Israel/Palestine 
conflict at the intersection of media, emotions, and visual representations, and cautions 
against envisaging the latter solely as driving forces behind progressive politics in war 
and conflict. 
 
Nabi Saleh, West Bank: Mohammed Tamimi and the Masked Soldier 
In August 2015, in Nabi Saleh, in the West Bank, an Israeli soldier was 
photographed while trying to subdue a twelve-year-old Palestinian boy. The child, 
Mohammed Tamimi, was suspected of having thrown stones at the Israeli forces. One 
of the pictures of this event, available online, shows a masked soldier with one hand 
holding his weapon and with the other one holding the neck of the Palestinian boy. A 
closer look at the picture shows the Israeli soldier is in distress, not knowing how to 
act. In another one, the soldier is trying not only to overcome the Palestinian boy, but 
also to fight the women and men that came to help him, while fellow soldiers are 
watching rather than intervening. Finally, a photo shows the boy’s sister, Ahed Tamimi, 
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biting the soldier’s hand in an attempt to release her brother.9 The incident in Nabi 
Saleh, recorded by a camera and disseminated in the public space, is one in the many 
that unfold across the West Bank and it hardly represents a novelty. The pictures 
circulated show the chaotic, the intimate, and the ludicrousness of the occupation while 
revealing the power asymmetry between the Israeli military personnel and Palestinian 
civilians. 
 
 
© Reuters/Mohamad Torokan  
Figure 10 The Masked Soldier and Mohammed Tamimi  
 
The distribution of these pictures across local and international media is partly 
due to the fact that Nabi Saleh is a hotspot for Palestinian activism against the 
occupation. In Nabi Saleh, the Israeli military forces and Palestinians clash in a 
ritualised manner every Friday, when old and young, local and international activists 
protest the occupation while carrying flags, banners, and cameras. The protests are part 
of the Nabi Saleh Solidarity Campaign supported by international and local activists. 
Bassem Tamimi, Mohammed’s father, initiated this campaign in 2009 in order to 
protest the building of Halamish (Neve Tzuf) settlement, and the settlers’ appropriation 
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of the nearby water spring and respectively, of the private Palestinian land. 10 
Considered a ‘prisoner of conscience’ by Amnesty International, Tamimi was arrested 
numerous times for his political activism. Moreover, his family’s activism is widely 
covered in the international media because it is at the forefront of the demonstrations 
against the occupation and against Jewish settlers’ appropriation of the water spring. 
His brother-in-law, Rushdie Tamimi, was killed during a demonstration and a teargas 
canister harmed another family member, Mustafa Tamimi. 11  Ahed, Mohammed’s 
sister, was pictured showing her fist to an Israeli soldier in 2012, a photo that 
determined the Turkish government to give her a bravery award and a smartphone as a 
prize.12   
When he witnessed the violent episode examined in this chapter, Eric 
Cortellesa was attending for the first time a protest in Nabi Saleh. Writing for The Times 
of Israel, he describes these events in the following manner:  
 
‘It was my first time at the weekly protest. For everyone else there, it 
was ritual. They greeted each other like members of a football team 
before taking the field. Once I arrived at the demonstrators’ 
rendezvous, I asked someone standing next to me what to expect from 
the impending protest. “We’ll start marching down the road, then the 
army will be waiting for us. Once we get to a certain point, they’ll 
start throwing tear gas at us, then kids will start throwing rocks at 
them on top of the hill,” he said. “And then it will go back and forth 
like that. And we’ll take lots of pictures,” he added’.13 
  
Despite that Cortellesa’s description of the Nabi Saleh’s protests insists on the 
ritualised nature of protests in the West Bank, one should not disregard their political 
significance. For instance, Ben Ehrenreich stresses that Palestinians’ protests are 
important for contesting the occupation. In his description of a Friday protest in Nabi 
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Saleh, other than the one examined in this section, Ehrenreich recounts a fleeting yet 
symbolic moment in which protesters, to security forces and settlers’ dismay, reached 
the water spring thus causing Jewish settlers’ physical and political unease. The 
description of the protest is worth quoting extensively: 
 
‘As usual, Israeli Army jeeps were waiting below the spring. The four 
soldiers standing outside them looked confused – it seemed they 
hadn’t expected the protesters to make it so far. The villagers marched 
past them to the spring, where they surprised three settlers eating 
lunch in the shade, still wet from a dip in one of the pools. The kids 
raced past. The grown-ups filed in, chatting and smoking. More 
soldiers arrived in body armor, carrying rifles and grenade launchers. 
Four settlers appeared on the ledge above the spring, young men in 
sunglasses and jeans, one of them carrying an automatic rifle. Beside 
me, a sturdy, bald officer from the Israel Defense Forces argued with 
an Israeli protester. “I let you come,” the officer insisted. “Now you 
have to go.” The children piled onto the swing the settlers had built 
and swung furiously, singing. A young settler argued with the I.D.F. 
officer, insisting that he clear the protesters away. “What difference 
does 10 minutes make?” the officer said. “Every 10 seconds makes a 
difference,” the settler answered. But before their 10 minutes were 
up, one hour after they arrived, the villagers gathered the children and 
left as they had come, clapping and chanting, their defiance buoyed 
by joy. For the first time in two and a half years, they had made it to 
the spring’.14 
   
This chapter shows that despite the growing awareness regarding the causes 
and the goals of Nabi Saleh’s protests, the presence of journalists and recording cameras 
may not always contest the dominant narratives that characterise the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. Referring to the episode with Mohmmed Tamimi, Anshel Pfeffer highlights 
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that images from the Occupied Palestinian Territories are continuously subjected to 
manipulative interpretations:  
 
‘Right-wing apologists of course have been quick to brand this as 
another “Pallywood” production and pointed out that the Palestinian 
family are known “troublemakers” who routinely stage such scenes. 
No amount of PR and media management will make the occupation 
of another nation look good, regardless of whether you think this is 
all their fault and it’s not an occupation because, as Naftali Bennett 
says, a nation cannot be an occupier in its own land. If we’re not 
occupying territory, then we sure as hell are occupying another 
people, and at the end of the day Israel is doing a bad job of it because 
deep down the majority of Israelis know it’s wrong. They just haven’t 
found a way to get out of the headlock which makes them hope that 
we can just continue chucking the IDF at the problem and somehow, 
one day, it will go away’.15 
 
Pfeffer expresses his dissatisfaction with the lack of Israel’s political will to 
solve the Middle East conflict and criticises the Israeli society’s continuous tolerance 
for the IDF violent behaviour in the West Bank. Furthermore, he cautions against the 
efforts of the right wing actors to present this episode as a staged event thus vilifying 
Palestinians and demeaning their resistance practices. His analysis gains significance 
in relation to the official responses generated by the circulation of the photographic 
evidence showing the Israeli serviceman harming Mohammed Tamimi. These reactions 
downplayed the soldier’s violence against the Palestinian boy by praising the restraint 
of the former and by situating the Israeli soldier in the position of the victim of a chaotic 
attack performed by women and children. For instance, the IDF’s Spokesperson 
described the episode in Nabi Saleh as following: 
 
‘[A] violent disturbance of the peace [took place] in Nabi Saleh, in 
which Palestinians threw stones at [the] IDF forces that were in the 
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place. The youth who was photographed was identified by the 
lookout force as a stone-thrower, and because of this it was decided 
to detain him. At the time of the arrest, a violent provocation by a 
number of Palestinians developed, including women and children. In 
light of the violent altercation, the commander decided not to go 
ahead with the detention’.16 
 
Moreover, a senior officer from the IDF Central Command presented this 
violent episode as a tactical error by stressing that the soldier acted outside the rules of 
engagement that require two members of the military forces to apprehend a suspect. 
However, he underlined that the Nabi Saleh episode was an exceptional event in which 
the Israeli soldier showed restraint despite being attacked: ‘One must not stake the 
national honor on one incident. It would have been legitimate for him to fire if he had 
felt that his life was in danger, and he preferred not to do so. He deserves praise for 
that’.17 Nevertheless, the sanitised representation of the violent episode at Nabi Saleh 
denies the political motives behind these protests and ignores that Palestinian protests 
against the occupation target Jewish settlers’ confiscation of land and water. More 
significantly, the IDF Spokesperson’s press release shifts the victim/perpetrator identity 
between Mohammed Tamimi and the Israeli soldier that attacked him, and affirms 
univocally the boy’s guilt despite testimonies that he had not thrown stones. Having 
witnessed the same events, the journalist Jonathan Pollack insisted that the Palestinian 
teenager was not throwing stones and that the Israeli military targeted him 
illegitimately.18  
The circulation of visual representations concerning the Israeli military 
personnel’s behaviour reminds local and international audiences of the violence and the 
power asymmetry that characterise interactions between Palestinians and military 
forces in the West Bank. Although these representations may disrupt the institutional 
narrative that cultivates a romanticised military image, they incite as well passionate 
debates about the vulnerability and helplessness of the Israeli forces during their 
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military service. In this light, visual representations of violence permit the 
depoliticisation of the IDF’s violence against Palestinians by directing the conversation 
towards the individual affective experiences of military personnel and away from the 
Palestinians’ experiences under the occupation. Whereas most of the time journalists 
highlight the absurdity of the occupation by providing clichéd representations of 
Palestinian protests, military elites recognise soldiers’ mistakes yet praise their self-
control. In this regard, the interpretations of the Nabi Saleh episode provided by 
journalists and military figures alike downplay the political nature of the occupation by 
presenting protests as a ludic choreography or by reiterating the moral standard of the 
Israeli military personnel while serving under the occupation. In this context, affective 
debates focus on the threats to which the Israeli military personnel are exposed rather 
than on the violence enacted by the Israeli servicemen and women in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. This discursive move normalises the violence of the occupation 
by determining the interpretation of the IDF’s violence against Palestinians as a self-
defense endeavour in order to protect vulnerable Israeli Jewish citizen-soldiers.   
Furthermore, this episode shows that the Israeli political figures rely on the 
symbolism of the vulnerable military figure in order to conceal the violence of the 
occupation and its consequences for Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. For instance, right wing political actors decried the failure of the military to 
protect the Israeli soldier. Israel’s Minister of Culture and Sport, Miri Regev, called for 
changing the open-fire regulations in order to ensure the protection of the Israeli 
military personnel’s lives: ‘We need to decide immediately that a soldier that is attacked 
is permitted to return fire. Period. I call on the minister of security to put an end to the 
humiliation and change the open-fire regulations immediately!’. 19  Regev’s words 
assign guilt to Mohammed Tamimi for attacking the Israeli soldier and reverse the 
victim/perpetrator identities in order to defend the right to kill even children that throw 
stones. Similarly, Avigdor Lieberman claimed this episode stained the reputation of the 
IDF as an instrument of security: 
 
‘We are talking about an incident which severely harms the deterrent 
capacity of the IDF. The pictures show a soldier being hit by 
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Palestinian women and children and in the end giving up on the stone-
thrower who started the whole incident, revealing weakness and 
helplessness’.20 
 
Other voices blamed the Israeli left wing movement for manipulating the 
public’s reaction to the Nabi Saleh episode and for endangering the Israeli soldier’s life 
by disseminating this recording. Sergeant Benjamin Anthony, who heads Our Soldiers 
Speak, an organisation that brings Israeli forces to English-speaking university 
campuses in order to speak about their military experiences, reiterated a well-known 
accusation against the left wing non-governmental organisations for conducting 
campaigns that damage the prestige of the military: ‘The left is so deeply entrenched in 
these efforts to undermine the activities of the IDF. They would say ‘we want to protect 
Palestinian rights’ but in that video they are clearly willing to place an Israeli soldier’s 
life in mortal danger’.21 In contrast, Sarit Michaeli, a spokesperson for the Israeli human 
rights organisation, B’Tselem, used this episode to stress that young Palestinians are 
subjected to a judicial regime that assigns criminal responsibility at a young age and 
that unlawfully discriminates between Israeli and Palestinian children if they are found 
guilty of throwing stones. She observed that: 
 
‘The video shows women trying to rescue a very young relative, 
barely over the age of the criminal responsibility, who is pinned down 
by an Israeli soldier. Technically, from the age of 12 both Israeli and 
Palestinian children can be arrested… but it’s unheard of that an 
Israeli minor, a settler child throwing stones, would be arrested that 
way’.22 
 
Sarit Michaeli’s assessment recalls the most recent events concerning 
sentences that punish Palestinian stone-throwers. In 2014, the Israeli Knesset imposed 
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harsher regulation for punishing Palestinian children and youth that throw stones by 
stipulating that they could be imprisoned between ten to twenty years depending on 
whether the court can prove intent or not.23 Moreover, in 2015, Benjamin Netanyahu’s 
security cabinet relaxed the regulations according to which soldiers could use live 
ammunition during protests against Palestinians that throw stones and firebombs. 
Under new rules, soldiers could use live ammunition if they judge theirs or civilians’ 
lives are under threat.24 
The different interpretations about the Israeli soldier’s behaviour in Nabi Saleh 
reveal the left-right cleavage of the Israeli political sphere. The right wing political 
elites portray the Israeli forces as victims of the military institution that fails to protect 
its troops or as victims of the Israeli leftist movements that lack patriotism and act 
against the interests of the state. Through these rhetorical practices, Palestinian children 
become (potential) enemies that are not only ready to harm the Israeli military 
personnel’s bodies, but also their moral self-identity. Furthermore, the circulation of 
pictures representing the events that took place in Nabi Saleh carries an ambivalent 
outcome regarding their potential to question the dominant narratives that characterise 
the Israel/Palestine conflict. Both the pictures showing the violent episode in Nabi 
Saleh and the soldier’s alleged emotions of restraint and vulnerability were mobilised 
by military and political elites in order to praise his behaviour, to dismiss his violent 
actions, and to call to reform the military institution in order to protect the IDF. In this 
context, Mohammed Tamimi’s experience is used to reinstate the humanity of the 
Israeli soldier and to laud his self-control. These affective debates constrain 
Mohammed’s possible innocence and his position as a victim since he was constructed 
as an enemy and his experience of violence was denied. In this respect, the violence 
against Mohammed Tamimi’s evokes Sara Ahmed’s argument that ‘other claims of 
injury can only be excluded’ only ‘if “others” are not assumed to have “lives” that are  
“innocent” ’.25 The exclusion of Mohammed’s pain strengthens and highlights the 
vulnerability and victimhood of Israeli military personnel at the expense of the 
Palestinian civilians despite their possible innocence. In this way, the IDF’s violence 
                                                        
23 The Huffington Post Staff, ‘Israel To Jail Stone-Throwers For Up To Twenty Years’. The Huffington 
Post, 21 July 2015. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/israel-jail-stone-
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ammunition-measures [Accessed 10 July 2017].  
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against Palestinians is downplayed, and the Israeli military personnel’s vulnerability 
and restraint are used to highlight the exemplarity of the Israeli military and to envisage 
it as being exposed to Palestinians’ violence, aggressions, and provocations. This 
discursive mechanism permits seeing Israeli servicemen and women as objects rather 
than subjects of violence therefore shielding them from their responsibility for the 
violence performed during their military service. 
 
Hebron, West Bank: Solidarity With the Military on Social Media 
In April 2014, David Adamov, a soldier from the Nahal Brigade, became the 
quintessence of contemporary military soldiering in Israel by blending heroism and 
victimhood with the circulation of emotions on and beyond social media. Youth Against 
Settlements, an activist group that works in Hebron, filmed him cocking his assault rifle 
towards a Palestinian teenager, Saddam Abu Sanina. The video recording was 
distributed on the social media platform YouTube and showed Adamov threatening and 
loading his rifle while demanding the Palestinian youth to stop recording the incident.26 
When a message posted on social media suggested that Adamov was jailed for his 
actions, a campaign of support and solidarity for the Israeli soldier was launched on 
Facebook. It showed military personnel from elite units (with their faces covered in 
order to avoid reprimand), office workers during lunch breaks, and babies and pets with 
the message ‘We are with David the Nahlavi’. The online social protest resulted in a 
Facebook page of support that gathered around 100,000 ‘likes’ and through which the 
video of Youth Against Settlements was shared almost 7, 500 times on social media.27 
The success of the campaign on social media was predicated on collective solidarity as 
it assumed that David represents every member of the Israeli public or, at least, every 
Israeli that shared a message of support for him on social media. 
The affective features of the online movement that supported Adamov show 
that ‘social and cultural bonds of camaraderie that constitute modern militaries could 
be enhanced through social media practices (…) by creating a shared space where such 
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bonds can be maintained’.28 Social media becomes a space in which Israeli servicemen 
and women build and sustain relations among themselves, with their families and 
friends, and with the wider public thus producing new types of social interaction and 
reimagining ‘notions of privacy and community, intimacy, and solitude’.29 Through the 
series of Facebook selfies and messages that were distributed in order to support 
Adamov, the Israeli military personnel reinforce the social bound between themselves 
and the wider public by inviting solidarity with David and the exoneration of his violent 
practices. In this respect, David’s community of online supporters represents what 
Stephanie Baker calls a ‘mediated crowd’, which emerges through ‘interactive online 
relationships enabled by new media technologies’ that bring together ‘aggrieved users 
into intense social relationships’ that traverse online and offline spaces.30 By benefiting 
of a network of support that links the online and the offline spheres, Adamov’s 
wrongful deeds are pardoned insofar as the solidarity between military personnel and 
the public contributes to his representation as a victim. Therefore, the success of the 
Facebook campaign shows the role of social media in constituting ‘an intimate public’ 
that supported him.31 Specifically, the cultivation of an affective connection between 
the Israeli civil and military spheres enabled Adamov’s exoneration because social 
media functions ‘as a porous, affective scene of identification among strangers that 
promises a certain experience of belonging and provides a complex of consolation, 
confirmation, discipline and discussion about how to live’.32  
The ‘David of Nahal’ episode shows that social media, and Facebook in 
particular, represent an intimate virtual site of belonging and reiteration of the collective 
Israeli Jewish identity since the practices of solidarity that define this episode function 
as ‘modes of attachment that make persons public and collective and that make 
collective scenes intimate spaces’.33 Social media are conceived in terms of social 
relations because they function ‘not only as conduits of information but also as creative 
forces, projecting and mapping the world and constructing (imagined) relationships 
among strangers, as well as [heightening] the more intimate sensations and feelings 
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30 Baker, S. A. Social Tragedy: The Power of Myth, Ritual, and Emotion in the New Media Ecology 
(New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 143.  
31 Berlant, The Female Complaint, p. viii. 
32 Berlant, The Female Complaint, p. viii.  
33 Berlant, ‘Intimacy’, p. 288. 
  152 
associated with those relationships’.34 The dissemination of pictures and messages of 
support via Facebook enabled the construction of belonging and affinity between the 
Israeli public and the military. In this regard, the Israeli citizen-soldiers used social 
media to interpellate the Israeli public, who is thought to be touched by and moved by 
the difficult experience of military service, in order to express sympathy for David and 
to support him. Likewise, Alex Lambert believes that Facebook rearticulates distance 
and absence since it builds intimate connections between different people that might 
not share close ties otherwise.35 In this way, social media encourages the building of 
(fictive) relations of proximity, belonging, and kinship that cultivate solidarity with the 
Israeli military yet forecloses conversations about Adamov’s and the military’s 
responsibility for the violence enacted against Palestinians. Therefore, through the 
power of social media to bring the intimacy of military service within the public sphere, 
the Facebook campaign mitigates the consequences of David Adamov’s actions and 
invites public support and empathy with him. By cultivating support for Adamov, the 
campaign constitutes him as a victim of the military system that punishes soldiers and 
that does not acknowledge the chaos and the emotional intensity of performing one’s 
military service in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
Furthermore, Adamov’s violence was depoliticised not only through the 
construction of a network of solidarity with him on social media, but also through 
official military and political responses to this episode. For example, the IDF responded 
by addressing the military personnel’s use of social media rather than commenting on 
David’s behaviour. For instance, the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, 
expressed his dissatisfaction with the military personnel’s digital dissent and argued 
that online protests challenge military ethics and discipline. He claimed this wave of 
online support for Adamov has 
 
‘raised issues of ethics in the military that we must deal with on every 
level. It is very important that we remember, and we say to our 
subordinates in a clear way, that Facebook is not an instrument of 
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command.  It’s here, and that is a fact, but it is not a substitute or even 
parallel to discourse between commanders and their soldiers’.36 
 
Equally significant, the military clarified that David was sentenced to twenty 
days in prison for assaulting a superior rather than for the Hebron incident. In exchange, 
the media reported the Palestinian teenagers, who were threatened by Adamov, were 
arrested and interrogated about their confrontation with the Israeli soldier. 37 
Furthermore, right wing politicians joined the online campaign by declaring their 
support for David both on social networks and through public statements. Similarly to 
the Nabi Saleh episode, they declared their sympathy for the soldier who was vilified 
for his abuses, and highlighted his helplessness and the danger that he and other military 
personnel experience during their military service. Having served in the IDF’s special 
units Sayeret Matkal and Maglan, the leader of the Jewish Home Party, Naftali Bennett, 
sympathised with David: 
 
‘I would have done the same as David the Nahal soldier. He did the 
right thing. Violence was directed at him. He was alone, surrounded 
by violent, provocative Arabs. He didn’t shoot. He defended himself 
and those surrounding him and reasonably ended the incident’.38 
 
These inflammatory remarks demarcate between who is guilty and who is 
innocent by offering unwavering support for David Adamov and by positioning him as 
a victim. Bennett continued by blaming left wing organisations for inciting this kind of 
events and emphasised that the left ‘lives to smear IDF soldiers. If the photographers 
weren’t there, the incident wouldn’t have happened’. 39  Likewise, Uri Ariel, the 
Minister of Construction and Agriculture, stressed that left wing activism limits the 
potential of the Israeli military personnel to defend themselves: ‘The reality in which 
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soldiers have to absorb harm and humiliation on a daily basis without being able to 
respond, even when their lives are really in danger, because we’re afraid of criticism, 
is intolerable’.40 In contrast, left wing activists like Yehuda Shaul, one the founders of 
veteran group Breaking the Silence, and Issa Amro, the founder of the Youth Against 
Settlements organisation, expressed their frustration with the affective responses 
provoked by this online campaign. Echoing Pffefer who discussed the Nabi Saleh 
episode, Shaul voiced his disappointment with the failure of these episodes to generate 
a public debate about the IDF’s abuses in the Occupied Palestinian Territories:  
 
‘If you really understand the story, these things are the norms, and 
not exceptions, because that’s how you behave there, that’s the reality 
of military occupation. If you’re a real combat soldier, if you are on 
the ground, you know that this is the way things are, and sadly, we 
don’t debate these things enough and we don’t confront them 
enough’.41 
 
Despite that his words normalise the IDF’s violence in a subtle way, Shaul 
deplores the prevalence of the military’s violent behaviour against Palestinians and 
their lack of accountability by criticising the apathy of the Israeli public regarding the 
IDF’s pervasive violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Likewise, Issa Amro 
expressed his concern with the socio-political situation that characterises the Israeli 
society. Amro disclosed that ‘this for me is a disgusting campaign’ insofar as it 
represents ‘a sign that Israeli society is getting more aggressive and extreme’. 42 
Furthermore, Kuntsman and Stein believe the Israeli public and the military personnel’s 
support for Adamov blends ‘patriotic solidarity, the narrative of soldier victimhood, 
and military anxiety about the unfolding military age’ in order to justify his behaviour.43 
Therefore, by launching, being involved in, and supporting an online campaign under 
the ‘We are all David of Nahal’ headline, the Israeli public and soldiers ‘replayed a 
recurrent Israeli political narrative about the military occupation – namely, an inversion 
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whereby the armed soldier, rather than the Palestinian civilian population, is figured as 
its chief victim’.44 The cultivation of solidarity between the Israeli citizen-soldiers and 
Adamov (and implicitly, the military collective body) restricts the possibility to imagine 
the IDF as acting violently outside the boundaries of self-defence because it vilifies 
Palestinians and presents them as sources of danger. 
The role of the ‘David of Nahal’ episode in reinforcing the affective 
boundaries between Israeli Jews and Palestinians is highlighted by the responses of 
solidarity and empathy that circulated on social networks, by the contribution of social 
media to bolstering nationalist feelings, and by its role in positing the Israeli military 
personnel as innocent victims of the occupation and of the military system. Similarly 
to the Nabi Saleh episode, the affective interpretations of the ‘David of Nahal’ episode 
reiterate the divisions that hinge on the Israeli politics across the political spectrum and 
remind of the power struggle between the left and right political figures in shaping the 
Israel/Palestine conflict narrative. Therefore, the study of the affective reverberations 
of the IDF’s violence against Palestinians in the public sphere shows that ‘public 
demonstrations of feeling are not merely authentic expressions of sentiment but also 
products of intense mediation by interested institutions and individuals’. 45 Since ‘such 
demonstrations are constituted by (and constitutive of) relations of power’, this episode 
shows the role of social media in circulating emotions that reject the position of 
Palestinians as victims, and that dismiss their precarious experience of living under the 
occupation. 46 Finally, by indicating the role of social media in disseminating emotional 
responses, this episode shows digital technology reshapes experiences of everyday 
militarism in the Israeli society by blurring the boundaries between the civil and 
military spheres. In this respect, the degree of support that Adamov enjoyed throughout 
the online campaign demonstrates the readiness of the Israeli public to disregard and to 
accept the Israeli military’s violent behaviour against Palestinians. Therefore, 
expressions of solidarity and empathy with David indicate the Israeli public’s subtle yet 
substantial consent for the military’s violent behaviour in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. Likewise, Ann Laura Stoler argues that consent is nurtured by an affective 
discourse that depends on ‘shaping appropriate and reasoned affect, by directing 
affective judgments, by severing some affective bonds and establishing others, by 
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adjudicating what constituted moral sentiments – in short, by educating the proper 
distribution of sentiments and desires’.47 The role of social media in nurturing kinship 
and attachment between the military and civil spheres shows the Israeli public 
continuous support for the military and the relative acceptance of its violent practices 
downplay the IDF’s violence against Palestinians and shield the military from its 
accountability. Equally significant, the solidarity with David Adamov, despite the 
visual evidence that incriminates him, raises questions regarding the power of 
alternative/dissenting voices and visual representations in questioning the positive 
image of the Israeli military.  
 
Beitunia, West Bank: Doubting Palestinian Pain 
In 2014, a violent episode that took place in Beitunia illustrated the leniency 
that Israeli forces enjoy in the aftermath of their violent behaviour against Palestinians. 
During a demonstration that marked the Nakba Day in Beitunia, near Ramallah, an 
Israeli border policeman shot and killed the seventeen-year old teenager Nadeem Siam 
Nawara, and the sixteen-year old teenager Mohammad Mahmoud Odeh Abu Daher. 
The third victim, Mohammad Abdullah Hussein al-Azzeh, a fifteen-year old teenager, 
survived the attack.48 Defence for Children International – Palestine distributed the 
recording of this episode, which provoked serious debates regarding the Israeli security 
forces’ lack of individual and collective accountability for their violent behaviour in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. Even though the IDF initially claimed that security 
forces used rubber bullets, tear gas, and stun grenades in order to disperse the 
demonstration attended by the three teenagers, the hospital officials from the Ramallah 
Medical Complex confirmed the teenagers were shot with live ammunition. 49  In 
November 2014, the IDF announced the border policeman, Ben Deri, who attacked the 
three boys, was arrested and charged with murder yet confined to house arrest. He was 
freed from house arrest in January 2017, after entering in a plea deal with the 
prosecution who lowered its charges from second-degree murder to negligent murder 
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and aggravated assault charges.50 Despite that the episode raises significant legal and 
political questions regarding Deri’s arrest and plea deal, this section focuses on the 
affective debates provoked by the circulation of this footage in the public sphere.  
This episode of violence shows affective interpretations of the violent 
encounter between military personnel and Palestinians deny the latter the position of 
victims. They indicate disbelief regarding the Palestinian pain and imagine them as 
cunning individuals that forge the violence they experience in order to falsely condemn 
the IDF for alleged violent behaviour. The security cameras of a carpentry shop 
recorded the moment in which the border policeman shot the boys. Furthermore, the 
shop owner, Faher Zayed, had witnessed the shooting and claimed the teenagers had 
not posed any threat to the Israeli soldiers and border policemen, and they had not 
thrown stones as it had been claimed by military officials.51 However, a month later 
after declaring that the youth were illegally targeted, Human Rights Watch disclosed 
that the Israeli security forces harassed Faher Zayed due to his testimony. They accused 
him of having lied and fabricated evidence, and took Zayed for interrogation to the 
nearby Ofer prison. He described his questioning as following: 
 
‘They told me that the video I gave to the press was fabricated, that 
everything I said and all my testimonies are a lie, that this is a serious 
violation of the law, and that I made the IDF look bad and caused a 
lot of problems. They told me the cameras need to be brought down 
within 24 hours.52 
 
Suspicion, accusations of staging death and of falsifying evidence surrounded 
the public debate regarding the injury and the death of the Palestinian teenagers. The 
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Israeli Minister of Defence at the time of the incident, Moshe Ya’alon, suggested the 
video recording was staged. Without having seen the actual recording, the he declared 
that ‘I’ve seen lots of films that were edited. This film I’ve not yet seen, but I know the 
system’.53 An Israeli army spokesperson, Arye Shalicar, claimed that the ‘film was 
edited and does not reflect the reality of the day in question, the violence. As part of 
our inquiry we have investigated whether there was live fire and we have not found that 
there was live fire’.54 Likewise, the former Israeli ambassador to the United States of 
America, Michel Oren, expressed his doubt about the authenticity of the recording 
circulated by the Defence for Children International – Palestine: ‘The way the bodies 
fall, the fact that there’s no blood – someone who was hit in the back and a bullet has 
an exit wound, there is a tremendous amount of bleeding. There’s no bleeding in the 
picture. There are many, many inconsistencies’. 55  Nonetheless, during the 
investigation, the prosecution found evidence that Deri had fired a live bullet. 
Eventually, he admitted firing a live bullet but in an unintentional manner since he did 
not know his firearm’s magazine contained one.56  
Assessing for Haaretz the official responses to the killings of the two 
teenagers, Hagai El-Ad deplored the missing of Palestinian suffering in the Israeli 
media: ‘When it is not documented on video it interests almost no one, and when it is 
documented it is repressed as a conspiracy’.57 His words echo Susan Sontag’s belief 
that 
 
‘[i]mages offering evidence that contradicts cherished pieties are 
invariably dismissed as having been staged for the camera. To 
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photographic corroboration of the atrocities committed by one’s own 
side, the standard response is that the pictures are a fabrication’.58  
 
Therefore, the continuous debate about the authenticity of the photos of 
Palestinian pain that circulate in the Israeli public sphere indicates a phenomenon of 
‘digital suspicion – a mode of suspicion directed against the digital image, articulated 
most prominent on social media, often in the language of amateur digital forensics (in 
charges of digital doctoring, Photoshop manipulation and so on).59 Military figures, 
political elites, and ordinary citizens alike use suspicion both as a ‘form of knowledge 
and an affective disposition – a way of securing their Zionist political claims and 
identities, and of producing the structures of feelings and community ties on which such 
claims depend’.60 Through this discourse of digital suspicion, Palestinians are not only 
denied the position of victims, but they are also presented as fictive victims that damage 
the prestige and the reputation of the Israeli military. Palestinians appear as distrustful 
and as fabricating their own violent experiences. This is a subtle yet important narrative 
that shifts the blame from the Israeli perpetrators to the Palestinian victims insofar as 
the latter are represented as subjects that lack credibility. Similarly to the Nabi Saleh 
episode when the victim/perpetrator narrative was shifted between the Israeli soldier 
and Mohammed Tamimi, the Beitunia episode indicates that 
 
‘[v]isual symbolics of pain are the subject of fierce contestation. They 
are images not for the sake of imagery itself, but they assist in the 
conclusion of the narratives that come to be associated with the 
imagery. Images thus become part of the narrative − stabilization 
process that seeks to solidify stories that mobilize disparate and 
fragmented events into a matrix of meaning’.61   
 
Specifically, the recording and pictures that show Nadeem and Mohammed’s 
pain are used by the Israeli military and political elites to evacuate the boys’ suffering 
and to present the Israeli security forces as victims of the Palestinian cunningness. The 
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debate about their authenticity shows that suspicion supports the exclusion of 
Palestinian narratives under the guise of unreliability and inaccuracy of information. In 
this regard, the interpretations of the Israeli military personnel’s violence against 
Palestinians disclose a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ that depends on ‘scales of trust that 
measur[e] what forms of witness, words and deeds, could be taken as reliably 
relevant’.62 By challenging the trustworthiness of recordings of military violence, both 
the Israeli military and public figures vilify Palestinians and present them as individual 
that are ready to forge their own violent experience in order to attract the attention of 
the international media and to stain the prestige of the Israeli military. Elaine Scarry’s 
words express the political symbolism of doubting Palestinians’ pain by recalling that 
‘to have great pain is to have certainty; to hear about pain is to have doubt’.63 Likewise, 
Liz Philipose is more equivocal in her assessment by stressing that ‘doubt is political, 
functioning to perpetuate existing hierarchies and inequalities’. 64  Doubting that 
Palestinians experience pain and suffering confines the possibility to recognise the 
Israeli policies and privileges that inflict and downplay the IDF’s violence against 
Palestinians.   
The investigation of the affective debates generated by visual representations 
of violence highlights the role emotions in sustaining the narratives that distinguish 
between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. Within the emotional narrative that marks the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, teenagers and children like Mohammed Tamimi, Saddam Abu 
Sanina, or Nadim Nawara experience a precarious situation. For Nadera Shalhoub-
Kevorkian, the Israeli military’s violent practices against children exemplify Israel’s 
colonial settler practices within which their suffering is not only denied, but also 
through which Palestinian children are constituted ‘as always already terrorist others 
who should be disciplined and violated’.65 Specifically, violence against Palestinian 
children indicates the politics of fear deployed by the Israeli state apparatus in order to 
justify the military’s violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Similarly, Lauren 
Berlant cautions that ‘fear is natural, but the objects that make you afraid emerge 
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historically’.66Therefore, the socio-construction of Palestinian children as objects of 
fear that are dangerous and that should be contained and disciplined are part and parcel 
of the production of Palestinians as racialised ‘Others’. Sara Ahmed observes that the 
affective hierarchies that distinguish between bodies emerge at the intersection between 
fear and racism: 
 
‘[F]ear both envelops the bodies that feel it, as well as constructs 
those bodies as enveloped, as contained by it, as if it comes from 
outside and moves inward. In the encounter, fear does not bring the 
bodies together: it is not a shared feeling, but works to differentiate 
between white and black bodies’.67 
 
The close relation between emotions and racialising discourses deepen the 
political significance of the affective responses that emerged in the aftermath of the 
dissemination of the episodes of violence investigated in this chapter. In this respect, 
the affective responses of solidarity, empathy, compassion for Israeli military personnel 
and respectively, suspicion against and the belittlement of Palestinian suffering show 
the image of the youth and children is shrouded in ‘cultural fantasies’ that distinguish 
between Palestinians and Israeli Jews.68 These ‘cultural fantasies’ represent ‘dominant 
racialised and gendered constructions that structure public intelligibilities, affective 
responses, frames of reception and interpretation’ that eventually inform and justify the 
IDF’s violence against Palestinians. 69  Therefore, cultural fantasies transform the 
Palestinian child or teenager in an alleged enemy that could be ‘anywhere and anyone, 
as a ghostlike figure in the present, who gives (…) nightmares about the future, as an 
anticipated future of injury’.70 The figure of the Palestinian enemy accumulates over 
time, gains affective value insofar as his or her figure is detached from a particular body 
and face. Since fear, anger, and anxiety cannot be associated with a particular 
Palestinian body as a source of injury, these emotions ‘circulate in an economic sense, 
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working to differentiate some others from other others, a differentiation that is never 
“over” as it awaits for others who have not yet arrived’.71  In the Israel/Palestine 
conflict, fear (re)creates the boundaries between Israeli military personnel and 
Palestinian civilians by (re)producing the image of the Palestinian as an aggressive 
subject who is willing to resort to violence and to harm the Israeli citizen-soldiers. 
Through the accumulation and the circulation of fear, doubt, suspicion, and aversion 
against the threatening figure of the Palestinian subject, the Israeli military assumes 
‘the young male is a metonym for Palestinian opposition and struggle against 
domination, the idea and symbols of which must be rooted out and silenced’. 72 
Therefore, the passionate debates, emotional engagements, and affective reverberations 
concerning the IDF’s violence against Palestinians indicate the role of emotions in 
depending the hierarchies that define the Israel/Palestine conflict and that legitimise the 
Israeli military’s violence as a self-defence effort. 
 
Conclusion 
The Nabi Saleh, Hebron, and respectively, Beitunia episode reveal the IDF’s 
widespread violence within the Occupied Palestinian Territories and disclose 
Palestinian youth and children’s precarious lives under the occupation. This chapter 
focuses on the affective echoes and interpretations generated by the circulation of 
images and narratives of violence in the local and international public sphere. 
Therefore, it highlights the role of the affective reactions and passionate debates 
generated by these episodes in upholding the divisions that characterise the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. Specifically, this chapter shows that affective interpretations 
of the violence that took place between Israeli military figures and Palestinian youth 
mobilise affinity, sympathy, solidarity, admiration for Israeli forces, and respectively, 
cultivate suspicion, doubt, fear, or hate towards Palestinians. These social relations of 
belonging and difference constitute the IDF’s benign image, strengthen the Israeli 
public’s positive perception of the Israeli military, and moderate the IDF’s 
accountability for the violence pursued in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
In order to illustrate the role of emotions in heightening the socio-political 
differences in the Israel/Palestine conflict, this chapter studies traditional and social 
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media as sites and means to ‘project or invite felt proximities, distances, desires, 
disgust, and disconnections’ regarding Palestinians and the Israeli military forces.73 It 
explores an array of discursive practices and a varied group of public, political, and 
military actors in order to map out the affective responses through which the military 
forces are constructed as vulnerable subjects, as victims of the Israeli military 
institution, and as targets of Palestinians’ ill intents. Through these rhetorical moves, 
Palestinian experiences of violence are dismissed and Palestinians themselves are 
blamed for ‘posing’ as victims or are viewed as perpetrators that affect the physical and 
the moral integrity of the Israeli military personnel. By eliciting affective debates that 
highlight division and antagonism, these episodes show that emotional engagements 
with visual representations of violence shifts the victim/perpetrator/witness dynamic 
between the Israeli citizen-soldiers and Palestinians, foreclose conversations about the 
IDF’s widespread violence against Palestinians, and disavow its socio-political 
implications for Palestinians living under the occupation. Conversations regarding the 
IDF’s individual and collective responsibility for their violent behaviour are not only 
masked by discourses of victimhood and vulnerability, but they also indicate the 
readiness of the Israeli public to mobilise behind its military despite visual evidence 
showing the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. Finally, yet significantly, these 
episodes show that the Israeli military’s violence against Palestinians and its repetition 
is linked with the racialised narratives that portray and produce Palestinians as threating 
and dangerous individuals. Therefore, by criticising the Israeli rhetorical engagement 
with visual representations of violence, this chapter shows that affective formations of 
race, history, politics, and cultural symbolism shape the construction of violent 
boundaries in the Israel/Palestine conflict, and legitimise and downplay the Israeli 
military’s violence against Palestinians. 
The study of the IDF’s violence against Palestinians at the intersection 
between emotions, media, and visual evidence shows the political complexity of 
circulating visual representations of violence for the purposes of contesting war, harm, 
and injury. Despite that the Israeli military’s violence against Palestinians is a 
widespread phenomenon, these episodes caused passionate debates regarding the IDF’s 
violent behaviour due to the aesthetic, technological, and cultural frameworks within 
which these events occurred, are placed, and debated. In this respect, these episodes 
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gained visibility due to the place in which they were situated, the actors that were 
involved in them, the time in which they occurred, or the techniques of dissemination 
that were used in order to circulate these episodes. Nabi Saleh is a site of resistance that 
gathers local and international activists and journalists therefore the ubiquity of cameras 
in this village permitted the recording and dissemination of this incident. The 
circulation of the ‘David of Nahal’ episode and its affective reverberations were caused 
by the dissemination of this video by a prominent human rights actor in the region 
(Youth against Settlements) and by the public and military personnel’s readiness to 
participate in an online solidarity campaign in order to support David Adamov. 
Likewise, the recording with the episode in Beitunia was distributed by a well-known 
human rights organisation that has access to the media and is recognised by the 
international community as a reliable source. Moreover, this episode was recorded 
during a significant national political moment, the Nakba Day, when local and 
international journalists are likely to be attentive to the events that take place in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories since they expect locals to clash with the Israeli 
military forces during protests against the occupation.  
Nonetheless, this chapter shows that visual representations of violence do not 
always contest dominant discourses or hinder injury and harm in the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. The study of the affective echoes produced by photographs and recordings that 
illustrate the IDF’s violence against Palestinians indicates that affective reverberations 
of visual representations moderate their potential to trouble prevailing discourses in the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. Therefore, the examination of representations of pain should 
take into account Susan Sontag’s warning that pictures carry the potential, to ‘objectify: 
they turn an event or a person into something that can be possessed’.74 In this context, 
the circulation of pictures that emphasise human misery are problematic since ‘in their 
[the photos] focus on the powerless’, those that suffer are ‘reduced to their 
powerlessness’.75 This research enriches Sontag views by showing that the affective 
reverberations generated by the episodes surveyed in this chapter indicate not only the 
solidification of Palestinians in the position of victims, but also the rejection and the 
denial of Palestinian victimhood under the occupation. The chapter stresses the 
importance of studying the politicisation of images of violence since their circulation 
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and their affective interpretation may indicate their ‘objectification toward the service 
of particular kinds of politics’. 76  Specifically, it shows the objectification of 
Palestinians is accompanied by the reinterpretation and appropriation of their pain 
through a variety of discourses and practices that rely on affective discourse that 
highlight hate, fear, suspicion, and animosity.  
Therefore, the study of the affective boundaries that characterise the 
Israel/Palestine conflict invites the examination of the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian 
subjectivities by focusing on ‘whose emotions are visible/legible in public, and how 
these emotions are selectively associated with/attached to some bodies and not to 
others’.77 Equally significant, this chapter indicates the importance of investigating the 
‘outcomes of these emotions and attachments’ since they offer clues about the relation 
between the constitution of a benign military subjectivity, the public support for the 
IDF, and the political, military and public reluctance to condemn the military for their 
violent behaviour. 78  Through affective discourses that deny, doubt, and erase 
Palestinian pain, Israeli citizen-soldiers, military and political authorities, and public 
figures construct a military image of virtuosity and vulnerability that reinforces the 
IDF’s idealised representation. This figure strengthens the affective attachment 
between the military and the Israeli public despite the circulation of incriminatory 
evidence that shows the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. Within these boundaries, 
the Israeli military’s violent behaviour cannot be interpreted anything else apart from 
self-defence endeavours in order to protect the individual and the collective Israeli 
Jewish body. The following chapter continues the study of the role of emotions in 
heightening differences in the Israel/Palestine conflict by exploring the practices 
through which Israeli Jewish and Palestinian dead bodies are commemorated, handled, 
and recovered in the aftermath of a violent attack. It argues that commemoration, 
forensic, legal, and bureaucratic practices through which Israeli Jewish and Palestinian 
dead bodies are remembered, managed, and retrieved in the aftermath of violence 
reinforce the affective boundaries that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict. These 
practices capture, circulate, and provoke grief, mourning, pain, loss, repulsion, and 
disgust that distinguish between the Israeli Jews and Palestinian dead bodies by 
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demanding the utmost care for the first ones and the exclusion of the latter from the 
Israeli socio-political order.  
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Chapter 5: Heroes, Victims of Terror, and Enemies: Practices 
and Counter-practices of Commemoration, Mourning, and 
Recovery of Israeli and Palestinian Dead Bodies 
 
‘Dead soldiers don’t talk. Here they do’.1 
 
Fieldwork Diary Entry 
Wednesday, April 22nd, 2015: Remembrance Day (Yom Hazikaron) for the Fallen 
of Israel’s Wars and for Terror Victims 
At 11 am, when a siren sounded across Israel, most of the Israeli Jews came 
to a standstill in order to honour the memory of the fallen soldiers and the victims of 
terror attacks. At that particular time, I was in Jerusalem, travelling with the light rail 
train, from the Ammunition Hill station to the Mount Herzl station. When the light rail 
stopped, passengers either stood up or stepped outside the train in order to observe a 
few moments of silence. I stood up as well from my seat while observing in a discreet 
manner the serious figures of the Israeli Jews, Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, tourists, or 
locals who were travelling with the light rail. As the light rail continued towards Mount 
Herzl, I noticed the numerous Israeli flags that adorned the streets and buildings of 
Jerusalem. More and more people boarded the train in order to go to the military 
cemetery in Mount Herzl. They were carrying flowers that undoubtedly would be laid 
down on the graves of their loved ones. Less than 30 minutes away, I arrived at the 
military cemetery together with hundreds of people who were making their way 
towards visiting the graves of their loved ones. As I entered the cemetery, I noticed that 
most of the tombs were patently adorned with fresh flowers, with pebbles (I would be 
later told in an informal conversation that putting small stones on graves symbolises 
the bonding between the living and the dead bodies thus showing that the memory of 
the deceased would never be forgotten), and with small Israeli flags with a narrow black 
ribbon attached to the latter. Interestingly enough, a one or two-page (A4 size) obituary 
was accompanying some graves therefore giving visitors the opportunity to read the 
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biographical account of the fallen soldiers or victims of terror that were interred in those 
sites. As I walked through the slots allocated to different operations or wars, I witnessed 
civilians and soldiers visiting the graves of the fallen ones. Some were praying, others 
were silently arranging flowers on the graves. Some were singing and others were 
crying. Most of the people were gathered around the slots that commemorated recent 
operations in which the IDF had been involved: the Second Intifada or the previous 
military operations the Gaza Strip (Operation Cast Lead, 2008/9; Operation Pillar of 
Defence, 2012; Operation Protective Edge, 2014).  
 
Inspired by these observations, the chapter examines affective repertoires that 
characterise rituals of memorialisation, commemoration, and recovery of the Israeli and 
Palestinian dead bodies in Israel. It shows the role of mourning, grief, loss, 
bereavement, and pain in justifying the IDF’s violence against Palestinians and in 
reinforcing the affective boundaries that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict. To 
this end, the chapter illustrates the role of state authorities, political and religious 
figures, medical experts, and civil actors in constructing the Israeli military subject as 
a ‘heroic victim’. This image carries significant consequences for the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. It imposes emotional, bureaucratic, and legal complexities in commemorating 
Palestinian dead bodies, informs the justification of violence in the name of the security 
of the Israeli state, and hinders the process of accountability with regard to the IDF’s 
violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
 In order to support this argument, the chapter divides in three sections, with 
the first one investigating a set of military obituaries published on the Israeli army’s 
Official Blog in order to map out the defining features of the Israeli ‘heroic victim’ 
figure.2 By presenting a conventional view regarding the Israeli military and its role in 
the Israeli society, these obituaries mourn the loss of heroic Israeli citizen-soldiers that 
have performed the ultimate patriotic sacrifice by giving their lives for the state. They 
conceal the violence that is part of military service. Through the description of unique, 
devoted, and talented servicemen and women, these obituaries envisage military deaths 
as tragic episodes. This aspect carries serious implications for the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. Resembling other Western (online) obituaries circulated in the public sphere, 
these official practices of commemoration extract the Israeli soldier-citizen from the 
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specificity of the Israel/Palestine conflict, and invite local and international audiences 
to view the Israeli military personnel as any other Western troops engaged in fighting 
global threats. These aspects heighten the feeling of affinity between the IDF, the local 
and the international public that reads, shares, and circulates these obituaries. In this 
way, these obituaries invite those that view them to support the Israeli military and to 
express sorrow for the individual and collective loss of these men and women. Through 
this affective technique, the IDF depoliticise their involvement in the Israel/Palestine 
conflict and downplay the military’s role in enforcing the occupation of Palestinians. 
The following section discusses the techniques through which the Israeli Institute of 
Forensic Medicine and ZAKA, a search-and-rescue ultra-Orthodox organisation that 
helps the Israeli authorities to address natural and man-made disasters in Israel, handle 
the Israeli citizen-soldiers’ and respectively, Palestinians’ living and dead bodies in the 
aftermath of a violent episode. It shows the Israeli forensic practices are imbued with 
Jewish religious values and construct a faultless and impeccable military subjectivity 
that reinforces the heroic yet benign nature of the Israeli military. This representation 
relies on a discourse according to which the Israeli Jewish (military) bodies are sacred, 
deserve the utmost care, and need to be separated and defended from Palestinian 
dangerous bodies. More significantly, the forensic practices through which the 
Palestinian and respectively, the Israeli Jewish bodies are handled cultivate disgust, 
aversion, and animosity against the former thus reinforcing the affective boundaries 
that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict. The final section investigates Palestinian 
and Israeli joint efforts to challenge the hegemonic discourses of mourning, grief, and 
bereavement that favour Israeli Jews at the detriment of Palestinians and that sanction 
violence against the latter. It explores the challenges and the successes that non-
governmental organisations like Combatants for Peace and Parents Circle – Families 
Forum: Palestinian and Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace experience while trying 
to organise joint commemoration events for Israeli and Palestinian victims during the 
Israeli Memorial Day. 3  The chapter concludes by highlighting the importance of 
studying the role of emotions in demarcating and differentiating between Israeli Jews 
and Palestinians, and by assessing the political implications of disseminating the 
‘heroic victim’ military figure to local and international audiences.   
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In Memoriam, 2015: Commemorating Heroes and Victims of Terror 
In 2015, the IDF decided to honour their fallen soldiers and victims of terror 
by creating an ‘In Memoriam’ webpage on the Official Blog of the Israeli military. A 
black and white page with shades of grey and the picture of a burning candle placed at 
the bottom of the page offers the following introductory message worth quoting 
extensively:  
 
‘In a country of over 8 million people, every family and every citizen 
is connected personally, in some way, to someone who lost his life. 
Today, the number of fallen stands at 23,320. We mourn their absence 
and we feel acutely the pain of our loss. We imagine the families they 
would have had, the homes they would have built, the grandchildren 
they would have given us. We talk to them, we feel that they are there 
– but we know that they can’t talk back. Over the years, the pain dulls 
a little bit, but it never loses its power to affect us. Every year, on 
Yom HaZikaron (Israel’s memorial day), Israel commemorates its 
fallen soldiers and victims of terror. To date, 23,320 people have been 
killed during active military duty. In Memoriam is a special project, 
meant to honor a small selection of fallen soldiers chosen at random, 
and to tell the stories of those who lost their lives defending the State 
of Israel. These tragedies are the result of the difficult reality Israel 
faces every day’.4  
 
This paragraph captures the essence of the commemoration ethos that 
permeates the Israeli society and highlights the special relation between the Israeli 
society and its military. The reader is reminded of the number of the Israeli population 
and of the number of the Israeli fallen soldiers and victims of terror in order to 
accentuate the sadness and the loss that brings the Israeli society together. The 
paragraph encourages readers to imagine the dead soldiers’ lives by picturing their 
failed opportunity to contribute demographically and materially to the Israeli collective 
body.  Despite being dead, soldiers are kept alive in the hearts and minds of the Israeli 
citizens, aspect that is emphasised by the phrase ‘we talk to them, we feel that they are 
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there’. Since it is expected that the experience of bereavement and grief is likely to 
alleviate but not disappear in the future, the paragraph suggests the tragic and the 
unfortunate loss of these men and women. Finally, the paragraph asks readers to 
empathise with the Israeli military and society since the tragic end of these soldier-
citizens is the outcome ‘of the difficult reality Israel faces every day’.  
Military troops have a duty and a right to legitimately kill their enemies in the 
name of defending the nation and in order to preserve the artificial boundaries of their 
community. Due to their task, military troops are afforded the utmost respect, and their 
(possible) military death expects absolute praise and celebration as a patriotic sacrifice. 
However, this view has always been subjected to contestation. For instance, the 
contested nature and legacy of the Vietnam War have raised questions regarding the 
ways in which the death of military personnel should be memorialised and preserved 
in the American public memory.5 Israel, a state born out of war and which has been 
involved across times in both conventional and non-conventional military operations, 
puts significant emphasis on its fallen military figures in order to secure the Israeli 
public’s continuous support for the IDF and to justify past and future actions in the 
name of the security of the state. 6  In Memoriam contributes to the ethos of 
commemoration of the Israeli citizen-soldiers yet its presence in the online sphere 
indicates that it addresses a wider local and international audience by introducing them 
to an idealised representation of the Israeli soldiering.  
The webpage honors fallen soldiers and victims of terror that died between 
1949 and 2015 and represents a collection of photographs that shows fifty-nine men, 
five women, and a twelve-year old boy smiling and wearing either their uniforms or 
their casual clothes. Each photograph is accompanied by a brief biography of the 
deceased individual. These obituaries follow a similar pattern despite the 
individualisation of each dead citizen-soldier and victim of terror through the 
presentation of a personal photograph, and occasional anecdotes provided by family 
members, acquaintances, or by unit commanders. They disclose the death age, the death 
cause, the educational trajectory and hobbies, the favorite mottos, the military career, 
and a brief description of the death cause (if known). Lastly, each obituary forwards 
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information concerning the surviving family members and the place of burial of the 
dead citizen-soldier. The circulation of online obituaries for citizen-soldiers is far from 
being a practice specific to the Israeli military. Maja Zehfuss investigated the linguistic, 
symbolic, and political messages of the obituaries published online by the British 
Ministry of Defense in order to commemorate the military personnel who died during 
Operation TELIC in Iraq. She believes obituaries efface both the violence that is 
enacted against the military personnel and the violence pursued by the military since 
they insist on representing troops as having died of a tragic death.7 Zehfuss’s work is 
inspired by Judith Butler’s view regarding the political role of obituaries: ‘[T]he 
obituary functions as the instrument by which grievability is publicly distributed. It is 
the means by which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publicly grievable life, an icon 
for national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes noteworthy’.8  
This chapter takes Zehfuss’s and Butler’s insights further and argues the Israeli 
online military obituaries constitute the military subject as a ‘heroic victim’, a 
representation that complicates the Israel/Palestine conflict because it confines local 
and international criticism regarding the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. 
Specifically, this figure appeals to the local Israeli public insofar as it reiterates the 
traditional representation of military service as a site of heroism and sacrifice for the 
purposes of defending the nation. As a cleansed representation of military service in 
Israel, obituaries present the Israeli citizen-soldiers as gifted troops and accomplished 
citizens that were tragically killed during their military service. Furthermore, the 
‘heroic victim’ figure appeals to an international audience by imagining the Israeli 
military as any other Western army engaged in fighting global threats. Therefore, these 
obituaries conceal the IDF’s instrumental role in enforcing the Israeli occupation and 
their violence against Palestinians since the Israeli citizen-soldiers are imagined as 
heroic figures whose death is a sacrifice performed for the purposes of defending Israel 
and the wider international community against the global threat of terrorism. 
To a certain extent, the obituaries published on the IDF’s Blog resemble with 
the Israeli military (self-)representations on social media that were examined in the 
third chapter. They celebrate the (imagined) multicultural identity of the military, 
highlight the joyful and cheerful citizen-soldiers that serve in the IDF, and construct a 
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gendered military representation by imagining strong male figures and sweet 
servicewomen. However, these obituaries distinguish from the IDF’s (self-) 
representations on Facebook insofar as they do not insist on presenting military service 
as a self-development practice. Rather, these obituaries highlight the exceptionality of 
each citizen-soldier and his or her unique contribution to their community, to the 
military, and to defending Israel. Specifically, they stress the courage and determination 
of the Israeli Jewish citizen-soldiers, highlight their devotion to and readiness to 
sacrifice for their community and Israel, and underline their remarkable individual and 
professional skills. These aspects represent the defining features of the Israeli ‘heroic 
victim’ figure, which is a representation that invites admiration for the Israeli troops’ 
distinctive features and that provokes pain and sadness for their (tragic) death.  
In order to reinforce the ‘heroic victim’ figure, most of these obituaries reflect 
characteristics that are associated with the cultural archetypes of the Sabra and the 
pioneer. The pioneer represents the quintessential figure of the pre-Israel period and 
the key symbol of the second immigration wave (1904-14 aliyah) in the Yishuv (pre-
state community), while the Sabras represent the first generation of native-born Israelis 
that both resembled and distinguished from their pioneer parents. The pioneer would 
pursue manual labour in order to secure both personal and national redemption. 
According to pioneers’ beliefs, physical labour through agriculture, vigour, secularism, 
love, and sacrifice for the settled land and for the collective body would bring about the 
emancipation of the Jew and a detachment from its bourgeois habits that characterised 
his or her life in the exile. Moreover, the Sabras became the symbolic figures of 
heroism, military masculinity, and combat success because it was believed their 
courage, sturdiness, and morality secured the victory of the Six-Day War (1967).9 By 
reminding of the Sabra and the pioneer figures, these obituaries situate the Israeli 
military subject at the intersection between continuity and change, reiterate the 
significance of military service in Israel, and remind the current generation of Israeli 
citizen-soldierss of their responsibility to carry forward the legacy of their parents and 
grandparents.  
Rooted in the Sabra and respectively, the pioneer figure, the image of the 
‘heroic victim’ is constructed through an emphasis on the military personnel’s devotion, 
love, and loyalty towards their local communities and Israel. For instance, First 
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Lieutenant Goldin, ‘attended together with his twin brother “Bnei Akiva” religious 
youth movement and over time, became counselors in the movement’.10 Similarly, 
Sergeant First Class Eyal Tuvia Benin, who was killed by enemy fire during the Second 
War of Lebanon in 2006, ‘was very active in the Israeli scout movement, where he 
learned and strengthened the values that would shape his short life: leadership, 
camaraderie, and a strong love for Israel’.11 Private Rivkah “Regina” Salzman is the 
perfect blend of the Sabra and the pioneer spirit since she has ‘made Aliyah to Israel 
with a youth group and settled in a kibbutz, Ein Ha’Horesh. She studied agriculture for 
a period of two and a half years, and afterwards became a farmer’.12 As a member of 
the Palmach, Rivkah fought ‘with great courage and dedication’ but was ‘mortally 
wounded while defending her home’.13  
Other obituaries stress the courage, the determination, and the readiness of 
these servicemen and women to sacrifice for Israel. For example, Private Levi Ismailov 
(Luba), who was killed during the early days of the Six-Day War in 1967, went to war 
without waiting for his call to duty: ‘On the eve of the Six-Day War, when he saw that 
his call to duty was delayed, he became impatient and prepared to head out by himself; 
and so, through courage and determination, he went out to fight in the Armored 
Corps’.14 Others overcame their disabilities or injuries in order to serve the State and 
the people of Israel as best as they could therefore they are regarded as examples of 
emulation. Sergeant First Class Yossef Avnery’s ‘physical limitations did not stop him 
from completing basic training, and he was one of the soldiers who inspired others and 
helped boost morale’.15 Finally, yet significantly, Shlomi Yirmiahu, who was killed 
during the Lebanon War in 2006, ‘suffered back problems but refused to hear about 
any change that might keep him away from his friends and his tank’.16 Despite that 
these obituaries recall the physical disabilities that some of these fallen soldiers and 
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victims of terror have experienced during their lifetime, they highlight that health issues 
did not hinder the performance of military service in an exemplary manner. These 
stories of courage, willpower, and sacrifice are quintessential for cultivating the heroic 
nature of the Israeli military.   
Invariably, the heroism of these soldier-citizens is highlighted through their 
presentation as gifted individuals who were endowed with the finest personal and 
professional characteristics. For instance, First Sergeant Sivan Bar-Nathan was ‘a 
natural leader’ who upon selection ‘to take the officer course (…) proved himself a 
distinguished soldier’.17 Lieutenant Colonel Dolev Keidar, who was killed during an 
altercation with Hamas fighters during Operation Protective Edge in 2014,  
 
‘was a very committed soldier, who was always there for his 
colleagues and the soldiers under his command. They describe him 
as a fearless leader, who was always the first soldier on the line and 
who was known for instilling confidence and motivation in his 
soldiers’.18 
 
 Furthermore, Sergeant Major Annan Kadur ‘carried out his duties above and 
beyond what was necessary and was described as professional, responsible and 
organized, an exemplary military man, admired by his superiors, subordinates and 
friends’. 19  Finally, yet significantly, the courage and competence of these token 
personalities were recognised by their peers and by the military. Sergeant Major Annan 
Kadur ‘was the Paratroopers Brigade’s nominee for the IDF Chief of Staff’s Excellency 
Award. The brigade decided that his parents and fiancée would receive the award in his 
name’.20 Moreover, Sergeant First Class Isaac “Gadi” Ezra fell while helping others 
during the Second Intifada in Jenin. He ‘was posthumously decorated with a medal for 
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his exemplary display of camaraderie, courage and the bravery to risk his own life for 
others’.21  
The talent, the distinctive skills, and the exceptional nature of these 
servicemen and women are reinforced by family members, unit commanders or by 
Israeli state officials who praise the qualities of these men and women. In their 
description of their loved ones or their colleagues, family members and military figures 
admire and highlight the bravery, the immortality, and the sacrifice proved by these 
fallen soldiers and victims of terror while performing their military duties. A letter sent 
by the Defense Minister reminds the serviceman’s bereaved family that ‘Second 
Lieutenant Mordechai Garidi gave his life for his country. He was an excellent soldier, 
a talented officer and a loyal friend who was liked by all’.22 The collective loss that is 
expressed in these obituaries is captured in the powerful eulogy that Corporal Suheil 
Abazak is given in the wake of his death during the Kiryat Shmona massacre. His 
commander described Suheil in the following way: 
 
‘The best of our sons and soldiers. I imagined he would have a big 
future. Suheil was about to go to officers course, but unfortunately he 
was taken from us. Only his memory and his contribution were left, 
and they will accompany us forever as a living torch that will light 
our way day and night’.23  
 
Likewise, Sergeant Shalom Silberman’s family received the following letter 
from his commander: ‘His heroism and bravery will forever be remembered in the 
history of our people and his name will forever be engraved in the soil and rocks of our 
country’.24 Sergeant Moshe Kazmirachi’s unit officer wrote a letter to his bereaved 
family stressing that Moshe’s death was not meaningless: ‘You belong to the glorious 
family of the Paratroopers who sacrificed many for the security of the people and the 
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country. We hope that thanks to your son and his brothers in arms, we will not know 
war anymore’.25 Furthermore, Shlomi Yimiahu’s parents recalled the sacrifice that he 
performed for the State of Israel and stressed his eternal life: ‘Your smile will be 
remembered forever. You will always be a hero’.26   
The eternal youth that is attached to the memory of fallen soldiers and victims 
of terror is a common trope in describing the heroic military figure. For instance, 
George Mosse believes masculinity, youth, and war symbolise the regeneration of life: 
‘[M]anhood was cast in the warrior image, symbolizing youth grown to maturity 
without losing its attributes of youthfulness’.27 The author emphasises that in both 
World Wars ‘youth and death were closely linked in that myth: youth as symbolic of 
manhood, virility, and energy, and death as not death at all but sacrifice and 
resurrection’.28 In this regard, he concludes that ‘the mythology of war: the fallen 
symbolized the triumph of youth’.29 Concerning the IDF, the relation between youth, 
death, and war is captured in Israel’s myth of the ‘living-dead’, a myth that attaches the 
Israeli heroes with immortality. The ‘living-dead’ figure is the citizen-soldier whose 
material and biological existence ended during military combat yet significantly, he or 
she are ‘present and alive in the national collective consciousness’.30 By and large, this 
is the aim of the Memorial Day in Israel, a day in which the thresholds between life and 
death, joy and sorrow are elided for the purposes of reproducing the myth of sacrifice 
according to which the Israeli citizen-soldiers died or had to die in order to prologue 
the life of the Israeli living body. Through annual commemoration and practices of 
remembrance, Israel endows its fallen soldiers and victims of terror with perennial life 
despite their material and biological death. Every soldier and victim of terror  becomes 
a ‘redemptive sacred figure’ whose memory and sacrifice is both celebrated and 
mourned by subsequent generations.31  
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Moreover, the construction of the Israeli heroic figure as eternally young 
accentuates the feeling of loss and sadness that is captured by these obituaries. The 
sentiments of grief and pain are heightened through the representation of these 
servicemen and women as honest, responsible, and devoted family and community 
members. For example, Staff Sergeant Moshe Malko, who died during Operation 
Protective Edge in 2014, ‘helped pay his family’s bills and hoped to rise professionally 
in the army in order to financially support his family.32 Likewise, Private Benjamin 
“Benny” Bougadry, ‘killed during the first day of the Six Day War’, was famously a 
family man, always loyal to his parents and relatives, constantly helping out wherever 
he could’.33 Similarly, Sergeant Major Kshaun is described as the perfect neighbor, ‘a 
very modest man, and pleasant, with an inner quiet and a smile on his face, who never 
did anything bad’. 34  Sergeant Moshe Kazmirachi’s school teacher reminded the 
attendance at the former’s funeral that Moshe will live forever in the hearts of those 
that knew him while rhetorically addressing to Moshe: ‘Your spirit floats around and 
is inside of us. All of your nicknames prove how sympathetic you were and how loved 
you were by your peers. Moshe, we will miss you!’.35 The voices of family members 
and acquaintances that give a personal touch to the biography of the loved ones recall 
that bereaved families play an important role in Israel. They enjoy socio-economic 
benefits, and social and political capital to be involved in decision-making processes 
with respect to national practices of commemoration.36  
The individualisation of these servicemen and women permits the reader to 
grasp the uniqueness of the personality of the deceased individual and to possibly 
identify with the stories read in the obituary. Likewise, Meira Weiss stresses that 
commemoration practices cultivate solidarity between the civil and the military 
spheres, while the public and the private intersect in order to form a ‘bereaved family’ 
that goes beyond socio-political differences in Israel. 37  Furthermore, through their 
                                                        
32 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘In Memoriam – Staff Sergeant Moshe Malko’, The IDF Blog. 
Available at: https://www.idfblog.com/in-memoriam/#Moshe%20Malko [Accessed 17 February 2016]. 
33 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘In Memoriam – Private Benjamin “Benny” Bougadry’, The IDF 
Blog. Available at: https://www.idfblog.com/in-memoriam/#Benjamin-Bougadry [Accessed 17 
February 2016]. 
34 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘In Memoriam – Sergeant Major Bayhesain Kshaun’, The IDF Blog. 
Available at: https://www.idfblog.com/in-memoriam/#Bayhesain%20Kshaun [Accessed 17 February 
2016]. 
35 The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, ‘In Memoriam – Sergeant Moshe Kazmirachi’. 
36 Weiss, The Chosen Body, pp. 75-8. 
37 Weiss, ‘ “We Are All One Bereaved Family” ’, p. 178. 
  179 
circulation in the online sphere, these obituaries invite not only local audiences, but 
also international audiences to share and join the Israeli experience of loss and grief by 
being introduced to the men and women that serve Israel and defend its collective body. 
Finally, yet significantly, these obituaries create heroes that are important for 
strengthening the affinity between the military, the Israeli society, and the broader 
public that accesses them. 
Notwithstanding the importance of these obituaries in enhancing the affective 
bond between the public and the military by constructing Israeli heroic figures, Judith 
Butler warns that practices of commemoration reinforce the enactment of violence. 
Since mourning determines ‘stoking nationalist fervor’ and replicates ‘the conditions 
of loss and victimization that come to justify a more or less permanent war’, these 
obituaries implicitly claim the Israeli troops’ victimhood and innocence and justify the 
enactment of violence, harm, and injury for the purposes of defending the Israeli Jewish 
individual and collective bodies. 38 In this respect, through their role in cultivating a 
devoted and irreplaceable military figure, these obituaries are reinterpreting the 
violence that is intrinsic in military service. They reiterate the tragic destiny of the 
Israeli young men and women and heighten their heroic nature because they imagine 
the Israeli troops as ‘forces [that] do not kill, but are killed’ while defending the Israeli 
Jewish individual and collective body.39 For example, Sergeant – Major Bayhesain 
Kshaun was killed ‘following an infiltration of a terrorist cell near Kibbutz Nir Am’, 
Staff Sergeant Pavel Slutsker was ‘killed in battle after Palestinian terrorists infiltrated 
Israel’, or Staff Sergeant Dvir Emanuelov was ‘killed by terrorists in the Jabaliya 
refugee camp’.40 These obituaries present a sanitised view on the enactment of violence 
in which the fallen soldiers are presented as victims of Palestinian attacks. Far from 
downplaying the individual and collective pain and grief regarding the loss of Israeli 
citizen-soldiers, or justifying the Palestinian enactment of violence, this criticism 
addresses the role of obituaries in reinterpreting the violence that characterises the 
military profession by presenting the Israeli troops as being exposed to and threatened 
by Palestinians’ violence.  
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These obituaries craft the ‘heroic victim’ military figure by carrying and 
reinforcing discourses of mourning, grief, loss, and bereavement that permeate the 
Israeli civil-military relations. Through its insistence on the Israeli citizen-soldiers’ 
dedication, sacrifice, talent, and uniqueness, the In Memoriam project asserts the heroic 
nature of the fallen soldiers and victims of terror and invite sorrow and sadness 
concerning their death. They are portrayed as having been killed while performing their 
duties or during unfortunate private circumstances. Despite highlighting the violence 
that is enacted against these Israeli servicemen and women in a succinct manner, these 
obituaries investigated here speak less about harm, injury, and war and more about the 
servicemen and women’s professional and personal qualities. Therefore, the circulation 
of personalised representations of military service is important for building a bridge of 
solidarity between the IDF and local audience. Increasingly wary of serving in the 
military either due to their moral belief or due to fear for their lives, some young Israeli 
men and women are reluctant to join the military. In this context, the circulation of a 
heroic military figure reinforces the desirability and attractiveness of the Israeli military 
service by attaching it with moral and political value, and by presenting it as an 
opportunity to demonstrate the remarkable skills of a hero. However, narratives of 
military service captured either in literary representations or in activist practices against 
the occupation contest the heroic image of the military and show the role of this 
representation in effacing the physical, psychological, and moral consequences of 
military service.41  
Moreover, through its obituaries written in English, In Memoriam is easily 
accessible to an international audience. Through their individualised representation of 
Israeli servicemen and women, these obituaries introduce the wider public to the 
official image of military service and, most importantly, invite Western audiences to 
empathise with the IDF. The personalised nature of these obituaries permits the 
Western audiences to see men and women that resemble to them. By circulating the 
representation of the Israeli Jewish troops as (young) men and women who have 
sacrificed for Israel and who exude of love, dedication, and uniqueness as parents, 
children or spouses, the IDF invites the Western public to express sorrow for the 
individual and collective loss of the Israeli military and society. This affinity between 
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the IDF and international audiences, presumably Western, is enhanced by the fact that 
these obituaries circulate a familiar military image that appeals to the Western public. 
Compared with Maja Zehfuss’s investigation of the British military’s obituaries that 
memorialise the British troops who have died during Operation TELIC, this research 
shows there is hardly any difference between the British and Israeli military personnel’s 
obituaries. They highlight the heroism of the servicemen and women who have 
sacrificed for the nation, stress their gifted personalities and competences as soldiers 
and citizens, and reinforce the sadness and the grief of those peers and family members 
who mourn the death of their loved ones. Nonetheless, by resembling any other 
(Western) military and by presenting Palestinians as dangerous individuals, the IDF 
extract their military personnel from the complexity of the Israel/Palestine conflict, 
conceals their instrumentalisation in enforcing the occupation of Palestinians, and 
present themselves as fighting against global threats. Therefore, by capturing, 
circulating and provoking pain, loss, sadness, grief, and bereavement, these obituaries 
construct the Israeli subject as a ‘heroic victim’, whose dissemination both reinforces 
and depoliticises the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. They cultivate a discourse 
according to which the Israeli military’s violence against Palestinians has a self-
defensive purpose insofar as the latter threaten and kill Israeli remarkable citizen-
soldiers. 
The following section broadens the study of the way in which ‘death informs 
(…) political life’ in Israel.42 It discusses the forensic practices through which the 
bodies of Israeli Jews and Palestinians are recovered, handled, and buried. Imbued with 
religious symbolism, these medical practices reinforce the affective boundaries 
between Israeli Jews and Palestinians insofar as they construct the Israeli Jewish body 
as a sacred entity that is worthy of veneration and respect to such an extent that it should 
be distinguished from the Palestinian one. In this regard, forensic practices are imbued 
with, circulate, and provoke grief, revulsion, and animosity that strengthen the 
differences that characterise the socio-political relations between the Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians. By distinguishing between who should and who should not be mourned 
and grieved, and by differentiating between for whom the Israeli public should and for 
whom should they not care for, forensic practices sanction the enactment of violence 
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for the purposes of defending the revered body of Israeli citizen-soldiers and of 
exonerating the Israeli troops’ violent behaviour against Palestinians in the name of 
state security.  
 
The Affective Politics of Managing (Violent) Death 
This section investigates the forensic practices of L. Greenberg National 
Institute of Forensic Medicine, a state institution, and those of ZAKA (Hebrew acronym 
for Disaster Victim Identification), the search-and-rescue ultra-Orthodox non-
governmental organisation that works under the umbrella of the Israeli state authorities. 
Both institutions are involved in managing the wounded and the dead bodies of both 
Israeli Jews and Palestinians, both victims and perpetrators involved in violent attacks. 
The L. Greenberg National Institute of Forensic Medicine (Abu Kabir Institute) is a 
scientific institution affiliated with Sackler School of Medicine (Tel Aviv University) 
and conducts forensic investigations on dead bodies at the request of the Israeli civil 
and military authorities. This institute performs autopsies on all bodies that have 
experienced physical violence. It conducts tests on victims of sexual violence, on 
victims that experienced violence during incarceration, or on Palestinians that died 
during interrogation and during violent interaction with the Israeli military and security 
forces. Chevra Kadisha (Aramaic for ‘Holy Society’), a religious institution that has a 
monopoly over burial practices in Israel, supervises the workings of this institute in an 
informal manner.43 
Moreover, ZAKA is a organisation that is ‘on call 24/7 to respond to any terror 
attack, disaster or accident immediately, professionally and with the necessary 
equipment’.44 It is a non-profit organisation that works under the formal umbrella of 
the police’s civil guard and its Division of Identification and Forensic Science, and 
collaborates with the IDF’s Home Front Command and the Institute of Forensic 
Medicine.45 ZAKA has also an International Rescue Unit, with volunteers that have 
assisted natural and man-made disasters across the world, from the earthquake that took 
place in Haiti in 2010 to the tsunami and earthquake that occurred in Japan in 2011, 
and the terror attacks that took place in Paris in 2015. As an official recognition of their 
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work, the United Nations granted ZAKA observer membership to the United Nations 
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.46 With its headquarters in Jerusalem, 
the organisation gathers around 3,000 Haredi volunteers across the country, which 
allows it to reach immediately the scene of a man-made or natural disaster. Even though 
its majority of members are ultra-Orthodox Jews, the organisation hosts a number of 
Christians, Muslims, secular Jews, Bedouins, and Druze members.47 ZAKA worked in 
an informal manner between 1989 and 1995 and its founding is a direct response to a 
terrorist attack on the 405 bus that travelled between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. The 
attack took place in 1989 and a number of informal volunteers rushed to the scene of 
the disaster to help the wounded.48 Since its establishment, the organisation functions 
as one of the few actors that is authorised by the state to prepare the Israeli Jews bodies 
for burial according to the Jewish laws. 49 Nurit Stadler believes its volunteers infuse 
the Israeli public space with ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) ideas and attitudes towards death 
and death rituals on the basis of a discourse of ‘corpse symbolism’, a narrative that 
relies on the veneration of the Israeli Jewish dead body.50  
This section argues the practices performed by ZAKA and the Institute of 
Forensic Medicine are informed by and shape a discourse that frame the Israeli citizen-
soldier as a vulnerable and sacred victim whose wounded or dead body deserves the 
highest care and attention at the detriment of the Palestinian one. Imbued with national 
Jewish religious symbolism, these forensic practices cultivate aversion and hatred 
against Palestinians and enhance the ideal and impeccable image of the Israeli military 
subject. Therefore, both institutions contribute to the cultivation of a faultless military 
subjectivity that reiterates the heroic and sacrificial nature of Israeli military service 
while enhancing the affective boundaries that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
L. Greenberg National Institute of Forensic Medicine 
The forensic practices performed at the Institute of Forensic Medicine reveal 
a continuous effort to distinguish between Jews and non-Jews, and especially, between 
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civilians and soldiers.51 During medical examination, the body of the dead soldier is 
treated with utmost respect. For instance, the subjection of the dead bodies of military 
personnel to autopsy and tests is performed separately from other bodies, and staff 
working at the Institute of Forensic Medicine are forbidden from taking tissues from 
the dead bodies of servicemen and women.52 The military body is considered sacred 
and its handling should be performed with the highest precaution. As a staff member 
stressed: ‘[T]he soldier is a hero, his body is sacred. We must not touch it, we must not 
take away anything’. 53  Against these social norms, the harvesting of tissue from 
soldiers’ dead bodies is prohibited and any medical practice on their corpses is 
forbidden. The utmost respect showed towards the bodies of the military personnel is 
explained through the fact that, as a symbol of society, the soldierly body is a metaphor 
for the collective body of the Israeli Jewish nation.54 In this regard, Weiss claims the 
‘Israeli nationalism is constructed upon the body [of the soldier], with the body as a 
literal and metaphoric vehicle for collective fears, hopes and commitments’.55 Any 
mishandling of the military body is an affront to the Israeli society and nation, and a 
sign of profound disrespect towards the sacrifices performed by Israeli troops to defend 
the Israeli Jewish individual and collective body.  
One of the controversies that characterises the working of this institute is the 
fact that it harvests skin and organs from Palestinians killed by the Israeli military for 
medical purposes. Staff members at the Institute of Forensic Medicine acknowledged 
that during the First Intifada, the skin of Palestinians and Israeli-Arabs was readily 
available for harvesting. 56  In 2009, the collection of Palestinians’ tissue and the 
harvesting of their organs became an international issue when the Swedish journalist 
Donald Boström published a piece in Aftonbladet, Sweden’s most circulated daily 
newspaper. In his article, he disclosed Palestinian accusations that the Institute of 
Forensic Medicine might have harvested in an illegal manner the organs of Palestinian 
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stone-throwers and alleged terrorists in the aftermath of their death.57 The journalist 
quoted a relative of a deceased Palestinian asking in a rhetoric manner:  
 
‘Why are they keeping the bodies for up to five days before they let 
us bury them? What happened to the bodies during that time? Why 
are they performing autopsy, against our will, when the cause of death 
is obvious? Why are the bodies returned at night? Why is it done with 
a military escort? Why is the area closed off during the funeral? Why 
is the electricity interrupted?’.58 
 
These words relate the concerns of Palestinian bereaved families with regard 
to the fate of their loved ones and express wariness regarding the inexplicable security 
measures that are taken with regard to the dead bodies of their relatives. The article 
presents Boström’s conversations with Palestinian families who claim their sons 
disappeared and they were brought back dead with their corpses cut open and wrapped 
in hospital fabric. His article is based on his fieldwork performed in early 1990s in the 
West Bank. As a mix of political rhetoric, euphemisms, and unsubstantiated evidence 
– it seems to suggest that the IDF illegally abduct Palestinians. The written piece 
angered the Israeli authorities since Boström did not support his arguments with solid 
evidence. However, the journalist had never argued in his article that the IDF was 
deliberately abducting Palestinians for organ harvesting. He had just presented the 
concerns of Palestinian families with regard to the ways in which the Israeli military 
might have mismanaged the dead bodies of their loved ones.59 Invited to Israel to 
discuss the publication of his article, Boström regretted the controversy provoked by 
his article but denied he had accused the IDF of having intentionally harvested 
Palestinian organs. The journalist called the Israeli media and authorities to engage in 
a fair investigation of the alleged Palestinian youth’s disappearances.60 Broadly, the 
controversy provoked by this article indicates the complex role that journalists play in 
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conflicts and that controversial articles might generate debates that could worsen the 
Israeli-Palestinian relations. Similarly with the discussion from the previous chapter 
regarding the visual representations of the IDF’s violence against Palestinians, the 
Boström affair indicates that passionate debates and affective echoes of the violent 
interactions between Israeli Jews and Palestinians may both reveal and deepen the 
socio-political antagonism that characterises the Israel/Palestine conflict.  
Nancy Scheper-Hughes offers a different perspective regarding the allegations 
about the mismanagement of Palestinian bodies by Israeli forensic state institutions. As 
a leading anthropologist working on illegal harvesting of organs and organ trafficking 
across the world, she has investigated the role of Israel in the illegal trade of organs. 
Witnessing the controversy sparked by the Swedish journalist’s article, the scholar 
published an interview with Doctor Yehuda Hiss, the former director of the Israeli 
Institute of Forensic Medicine. She interviewed Hiss in 2000 and the talk was 
disseminated on Channel Two in Israel. He acknowledged that during the 1990s, the 
Israeli pathologists were harvesting organs from dead Israeli and Palestinian bodies 
without the consent of the families of the deceased individuals. These organs and tissue 
were sometimes transplanted to the bodies of the Israeli military personnel with the 
tacit approval of the military leadership.61  The harvesting of Palestinian organs is 
controversial since they are considered the traditional enemy of Israel thus any harm to 
their bodies, including illegal harvesting of their organs and tissue, is seen as a 
continuation of violence that is enacted against them under the occupation. Moreover, 
the harvesting of organs from the Israeli military personnel represents a severe breach 
of the social rules that require the utmost care for the military body and that prohibit 
the harvesting of organs from troops since military corpses are sacred. Despite these 
socio-political controversies, Hiss readily admitted the institute and the military 
enjoyed a strong and mutually beneficial relationship. He reckoned during his interview 
with Nancy Scheper-Hughes that: 
‘There is a special relationship between the institute and the army 
because of the current political situation in Israel. All Israelis feel we 
all have an obligation to help out in some way, and because we all 
served in the army, we all have a personal stake in the army ever after. 
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We are all linked to the army. And because of this, we took it 
[harvesting] for granted. We never asked. We thought it was part of 
the duty of all Israelis to cooperate’.62 
  
In her article, ‘The Body of the Terrorist’, Scheper-Hughes motivates her 
decision to publicise the interview with Hiss as an effort to reveal the presence of Israel 
within the international network of illegal organ-trade and to disclose the harassment 
that Israeli scholars working at the Institute of Forensic Medicine experience due to 
their academic work.63 For instance, the author recalls the problems faced by Meira 
Weiss (whose work is cited in this project) and those faced by Doctor Chen Kugel, a 
high ranking military officer who worked with Hiss and confronted the latter about the 
illegal practices that took place at the institute.64 Kugel wanted to bring Hiss to justice 
and expressed his dismay at the way in which the Institute of Forensic Medicine was 
illegally harvesting body parts and tissues from Israelis and Palestinians, tourists, 
immigrants, victims of terror and Israeli civilians.65 He stressed that it was very easy to 
harvest organs from Palestinians since ‘they would be sent back across the border, and 
if there were any complaints, coming from their families, they were the enemy and so, 
of course, they were lying and no one would ever believe them’.66 For example, during 
her investigation, Scheper-Hughes found out that in 1995 a Palestinian man, Abdel 
Karim Abdel Musalmeh, was shot in the head by the Israeli security forces and his body 
was returned to the family after an autopsy was performed on the corpse followed by 
the removal of tissue and cornea.67 These illegal forensic practices came to light in early 
2000s, when the Israeli authorities, supported by leading international forensic experts, 
discovered that Hiss had performed autopsies and removed tissues and organs without 
waiting for consent from the families of the deceased individuals. He sold the tissues 
and organs harvested to Israeli hospitals and private citizens. Following these events, 
Hiss was removed from the leadership of the institute but he remained in the position 
of Israel’s chief pathologist. He defended himself in front of the Israeli public and 
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authorities by arguing he had done the right thing for the purposes of saving victims of 
terror and ill Israelis. Furthermore, the Israeli military and the Ministry of Health were 
forced to acknowledge they had known about the illegal practices performed at the 
Institute of Forensic Medicine and that both Israeli and Palestinian organs were 
harvested in an illegal manner by pathologists working there. In 2013, Kugel took over 
the leadership of the Institute of Forensic Medicine and replaced Hiss after the latter 
was dismissed.68  
Whereas the body of the Israeli soldier-citizen benefits from the utmost 
consideration, the body of the Palestinian suicide terrorist is the quintessence of the 
‘other’, which should be disregarded and excluded from the Israeli body politic. The 
institute collaborates with the IDF and the Israeli Security Services (Shaback) in order 
to identify suicide bombers with the aim to find out the terrorist networks they are part 
of for the purposes of preventing future attacks.69 The management of the bodies of 
Palestinian assailants became an issue of controversy during Meira Weiss’s fieldwork 
when she researched the activities of the Institute of Forensic Medicine. For ten years, 
Weiss had worked as the official ethnographer of the institute and was granted access 
to its practices and its staff members. In a reflexive piece, she recounts the politics 
behind the identification of a Palestinian corpse at this institute. Weiss recalls her 
participation at the forensic evaluation of a Palestinian alleged attacker, Machmud 
Halil, whose autopsy was performed in the presence of a foreign expert from Ireland. 
She recollects that two file notes accompanied the cadaver. The first one claimed the 
IDF identified Halil as a terrorist who was killed near Jenin, during a fight between a 
couple of Palestinians and Israeli troops. The second file note contained information 
from the foreign press agency Associated Press, which identified Halil as one of the 
Palestinians who were arrested alive by Israeli security forces near Jenin yet both of 
them died during detention. Through the autopsy of the body, the institute had the 
power to adjudicate between the two versions of the same event, between the IDF’s 
claim that the Palestinian was killed during fighting and the press agency’s claims that 
Halil was killed in the aftermath of his arrest. Weiss notes to her dismay that the Israeli 
pathologists did not correct the failure of the Irish expert to recognise that the entry 
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wounds of the bullet proved the Palestinian man was shot during arrest rather than while 
running as it was claimed by the file note. Equally significant, Weiss has observed the 
Israeli pathologists withheld evidence from the Irish foreign expert, namely the 
Palestinian man’s hat and shirt that were torn in the back, evidence that could have 
challenged the IDF’s official version regarding the violence that took place between 
Palestinians and military forces. Finally, the author denounces the deliberate 
misleading of the foreign expert that examined Halil’s body when the former was told 
that the bruise on the Palestinian’s body was caused by a passing bullet rather than by 
torture during arrest.70  
Weiss’s story is indicative of the role of the Institute of Forensic Medicine in 
in reinforcing the classifying discourse between Israeli Jews and Palestinians while 
acting as a gatekeeper for the Israeli national security and for the IDF’s violent actions 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The controversies, rumours, and the allegations 
that surround the workings of the Israeli Institute of Forensic Medicine indicate the 
complex relations between the Israeli nationalistic ideas concerning the symbolism of 
the Israeli Jewish body and, the pervasive role and presence of the Israeli military in 
the management of the Israeli and Palestinian corpses. Furthermore, the management 
of Israeli and Palestinian dead bodies without the consent of their families raises 
questions regarding the power of actors such as Yehuda Hiss to impose ‘informal’ rules 
and practices concerning the management of bodies brought for autopsy. Finally, yet 
significantly, the speculations concerning the unauthorised management of the 
Palestinian corpses together with the role of the Institute of Forensic Medicine in 
manipulating the findings of autopsies indicate the politicisation of Israeli and 
Palestinian bodies, dead or alive. Even though the insights concerning the way in which 
Palestinian cadavers are managed stir away from adjudicating the deliberate and 
intentional use of their corpses for illegal organ trade, this study indicates the socio-
political and moral controversies with regard to the politicisation of the autopsies of 
Palestinian dead bodies. Against the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the allegations, 
controversies, and rumours regarding the management of the Palestinian bodies 
indicate the continuum of violence, desubjectification, and humiliation to which 
‘enemy’ bodies are subject to while shaping and being shaped by the hierarchical 
discourse that distinguishes between Israelis Jews and Palestinians. 
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ZAKA (Disaster Victim Identification) 
One of the first responders arriving at a site of a disaster, ZAKA members are 
easily distinguishable because they wear bright yellow and blue emergency jackets. At 
the scene of the tragedy, ZAKA members cooperate with the police, the Red Cross, the 
army or the fire fighters to recover the remains of the victims and to help the wounded.71 
ZAKA will treat the wounded first and foremost followed by the examination of the 
dead bodies.72 Volunteers will cover the corpses and will make considerable effort to 
recover all the parts of the body making sure that they do not leave behind blood or bits 
of flesh. Following these meticulous practices, this organisation transfers the dead 
bodies or the bodily remains to the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Tel Aviv that is in 
charge of identifying the body. 73  The quintessence of the work performed by its 
volunteers is captured in ZAKA Jerusalem Deputy Commander’s Yossi Fraenkel’s 
words: ‘We wipe away all traces of spilled blood and remove all human remains to 
ensure a full Jewish burial for the victims. Depending on the nature of the terror attack, 
this can take many hours of work. That’s why ZAKA is often the first to arrive, but 
always the last to leave the scene’.74  
ZAKA’s peculiar practices of recovering and managing dead bodies represent 
an example of care that is given to the Jewish Israeli body even in the direst 
circumstances. Its efforts to assembly the body reflect an allegory for reconstructing 
the nation in the aftermath of a man-made or natural disaster in Israel. In this respect, 
ZAKA’s ‘recovery and burial of the bodies is a ritual that imbues bodies with 
subjectivity’.75 As such, ‘the recovery of bodies does more than attempt to re-establish 
subject/body coherence; it attempts to restore the appearance of integrity of the [Israeli] 
state as well’.76 Furthermore, its practices remind of Mary Douglas’s observation that 
ancient Israelites’ preoccupation with the Jewish body illustrates both material and 
symbolic aspects. They feared that anything that could threaten ‘the integrity, unity and 
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purity of the physical body’ could threaten as well the ‘boundaries of their body 
politic’.77 Nonetheless, in contemporary times, ‘the body politic is again threatened’ 
insofar as ‘its boundaries are being penetrated’ by attackers that target citizens and 
soldiers in a variety of places, from checkpoints to the busy streets of Jerusalem and 
Tel-Aviv.78  
Acting according to these ancient beliefs, ZAKA’s interest in maintaining the 
sanctity, the unity, and the purity of the Israeli body became an object of controversy 
in 2015, when this organisation decided to distinguish between Israeli Jews and 
Palestinians when offering help to wounded bodies at the scene of terrorist attacks. The 
Israeli Emergency Medical Services, Magen David Adom, asked medical authorities to 
attend to the severely wounded first, without distinguishing between victims and 
perpetrators. In response, ZAKA claimed they operate distinctively by treating the 
wounded Israeli Jews first and foremost at the detriment of Palestinian perpetrators.79 
The founder and the chairman of the organisation, Yehuda Meshi-Zahav, motivated 
volunteers’ approach by stressing they are prohibited to touch the body of a terrorist 
before the police does and declared that ‘we instruct our volunteers to first take care of 
all Jews, because they were harmed just because they are Jews, while the terrorist 
murderer deserve[s] death’. 80  However, Meshi-Zahav recognised his organisation 
operates within questionable ethical medical boundaries: ‘Although our Code of Ethics 
says we should first take care of those most severely injured, we need to know that there 
is also a limit to morality. If we don’t make the distinction, we will lose direction’.81 
Moreover, the practices of differentiation between the Israeli Jewish and 
Palestinian bodies gained further symbolical meaning through ZAKA’s decision to 
place Israeli and Palestinian human remains in bags of different colours. Until 2015, 
the organisation had used white body bags with the logo of the organisation in order to 
recover the remains of both victims and perpetrators of terrorist attacks. This decision 
is an official answer to some Israeli citizens’ grievances that believed the bodies of 
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terrorists are desecrating the ZAKA name through their actions and their way of death.82 
As a response to these public grievances, Yehuda Meshi-Zahav declared that:  
 
‘ZAKA is an organization entrusted with honoring the dead. Man is 
made in the divine image – all men, and therefore ZAKA carries out 
its mission in Israel and around the world with dignity and sensitivity, 
irrespective of religion, race or creed. But when it comes to 
murderous and brutal terrorists, we too must know how to make a 
separation between victim and murderer. From today, we have taken 
this decision not to desecrate or defile ZAKA body bags’.83 
 
This novel practice regarding the handling of Israeli and Palestinian dead 
bodies carries powerful symbolic and political significances. First, the covering of the 
Israeli Jewish bodies with a white bag is a symbolic reminder of the fact that, in Israel, 
the dead body is shrouded during burial. However, military troops benefit from a 
different burial ritual. They are placed in a closed coffin because their injured body or 
the missing parts of the body must be concealed from the visual because the military 
body symbolises the Israeli nation. The bodies of military troops cannot be shown if 
bodily parts are missing since it contests the integrity of the Israeli Jewish collective 
body. 84 Second, ZAKA’s decision to place the bodies of terrorists and the bodies of 
victims in bags of different colour indicate a continuous effort ‘to physically distinguish 
the body of the Arab terrorist from the bodies of Israelis – so that, literally, “their body” 
will not blend with “our bodies” ’. 85  An equal treatment to Israeli Jewish and 
Palestinian bodies would signify readiness to accept Palestinians within the boundaries 
of the Israeli Jewish body politic, and by extension, the legitimacy of their grievances. 
Therefore, the forensic efforts to distinguish between the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian 
bodies are driven by the assumption that ‘to become contaminated by the [Palestinian] 
corpse becomes an additional criterion of accepting the other’. 86  This practice of 
differentiating between Israeli Jews and Palestinian bodies by situating them in bags of 
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different colour indicates fears and unease regarding the possibility of Palestinians 
bodies to penetrate and ‘to contaminate’ the purity and the cleanness of the Israeli 
Jewish body politic. By treating the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian bodies in an equal 
manner, the purity and the unity of the Israeli Jewish body is troubled and contested. 
Similarly, Douglas stresses that symbols of pollution are challenging systems of 
classification and order thus ‘uncleanness or dirt is that which must not be included if 
a pattern is to be maintained’.87  
Depositing Palestinian remains in bags used for Israeli Jewish bodies or giving 
Palestinians medical treatment in the same way that is afforded to the Israeli Jewish 
wounded bodies desecrates and contests the sanctity and the purity of the Israeli Jewish 
individual and collective body. ZAKA’s medical practices indicate that ‘a polluting 
person is always in the wrong. He has developed some wrong condition or simply 
crossed some line which should not have been crossed and this displacement unleashes 
danger for someone’. 88  Moreover, the need to maintain the purity of the Israeli 
collective body by placing Palestinian bodily remains in different colour bags and in 
attending Palestinian wounds after treating the Israeli Jewish wounded victims of 
terrorist attacks indicate disgust and revulsion towards Palestinians and their abhorrent 
behaviour. Miller believes that disgust has ‘close affinities’ with emotions, such as 
melancholy, contempt, shame, hatred and fear. 89  Therefore, ZAKA’s controversial 
handling of the Palestinian bodily remains show how ‘these emotions often bleed into 
one another or are experienced simultaneously’ thus legitimising the IDF’s violence 
against Palestinians.90 Its treatment of the Palestinian wounded bodies and remains 
reiterate the affective boundaries that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict because 
ZAKA cultivates disgust and revulsion towards Palestinians and towards their presence 
within the Israeli Jewish body politic. 
Even though ZAKA is unique in its actions, the practice of carefully 
distinguishing between the bodies of victims and bodies of terrorist attackers became a 
topic of controversy in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on World Trade Center in New 
York. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the American forensic authorities made 
                                                        
87 Douglas, Purity and Danger, p. 41. 
88 Douglas, Purity and Danger, p. 114. 
89 Miller, W. I. The Anatomy of Disgust  (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 25. 
90 Ashworth, M. ‘Affective Governmentality: Governing Through Disgust in Uganda’, Social & Legal 
Studies, 26 (2017) p. 204. 
  194 
considerable effort to recover the victims’ remains.91 However, more than one thousand 
one hundred victims from the World Trade Center and five victims from the Pentagon 
remain unidentified because the forensic experts could not find any DNA trace in the 
aftermath of the attacks.92 At the same time, family members of the victims from the 
9/11 attacks expressed their concern that body parts of the attackers were mixed with 
the victims’ bodies. Robert Shaler, the head of New York’s Department of Forensic 
Biology at the time of the terrorist attacks and who lead the expert team that identified 
the bodily remains of victims and attackers, declared that the families of the victims 
wanted to ensure the separation between their loved ones and attackers: ‘They 
[families] did not want the terrorists mixed in with their loved ones. These people 
[attackers] were criminals and did not deserve to be with them’.93 In this respect, Stuart 
J. Murray notes that in a terrorist attack, the attacker’s body becomes a weapon that 
penetrates the body of the victim. In this way, the body of the victim and the body of 
the attacker become inextricably linked thus challenging the forensic efforts to assert 
where the body of the victim ends and where the body of the attacker begins.94 This is 
influenced by the configurations of contemporary modes of war and conflict within 
which the ‘human body is the battlefield’ that both challenges and equally reinforces 
the us-them, victim-perpetrator, moral-immoral, legitimate-illegitimate binaries.95 As 
Lauren Wilcox rightfully observes, in instances of suicide terrorist attacks, ‘abject 
bodies of the bomber and his or her victims’ are transformed ‘into a spectacle that 
exposes not only the instability of the bodily integrity, but the instability of the political 
order as well’.96 Therefore, ZAKA’s practices are an attempt to prevent the blending 
between the remains of the victims and the remains of attackers because it challenges 
the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and upsets the distinction between who is inside 
and should be left outside from the Israeli Jewish body politic. 
 The identification of bodily remains in the aftermath of a terrorist attack is 
fraught with forensic, affective, and legal controversies thus showing that ‘human 
remains, like all ‘conflict bodies’ became powerful symbols not in and of themselves, 
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but because of their ambiguity and multivocality’.97 This social anguish – the blending 
of the victim’s body with the body of the attacker – is present in the work that is 
performed by both ZAKA and the Institute of Forensic Medicine. Autopsies are 
performed separately and according to different protocols. If the body of the citizen-
soldier is subjected to minimal investigation, the examination of the Palestinian 
attackers’ bodies is thorough and aims to find out clues about the way in which the 
attack was performed and the network that the attacker might belong to. These practices 
reiterate the sanctity of the Israeli Jewish body and the Israeli permanent interest to 
defend the wellbeing of the community. Equally significant, the placing of victims and 
perpetrators in body bags of different colours or the treatment of the wounded bodies 
of a terrorist attack in a differential way indicate the efforts performed by the Israeli 
authorities to distinguish between who should be inside and who should be outside the 
Israeli socio-political order. In this regard, ZAKA’s forensic practices through which 
Palestinian living and dead bodies are given a different treatment than Israeli Jewish 
bodies show the role of this organisation in upholding the affective boundaries that 
characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict by cultivating revulsion, disgust, and animosity 
towards Palestinians.  
Finally, yet significantly, the allegations and controversies that surround the 
management of the dead bodies and bodily remains of Palestinians, either involved or 
caught in violence, indicate that Israeli state authorities, and the institutions that are 
delegated to act in their name, are working with and shaping a discourse that favours 
the Israeli Jews at the detriment of the Palestinian bodies. They produce an emotional 
discourse that imagines the Israeli soldier-citizen as a vulnerable victim whose body 
deserves the utmost care at the detriment of other bodies. As state representatives and 
institutions collaborating with the state apparatus, ZAKA and the Institute of Forensic 
Medicine validate and reinforce the affective boundaries that characterise the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. Against this institutional repertoire that reinforces violence 
between the two sides of the conflict, the final section of the chapter discusses the 
efforts made by and the challenges experienced by social movements and non-
governmental organisations in order to commemorate and remember the casualties of 
the Israeli/Palestinian conflict notwithstanding their position of either victims or 
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perpetrators. Therefore, the chapter ends by investigating efforts to upset the grid of 
intelligibility that distinguishes between Palestinians and Israeli Jews. As such, the final 
section echoes and does justice to Edward Said’s claims that,  
 
‘to build a conceptual framework around the notion of us-versus-
them is in effect to pretend that the principal consideration is 
epistemological and natural – our civilization is known and accepted, 
theirs is different and strange – whereas in fact the framework 
separating us from them is belligerent, constructed, and situational’.98  
 
Efforts and Challenges to ‘Egalitarian Mourning’ 
In January 1988, a feminist and anti-militarist social movement, Women in 
Black emerged in Jerusalem in order to protest against the Israeli military aggression. 
Supported by Palestinian women, Women in Black activists started marching in the 
West Bank in order to protest the Israeli army’s violent practices. Their protest was 
defined by their black clothing – traditionally worn during rituals of mourning and 
burial – and by their silent vigils for Palestinian victims. Their vigils were accompanied 
by the message ‘Stop the Occupation’ that was symbolically captured by a hand-
signaling stop image. The organisation holds vigils every Friday between 1 pm and 2 
pm in Gan Shmuel, Haifa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.99 Today, Women in Black is an 
international feminist activist network that protests across the world against injustice, 
war, militarism, violence against women, or against human rights violations. In June 
2001, more that 10,000 women organised in 150 groups, and held vigils against the 
Israeli occupation all across the world, among which in Australia, Germany, Mexico, 
Turkey, and the United States of America.100 Through their performance of silent vigils, 
Women in Black challenge the patriarchal features of the Israeli society and their 
assigned status of mothers that mourn the death of their sons and daughters that sacrifice 
for Israel. Moreover, they challenge the militaristic ethos of the Israeli society and call 
for ending the occupation of the Palestinian territories. Their practices unsettle the 
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conventional discourses concerning nationalism, gender, and military conscription. 
Therefore, the activism performed by Women in Black ‘ought to be construed as an 
ethical and political reflection on what it means to be responsible to the memory of the 
lost other, the one whose suffering and loss is expropriated (the enemy, the marginal, 
the foreign, the illegal immigrant, the other)’.101 Women in Black calls into question the 
status quo of the political order by inviting Israel to think about responsibility for and 
responsiveness towards Palestinians. Even though this organisation seems less 
interested in arguing for ‘egalitarian mourning’ for victims of Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict alike, their practices are important because they challenge the Israeli militaristic 
ethos, its military practices of occupation, and the patriarchal configuration of the 
Israeli society.102  
Displaying a different ethos, the non-governmental organisation Parents 
Circle – Families Forum: Palestinian and Israeli Bereaved Families for Peace 
(Parents Circle – Families Forum hereafter) was established in September 1995 and is 
based on the principles of reconciliation and dialogue. Parents Circle – Families Forum 
is a social movement born out of grief. In 1994, Yitzhak Frankenthal, a bereaved father 
spent a few months in an Israeli public library in order to trace all the Israeli families 
that lost a loved one due to terrorist attacks. By the end of his research, he discovered 
that there were four hundred twenty two bereaved families. Frankenthal invited three 
hundred fifty of them – he excluded recently bereaved families and those that made 
controversial statements against Palestinians – to join a group of grieving Israeli and 
Palestinian families. Forty-four families answered positively and formed the core of the 
Parents Circle – Families Forum.103 Today, the organisation conducts an array of 
activities, from film screenings, to dialogues groups, and exhibitions in which Israeli 
and Palestinians bereaved families meet and share with each other the pain of losing a 
loved one.104 For instance, a significant event took place in the summer of 2014 when 
Parents Circle – Families Forum organised a peace vigil that started before, continued 
throughout and after the launching of Operation Protective Edge. For seventy days, 
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Israeli activists, scholars, left wing politicians, and Palestinians activists, gathered in 
the plaza of the Tel Aviv cinemateque, and hosted activities that promoted 
reconciliation, dialogue, empathy, tolerance, and listening in order to counterattack the 
right wing Israeli official discourse.105 Other activities performed by this organisation 
include trips of bereaved Israelis and Palestinians to Israel and the West Bank in order 
to meet with the families whose loved ones were killed during conflict.106 Speaking 
about a meeting between Israeli and Palestinian bereaved family members, the then 
Palestinian co-chairman of the organisation, Abu Awwad, stressed that ‘the important 
thing is that we get dialogue going between us, the ordinary people. We need to 
understand each other, with the main problem being the dislike for the different. As 
soon as we change that, we can move that change further up the ladder’.107  
The efforts pursued by Parents Circle – Families Forum represent a minor yet 
important effort to secure ‘egalitarian mourning’ for both Israeli and Palestinian victims 
of conflict. Their determination to facilitate meetings between both sides of the conflict 
and the difficulties that they experience in organising events demonstrate the strength 
of the discourses of mourning and grief that favour Israeli Jews citizen-soldiers at the 
detriment of Palestinians. One of the movement’s most significant events is the 
organisation of a joint commemoration event for Israeli and Palestinian victims of 
conflict. Annually, Parents Circle – Families Forum joins efforts with Combatants for 
Peace to bring family members of Palestinian victims to the event in order to share their 
stories of loss, bereavement, and mourning. The event takes place on the eve of Israel’s 
Memorial Day and is a counter practice to the official state practices of commemoration 
that entails an official ceremony in Tel Aviv’s Rabin Square and which includes a 
screening of Israeli Jews talking publicly about their experiences of pain and grief.108  
The efforts to organise joint commemoration practices are met with serious 
resistance from different segments of the Israeli society. In 2015, a group of one 
hundred families appealed to the Israeli Ministry of Defense in order to prevent a joint 
Israeli-Palestinian commemoration event.109 The families, supported by the Samaria 
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Settlers’ Committee, asked the Ministry of Defense to prevent the entry of the 
Palestinian families in Israel because ‘the ceremony is a provocation which degrades 
Memorial Day and the memory of the fallen. We are shocked by the fact that the Israeli 
government allows a joint memorial ceremony for our enemies who took part in 
murdering and harming our children’.110 In contrast, the spokeswoman representing 
Combatants for Peace, Tamar Halfon, responded to this contention by stressing that 
‘we must remember that war is not fate but a human choice. That is why particularly 
on this day we call on both sides to acknowledge the pain and hope of those living on 
the other side of the fence, and try to prevent the next war’.111 This was not the first 
time when the joint actions promoted by Combatants for Peace and by Parents Circle 
– Families Forum were met with public clamor. In 2011, the then Minister of 
Education, Gideon Sa’ar, announced that the participation of Palestinian bereaved 
relatives whose family members were killed during conflict would be prevented from 
joining Israeli-Palestinian events for reconciliation. Representing a group of Israeli 
parents that disagreed with the participation of Palestinian parents at joint meetings, the 
attorney Hila Cohen declared that ‘drawing a comparison between bereaved Israeli 
families and Palestinian families is inconceivable, as such discussions legitimize acts 
of terrorism’.112  
Furthermore, the likening between the suffering of Israeli Jews bereaved 
families and the grief and pain of Palestinian families of terrorist attackers became a 
reason of controversy in the Israeli public sphere in 2016, when a host from the Army 
Radio wondered on air about the difference between the bereavement of Israeli Jewish 
and Palestinian families regarding the practice of withholding dead bodies by either 
Hamas or Israeli authorities. The radio host, Razi Barkai, claimed that ‘from the point 
of view of the feelings of a bereaved Palestinian mother and a bereaved Jewish mother, 
I don’t think there’s a difference’.113 In response, the former Likud member of Israeli 
Knesset Moshe Feiglin wrote on a social media website the following: ‘There isn’t just 
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pain – there’s good pain and there’s bad pain’.114 Furthermore, Hadar Goldin’s and 
Oron Shaul’s parents, the Israeli troops killed during the Operation Protective Edge in 
2014, demanded Barkai’s suspension and asked him to publicly apologise for his lack 
of empathy. Hadar Goldin’s father complained that ‘we are in a struggle to prove to the 
whole world that there are enormous differences between us and our enemies, and on 
Army Radio Barkai compares the Shaul and Goldin families and their feelings to the 
families of murderous terrorists’.115 In response to this controversy, Robi Damelin, the 
International Relations Spokesperson of The Parents Circle – Families Forum, penned 
an article in the widely circulated left wing newspaper Haaretz and asked in a rhetorical 
manner:  
 
‘What makes you think that the tears on the pillow of a bereaved 
Palestinian mother are of a different color or substance than those of 
a grieving Israeli mother? What could make you think that in 
comparing suffering no mother can suffer more than ‘our’ 
mothers?  Perhaps you think that you know how a Palestinian mother 
feels, or that their culture is different, or that she does not value the 
life of her child like ‘we’ do?  
 
Robi Damelin, who lost her son after being killed by a Palestinian sniper, takes 
aim at those segments of the Israeli public and authorities that believe that the Israeli 
Jewish lives are more valuable and that their pain is worth disclosing and mourning in 
the public space. Damelin speaks against inflammatory discourses promoted by state 
officials such as Ayelet Shaked, the Minister of Justice, who wrote on social media that 
‘they [Palestinians] are all enemy fighters and they are all marked for death’. Shaked 
accused the mothers of Palestinian martyrs that they ‘send them to hell with flowers 
and kisses. They need to follow their sons, there is nothing more just than that’.116 It is 
exactly this discourse of mourning and grief that informs the enactment of violence that 
Damelin is arguing against:  
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‘[P]unishment, the withholding of dead bodies, born out of revenge, 
will only create more hatred and wish for revenge.  We should have 
learnt this by now. Instead of the never-ending cycle of violence 
perhaps there is another way. We seem to repeat the same patterns of 
behavior on both sides, behavior we already know will only lead to 
more death and the destruction of families’.117    
 
These words invite the reader to recognise that violence breeds further 
violence on both sides of the conflict and that both Israeli Jews and Palestinians should 
acknowledge that ending revenge and hatred between the two sides could bring about 
the end of violence. A similar dispute to the one mentioned above took place in 2012 
when Combatants for Peace and Parents Circle – Family Forum organised an Israeli-
Palestinian joint event in order to commemorate the Israeli and Palestinian victims of 
violence. The event was scheduled to take place in Tel Aviv’s harbor. A Facebook 
advocacy group was set up to call for canceling the event followed by public demands 
made by Israeli members of the Knesset to ban the event. Even though the event was 
not cancelled, the chair of the company that manages the harbor, Naomi Enoch, publicly 
declared that ‘as a governmental body we reject any attempt to put dead IDF soldiers 
and Palestinian victims on a par as damaging the memory of the fallen soldiers’.118 The 
efforts of the Israeli non-governmental organisations to commemorate Palestinian and 
Israeli victims of the conflict represent frail yet hopeful actions to challenge the 
discourse of mourning that distinguishes between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. They 
aim to achieve solidarity between the two sides of the conflict through joint mourning 
rituals by demonstrating the Israeli Jews and Palestinians bereaved families experience 
the same pain, loss, and grief.  
Even though non-governmental organisations try to challenge the binary 
discourses that permeate the Israeli civil and military spheres and to contest the labeling 
of Palestinians as dangerous terrorists, this research shows there are other bureaucratic, 
emotional, and legal obstacles that prevent the commemoration of Palestinian deaths in 
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the Israeli public sphere. For instance, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian discusses the legal 
disputes involving the two Muslim cemeteries in East Jerusalem, Bab Alsbat and 
respectively, Mamilla cemetery. The author claims that the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
efforts to prevent Palestinians from accessing and using these graveyards aim to 
dispossess, to erase, and to challenge Palestinians’ claims to memory and past.119 The 
legal dispute that involves Bab Alsbat refers to the efforts pursued by a group of Jewish 
settlers to prevent Palestinians’ access to the graveyard by arguing that burial in that 
site endangers the public health of the Israeli Jews citizens and damages the Jewish 
ancient relics that are buried in the cemetery.120 This group of Jewish settlers argues 
that the cemetery, located in an adjacent area to the Wailing Wall, in the Ofel Way, is 
an archeological site of highly public and religious significance that does not warrant 
the building of graves.121 
The dispute involving the case of the Mamilla cemetery is more complex. 
More than 1,000 years old, a plot on the edge of Mamilla Cemetery was selected as a 
site for building Israel’s Center for Human Dignity – Museum of Tolerance. Human 
remains were excavated and the Muslim authorities accused Israel of desecrating the 
ancient graves. Despite legal objections, the Supreme Court approved the building of 
the planned museum.122 Weekly protests followed the Court’s decision and a group of 
sixty Palestinians launched an international campaign to save the Mamilla cemetery. 
The movement organises protests, vigils, and engages in international advocacy efforts 
in order to save the cemetery.123 The campaign and the activists that organise vigils at 
the Mamilla cemetery contest the classifying discourse and practices of 
commemoration according to which the Palestinian deaths are less grievable than the 
Israeli Jewish ones. The legal controversies that characterise Muslim cemeteries in East 
Jerusalem show that the Israeli legal system is flawed, allows the infliction of 
psychological violence against bereaved families, and permits the desecration of the 
Palestinian graveyards.  
This hierarchical discourse of grief that characterises the legal disputes about 
Muslim graveyards is rounded by ethnographical findings concerning the difficulties 
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that Palestinians from East Jerusalem experience when performing rituals of burial and 
mourning. In this regard, Shalhoub-Kevorkian underlines that, for the Israeli state, 
‘dead and their desecrated bodies are turned into symbols of power and became 
boundary markers that appropriate Palestinian place, space and conduct to reproduce a 
context of constant uncertainty and chaos’.124 The author shares Rasha and Samer’s 
baby’s story in order to show how the Israeli security services control and police the 
death and the burial of Palestinians. The baby’s mother, Rasha, argues that her infant 
child died when the Israeli security forces entered her house and threw teargas bombs. 
Her baby, suffering from a cold, stopped breathing due to the heavy smell of tear gas. 
The baby’s mother accused the Israeli security forces of preventing her from taking her 
baby to the hospital. The baby’s father, Samer, recounted that when they eventually 
reached the hospital with the baby the hospital authorities called the police to question 
the family and the hospital personnel that took care of the baby. He recalled the pressure 
that the police put on doctors and nurses to issue a medical report that stated the baby 
had died because of cold and fever. Finally, Rasha recalled that the funeral of her baby 
was heavily controlled and policed by the Israeli authorities and that only fifteen family 
members were allowed to be near the grave.125 According to Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 
stories such as the one told by Rasha and Samer show that:  
 
‘Policing death and dying is a technology that dispossesses the native 
bereaved of the ability to mourn the dead. The violence of such 
dispossession deprives people of their ritual, culture and language 
[while] the human body, dead or alive, are marked as different, as 
lower in their humanity, as open to violation and damage’.126  
 
This section has explored the efforts pursued by and the difficulties 
experienced by Israeli Jews and Palestinians to organise events in which victims from 
both sides of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are mourned in an equal manner. By 
discussing the successes and the controversies that surround the commemoration of 
Israeli Jews and Palestinians during joint events, it shows that there are brief moments 
of solidarity that upset the belligerent socio-political order that characterises the 
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Israel/Palestine conflict. Furthermore, the section dwelled on the psychological, 
bureaucratic, and emotional barriers that Palestinians living in East Jerusalem 
experience while performing rituals of mourning and burial. The examples presented 
in this chapter indicate the reluctance of large segments of the Israeli society or public 
authorities to welcome the bereavement of Palestinian deaths in the Israeli public sphere 
even if they might not be directly involved in violent confrontations between military 
troops and Palestinians.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the social practices through which the bodies of 
Israeli Jews and Palestinian are memorialised, recovered and handled. It indicates that 
commemoration, forensic, bureaucratic, and respectively legal practices capture, 
circulate, and provoke dispositions of mourning, grief, pain, loss, revulsion, and 
animosity that reinforce the affective differences that characterise the Israel/Palestine 
conflict. The examination of these practices shows the emergence of the ‘heroic victim’ 
military figure as an affective technique through which the IDF reinterpret violence 
against Palestinians as a self-defence endeavour for the purposes of defending the 
Israeli Jewish individual and collective body. Contrasted with the Palestinian body 
either in an implicit or explicit manner, the ‘heroic victim’ figure imagines the Israeli 
servicemen and women as gifted individual whose bodies are sacred and pure, and who 
are endowed with exceptional military and individual qualities. Through this flawless 
representation, the Israeli military curbs local (and international) criticism against the 
IDF and their violent abuses in the Israel/Palestine conflict. By studying military 
obituaries, medical, discursive, and respectively, bureaucratic practices that contest an 
‘egalitarian mourning’ of Israeli Jews and Palestinian bodies, this research highlights 
the efforts pursued by a variety of actors to differentiate between Israeli Jewish and 
Palestinian bodies in order to stress the distinctiveness and the impeccability of the 
Israeli military figure. Through this lens, the military subject becomes incapable of 
harming other bodies and he is imagined as a tragic victim whose death is invariably 
caused by threatening and dangerous Palestinians. Accompanied by this symbolism, 
the IDF’s violence against Palestinians is reinterpreted as efforts to defend the 
individual and collective Israeli Jewish body.   
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Furthermore, this chapter shows that the online commemoration practices and 
the management of the dead bodies by influential gatekeepers such as the Israeli 
military, ZAKA, the Institute of Forensic Medicine, and the Supreme Court confine the 
possibility to mourn and grieve Israeli Jews and Palestinians in an ‘egalitarian manner’. 
The commendable efforts of Women in Black, Combatants for Peace and Parents’ 
Circle – Family Forum and the difficulties that they experience while organising joint 
commemoration events speak to and challenge the mourning and grief that are part and 
parcel of the discourse that justifies, allows, and reinterprets the enactment of violence 
in the name of the security of the state. Their counter-practices upset the politicised 
nature of mourning, bereavement, and grief in Israel and invite a reflection upon the 
ways in which brief moments of solidarity can unmake violence, inequality, and 
conflict.  
By investigating the political nature of mourning and recovering bodies and 
bodily parts and by mapping out the role of state authorities in acting as gatekeepers in 
distinguishing between bodies that should and that should not be commemorated, 
grieved, and buried, this chapter claims that Israeli state authorities politicise mourning, 
grief, loss and pain in order to disregard and conceal the violence that is enacted in the 
name of the security of the state. Against this background, the Israeli citizen-soldier is 
both a hero and a victim – a social imaginary that confines criticism and condemnation 
against the Israeli military. This representation offers a sanitised and idealised version 
of the Israeli military subjectivity, and invites solidarity with and support for the IDF 
since local and international audiences are called upon to admire the talented young 
men and women that have sacrificed for Israel and to express sadness and sorrow 
regarding their tragic death. 
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Conclusion 
 
The project has investigated the productive power of emotions in constituting 
the Israeli military subjectivity by examining the practices, actors, representations, and 
processes that are involved in creating the Israeli soldiering figure and in constituting 
the affective boundaries that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict. The central 
research asks: How do emotions arise within and constitute the conviction that the ‘IDF 
is the most moral army in the world’ inside civil and military spheres? Offering one 
answer among the possible ones, the project argues that emotions arising from (self-
)representations within the IDF constitute a professional, non-threatening, and 
humanitarian soldiering image that nurtures civil, military, and political tolerance for 
violence against Palestinians. 
Due to its interest in the role of emotions in the Israel/Palestine conflict, the 
thesis highlights the importance of thinking about emotions as modalities and 
techniques of governing the conduct and the views of local and international audiences 
towards the Israeli military. It shows a variety of social practices cultivate a proficient, 
benign, and humanitarian military figure that moderates local and international dissent 
by embodying, circulating, and eliciting emotions of affiliation with the military and 
respectively, hostility towards Palestinians. This research nuances the study of 
emotions in war and conflict by moving from an engagement with their essentialism 
(what emotions are) towards an analysis of the political trajectory of emotions (what do 
emotions do, who are the actors that rely on emotions to (self-)govern, how are 
emotions incited and acted through, what are the means and the consequences of 
governing through emotions). Therefore, it has examined ‘what do emotions do?’, 
‘what are emotions for?’, and ‘how do emotions operate?’ within the Israel/Palestine 
conflict by building on the scholarly work of feminist and critical scholars like Sara 
Ahmed, Claire Hemmings, Ann Cvetkovich, Carolyn Pedwell, and Laurent Berlant. 
They claim the study of emotions reveals power inequalities, injury, and violence while 
maintaining open the possibility to challenge discrimination, disparity, and harm.  
Through its engagement with the materialisation of emotions and the 
emotionality of varied Israeli military (self-)representations, the thesis sits comfortably 
alongside other feminist investigations of the Israeli military while exploring the 
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productive power of emotions within the Israel/Palestine conflict. It shows that 
emotions accompany discourses, interpretations, and representations that sanction, 
condone, and downplay the Israeli forces’ violence against Palestinians. In spite of 
providing a pessimistic view regarding the Middle East conflict, this research unearths 
emotions, practices, representations, actors, and bodies through which the flawless 
image of the Israeli military is both constituted and disputed by both Palestinians and 
Israeli citizen-soldiers. This approach opens the Israeli military practices to criticism, 
troubles the perpetrator/victim binary view that is attached to Palestinian subjects living 
under the occupation, and raises questions regarding the fluidity, ambivalence, and the 
contested political role of emotions in the Israel/Palestine conflict.  
 
The Cultivation of a Flawless Military Subjectivity: Means of (Self-) 
Government By Emotions 
Phenomenological approaches, interested in mapping out the affective 
baggage of military service, argue emotions such as fear, anger, hate, distress, boredom, 
anxiety, resentment, despair, or tiredness are the principal emotional estates that 
determine military forces to act reckless, and to physically and psychologically abuse 
innocent civilians. Seen through this lens, violence is an inevitable outcome of military 
service under the duress of combat and an unfortunate consequence of the tumultuous 
nature of war and conflict. Through this narrow perspective, violence against civilians 
is a breach of military discipline. Although this literature is important for criticising the 
clinical and sanitised representations of war put forward by political and military elites, 
it carries a limited explanatory value for the development of this project. As such, this 
thesis situates individual emotions in the power structures within which they emerge 
and gain meaning in order to elucidate the reluctance to condemn the Israeli forces for 
the violence enacted against Palestinians. It investigates the reliance of the IDF on 
emotions in introducing citizen-soldiers to the Israeli military culture and life, and 
examines the affective responses and passionate debates provoked by the circulation of 
visual representations of the Israeli forces’ violence against Palestinians in the public 
sphere. Finally, yet significantly, this research scrutinises the practices through which 
the Palestinian and Israeli Jewish bodies are recovered, buried, and commemorated in 
the aftermath of a violent attack. These areas of inquiry have enabled this project to 
present the social practices that embody, circulate, and provoke emotions that constitute 
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a benign military image, which nurtures the military, political, and public leniency for 
the IDF’s violence against Palestinians.  
The first chapter of the thesis provides the theoretical framework for the 
development of this project and argues this idealised military subjectivity functions as 
an ‘affective frame of soldiering’ that moderates local and international dissent against 
the military therefore confining the possibility to hold the Israeli forces accountable for 
their violence against Palestinians. It blends Michel Foucault’s regime of truth and 
Judith Butler’s frames of war with Sara Ahmed’s theory of the cultural politics of 
emotions in order to investigate the practices, emotions, representations, actors, and 
bodies that constitute and reproduce a romanticised Israeli military image that nurtures 
the military, political, and public tolerance for the Israeli forces’ violent behaviour 
against Palestinians. The claim that individual and collective tolerance for the IDF’s 
mistreatment of Palestinians is informed by a variety of affective social practices that 
construct a professional, non-threatening, and compassionate military image suggests 
the importance of bringing emotions and violence under a broader analytical 
framework. In this respect, this research insists that in order to explain the leeway that 
the Israeli military forces enjoy in harming Palestinians, it is important to examine the 
individual and collective affective investment in cultivating a flawless Israeli military 
subjectivity. One way to broaden the methodological engagement with the productive 
power of emotions in war, conflict, and violence is by studying the Israeli public’s 
continuous support for the military and the tolerance for the Israeli forces’ mistreatment 
of Palestinians at the intersection between the literature on governmentality and the 
scholarship on emotions.   
Developed by Michel Foucault, governmentality refers to the techniques 
through which the state controls and governs the population with the ultimate aim to 
secure their wellbeing. In the author’s words, it refers to  
 
‘the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this 
very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as 
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its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and 
apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument’.1  
 
Far from being a collective and aggregated entity, state power is dispersed 
among a variety of actors that gather and process information, and impose particular 
governing regimes upon the population that guides their behaviour, way of acting and 
of thinking, and their engagement with socio-economic resources and practices. 
Interested in practices of governmentality within the context of neoliberalism, Foucault 
believed the ultimate aim of neoliberal governing is to teach individuals how to govern 
themselves. In this respect, technologies of the self 
 
‘permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves 
in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection or immortality’.2  
 
Differently put, the governing of subjectivity does not take place through 
manipulation but ‘by encouraging, inculcating, and suggesting certain ways of 
[individual and collective] conduct that increase the health, wealth and happiness’ of 
the population.3 Although thinking about emotions in the context of governmentality 
seems to be at odds with Foucault’s theoretical programme due to its emphasis on 
rationality, it is important to highlight that rationality is not void of an affective 
component. For instance, the author observes that governmentality is interested in how 
the population thinks and feels, in ‘its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of 
behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements’.4  
As an emerging field of inquiry, the intersection between governmentality and 
emotions covers a variety of fields such as legal studies, criminology, urban geography, 
citizenship studies or development studies. Although some scholars who work with 
                                                        
1 Foucault, M. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 108.  
2 Foucault, M. ‘Technologies of the Self’, in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, 
edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick. H. Hutton (London, Tavistock Publications, 
1988), p. 18.  
3 Isin, E. F. ‘The Neurotic Citizen’, Citizenship Studies, 8 (2004) p. 220.  
4 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 75. 
  210 
governmentality and emotions distinguish between the latter and affect while other 
authors conflate affects with emotions, they agree the scholarly practice to distinguish 
between the two of them reinforces the Cartesian body/mind dichotomy, which is a 
view strongly challenged by the feminist scholarship. 5  Michael Ashworth argues 
Ugandan state actors, religious figures, and journalists have constructed a discourse of 
disgust against homosexuality in order to secure the passing of a law that would 
criminalise it. 6  Furthermore, Sean Watson claims criminology benefits from 
intersecting the theory of social control with affect as it provides a solid framework for 
studying the cultivation of police officers’ subjectivities. 7  Alternatively, D. Asher 
Ghertner argues authorities in New Delhi have used aesthetic norms and codes in their 
slum surveys in order to cultivate the dwellers’ interest to improve their slums or to 
resettle from the slums deemed unfit therefore permitting the demolition of their homes 
without resistance. 8  Finally, Anne-Marie Fortier studies the role of emotions in 
cultivating citizenship by mapping our practices, policies and programmes through 
which the British authorities cultivate affective citizenship for the purposes of 
enhancing minority inclusion. 9  With regard to the study of the military, James 
Eastwood, Allison Howell, Beatrice Jauregui, and Harriet Gray study the constitution 
of soldierly subjectivity through the lens of governmentality. Through a variety of 
examples ranging from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Israel, 
Canada, and Australia, these scholars argue military service is increasingly portrayed 
as a practice of the self that is based on the responsibilisation of the individual military 
recruit.10 In spite of agreeing that the construction of the (resilient) military subject 
contributes to the normalisation and the perpetuation of war and conflict, these authors 
pay little attention to the theoretical strength of marrying governmentality with the 
literature on emotions/affect. Encouraged by the recent scholarly interest in studying 
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the military as a practice of (self-)governmentality and the potential of intersecting 
governmentality with emotions, the project concludes by outlining the strengths of 
studying the persistence of the conviction that the ‘IDF is the most moral army in the 
world’ at the intersection between these two bodies of literature.  
The study of the public, political, and military reluctance to condemn the 
Israeli military’s violence against Palestinians at the intersection between 
governmentality and emotions indicates that the Israeli benign military figure functions 
as a discursive system that regulates, generates, and determines individual and 
collective dispositions, behaviours, and beliefs regarding the IDF. This discursive 
system cultivates individual and collective affective subjectivities actively invested in 
nurturing and praising the impeccability of the Israeli military subjectivity. The project 
has showed the construction of the IDF’s romaticised military figure is ‘the practical 
labour of a variety of agents who operate [within and] beyond the state system, the 
spheres of the official and unofficial, state and civil society and governed and 
governor’.11 In this respect, it has mapped out the role of a variety of individual and 
collective actors that endeavor to construct a faultless Israeli military subjectivity. The 
second and third chapters have investigated the role of the IDF’s Education and Youth 
Corps and respectively, of the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit in constituting military service 
as an attractive and desirable activity. This view permits recruits to develop remarkable 
qualities that would serve their military and civilian lives alike. The fourth chapter has 
highlighted the role of political actors, military leaders, public figures, and citizen-
soldiers in imagining and constituting the Israeli military subjectivity. These actors shift 
responsibility from the Israeli troops to Palestinians by imaging the former as 
vulnerable and defenseless figures that are attacked by vile and cunning Palestinians, 
who fabricate their pain in order to convict the Israeli military personnel of fictive 
violent abuses. Lastly, the fifth chapter has examined the role of the military, medical, 
and public authorities in constructing a ‘heroic victim’ military figure. These actors 
stress the importance of treating the body of the citizen-soldier with the utmost care and 
respect yet neglect, disregard, and mistreat the Palestinian dead bodies. The prevalence 
of this remarkable military image, and it role in justifying violence, hinders Palestinians 
efforts, either individual or in cooperation with Israeli Jewish citizens and 
organisations, to honour their dead relatives or to participate at joint commemoration 
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events with the Israeli Jewish bereaved families. Therefore, the project has showed a 
variety of actors, institutions, and individual and collective bodies construct a 
romanticised military subjectivity by relying on discourses, practices, and processes 
that capture, circulate, and incite emotions for the purposes of eliciting individual and 
collective positive attitude, trust, and support for the Israeli military. 
The fruitfulness of an engagement with governmentality and emotions is 
visible throughout the entire project as these actors rely on affective dispositions, 
passionate debates, and emotional engagements in order to elicit individual and 
collective support and solidarity with the Israeli military. Pedagogical activities pursued 
by Israeli recruits aim to secure both individual and collective affective investment in 
defending and building the State of Israel. The second chapter has showed that emotions 
are part and parcel of the military didactic practices during which recruits are asked to 
work through their emotions in order to cultivate and appropriate a productive military 
subjectivity. Trips to historical sites, workshops in which the Israeli recruits are invited 
to discuss their affective experiences of serving under the occupation, or lectures about 
Zionism and the history of the Jewish people equip recruits with moral strength, loyalty, 
devotion, and commitment towards building and defending the Israel. Moreover, these 
educational practices, influenced by the power struggle between secular and religious 
Israeli voices, imbue the Israeli (future) military forces with a sense of exceptionality 
and superiority, aspects that carry significant political implications for the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. As an image that envisages the Israeli military personnel as 
remarkable and moral figures who are committed to care for Palestinians and for other 
foreign individuals that might experience difficult situations, the professional, non-
threatening, and benign military representation conceals the violence that is enacted by 
and against the Israeli military forces, and effaces the Palestinian pain and narrative. 
Equally, the third chapter has indicated the importance of studying the emotions 
embedded in, circulated and respectively provoked by the military photos that 
constitute the IDF’s official Facebook account. These pictures exude happiness, 
relaxation, and excitement. They imagine military service as an opportunity for the 
Israeli citizen-soldiers to develop their skills, irrespectively of their gender, race, class, 
ethnicity, or religion. These photos erase the violence of the military service. They 
present joyful young men and women that blend with breathtaking landscape, that play 
soccer with they peers, that travel to Nepal or Turkey for humanitarian interventions, 
or that help Palestinians to access medical treatment in the West Bank or Israel. 
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Similarly to didactic military activities, these pictures present military service as an 
attractive opportunity to enhance one’s abilities and to enjoy fulfilling experiences that 
serve his or her civilian and military lives alike. The second and third chapter of the 
thesis put forward an idealised representation of military service and life that aims to 
confine criticism, and to moderate Israeli recruits’ reluctance to join the military or to 
serve in combat positions. Therefore, these pedagogical and aesthetic practices function 
as subtle emotional techniques for the purposes of enhancing the Israeli youth’s desire 
to join and to dedicate themselves to the military.  
Furthermore, the circulation of the professional, non-threatening, and 
compassionate military subjectivity permits the IDF to govern the attitude of 
international audiences towards the Israeli military in order to attract their support and 
solidarity with the Israeli military. The imaginary resemblance between the IDF and 
other Western militaries is important for encouraging international audiences to relate 
to, to empathise with, and to support the Israeli military. The dissemination of this 
benign image invites non-Israeli audiences to become emotionally invested in the IDF 
thus determing the moderation of criticism and the cultivation of a positive view 
towards the Israeli military. In this respect, the construction of an affective link between 
the IDF and international audiences is informed by the efforts pursued by a variety of 
Israeli actors to liken the Israeli military with its Western counterparts while presenting 
the IDF as being involved in combat and humanitarian missions alike. This carefully 
crafted image cultivates international support for and solidarity with the IDF by 
extracting the Israeli military from the complexity of the Israel/Palestine conflict and 
by moderating its instrumentality in the military occupation of Palestinians. Through 
this discursive move, the Israeli military does not only depoliticise the IDF’s 
involvement in the Israel/Palestine conflict, but it also imagines the Israeli military as 
being involved in the global fight against radical fighters therefore appealing to Western 
audiences.  
Finally, yet significantly, the efforts pursued by a variety of Israeli actors to 
cultivate local and international support for the military is dependent on the affective 
constitution of antagonistic Israeli Jewish and Palestinian subjectivities. In the 
Israel/Palestine conflict, emotions are technologies of government that shape the 
conduct of the Israeli citizen-soldiers by imposing on them a gendered and racialised 
regime of truth that cultivates affiliation with the Israeli military and that invites 
antagonism and hostility towards Palestinians. Similarly, by drawing on the intersection 
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between affect and governmnetality, Haktan Ural stresses that neoliberal discourses are 
marked by an affective dynamic that produces subject positions that serve the neoliberal 
order by marginalising and excluding undesirable subjects that do not correspond to the 
rational needs of the state and its citizens. In this view, neoliberal governmentality is 
‘marked with certain affective dispositions that name other subjects as menaces to the 
social order’ since ‘dispositions derive from discomfort with certain people, places or 
practices’.12 The efforts pursued by Israeli individual and collective actors in order to 
cultivate support for and attachment towards the IDF are linked with their interest to 
vilify and denigrate Palestinians thus sanctioning the enactment of violence against the 
latter. In this regard, this thesis showed that both pedagogical practices and aesthetic 
representations imagine Palestinians as terrorists and ‘dangerous civilians’ who are 
ready to sacrifice their families and children in order to harm the Israeli troops or to 
blame them for alleged violence. Moreover, the fourth and respectively, the fifth 
chapter of the thesis have reinforced the stereotypical representation of Palestinians by 
indicating the role of political authorities, military and religious leaders, public figures, 
and citizen-soldiers in reinterpreting, justifying, and downplaying the IDF’s violence 
against Palestinians. Rhetorical practices express doubt, suspicion, and disbelief 
towards Palestinian pain and violent experiences, and express empathy and support for 
the Israeli troops who are exposed to the Palestinian threatening behaviour during their 
military service. Through the rhetorical assessment of the episodes of violence 
circulated in the public sphere, Palestinians become vile and cunning individuals that 
are ready to harm the Israeli military personnel and to fabricate their pain for the 
purposes of condemning military personnel for imaginary violent abuses. Forensic 
practices neglect Palestinian wounded and dead bodies in violent attacks, and hide or 
falsify evidence that indicates the Israeli forces’ responsibility for harming Palestinians. 
Thus medical figures, political and military elites, and private individuals affectively 
engage with the IDF’s violence against Palestinians in order to create and circulate 
particular representations of military service that appeal to Western and local audiences 
alike: a defenseless and vulnerable yet heroic figure who is ready to sacrifice for the 
Israeli collective wellbeing while facing radicalised and ruthless Palestinian freedom 
fighters. 
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Therefore, the circulation of familiar soldiering representations to local and 
international audiences enables the IDF to build an affective kinship between the 
military, and local and international audiences for the purposes of securing their 
endorsement and approval for the IDF’s (future) military operations. A variety of 
actors, practices, discourses, and interpretations try to elicit support, empathy, and 
solidarity with the Israeli professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military 
figure and to provoke hostility and opposition towards Palestinians. The participation 
of an array of actors and practices at constituting an idealised military image illustrates 
the assumptions of governmetality according to which the state imposes particular 
regimes of truth on citizens for the purposes of guiding their behaviour, dispositions, 
and beliefs. The blending between governmentality and emotions indicates that state 
authorities intervene upon and cultivate collective affects in order to organise the good 
life of the population. Practices of governmentality are aimed at the population and 
collective life in order to secure their wellbeing from health programmes monitoring 
depression to confidence in public authorities and, the case of the Israeli military, in 
order to secure support, solidarity, and trust in the IDF. Nevertheless, the success of the 
techniques of governmentality to act on and through emotions in order to regulate the 
conduct of the population depends on constructing and fabricating threats, dangers, 
risks, menaces that need to be controlled and, if needed, eliminated. Translating these 
insights to the efforts pursued by the IDF in order to moderate dissent against the Israeli 
military personnel and against the occupation, this research shows didactic, aesthetic, 
rhetorical, commemoration, legal, forensic, and bureaucratic practices cultivate the 
Israeli public’s trust and support for the military. These practices conceal, reinterpret, 
and downplay the violence that is inherent in military service by constituting an 
idealised representation of military subjectivity that encourages individual and 
collective positive views towards the Israeli military. This positive view towards the 
IDF is dependent on contrasting the Israeli ‘good military subjectivity’ with the 
fearsome, wicked, and vile Palestinian that might enact his own suffering in order to 
falsely accuse the military of violent behaviour in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
In this respect, the individual and collective affiliation with the Israeli military relies on 
variety of symbolic and material practices that cultivate a benign soldiering figure. This 
romanticised military representation creates the affective social and political barriers 
that sanction violence and harm in the Israel/Palestine conflict by nurturing the 
hesitancy of the Israeli public, political, and military to investigate, prosecute, and 
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condemn the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. As a consequence, its imagined 
faultlessness confines the possibility to hold the Israeli military personnel accountable 
for their unrestrained violence against Palestinian civilians.  
The thesis nuances the feminist and critical literature that addresses the Israeli 
military’s violent behaviour against Palestinians by blending the literature on emotions 
with the study on gvernmentality with the aim to explain the tolerance for the Israeli 
military’s violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It indicates the importance 
of situating emotions within the broader power relations that define the Israel/Palestine 
conflict and encourages the study of the productive power of emotions when addressing 
the public, political, and military leniency for the Israeli military personnel’s violence 
against Palestinians. Therefore, the study of emotions as modalities and techniques of 
(self-)government that cultivate support and affiliation with the Israeli military and 
respectively, disregard and hostility towards Palestinians rethinks the role of emotions 
in cultivating military subjectivity. As such, the thesis underlines a change regarding 
the role of emotions in military training since military education is less driven by the 
need to repress emotions and more focused on encouraging recruits to work with their 
emotions in order to cultivate their military subjectivities. Eastwood, Gray, Howell, and 
Jauregui have used governmentality in order to study the cultivation of a resilient 
military subjectivity as a form of neoliberal responsibilisation through which the 
military shifts its aggregated responsibility onto the individual recruit. In contrast, this 
project nuances the study of military subjectivity as a practice of (self-)governmentality 
and highlights the importance of studying the reliance of the military on emotions in 
order to govern recruits and to build a positive military image for the purposes of local 
and international consumption. A detour through Foucault’s disciplinary power 
reinforces this argument. The military is the quintessential site for the application of 
the disciplinary power of the individual body. Disciplinary power targets capacities and 
actions by shaping what soldiers should, may or can do while ‘the desired outcome is 
for the discipline to keep going by itself, to be a normed conduct, and the means of 
training of what a body can do’.13 The social control of the bodies through discipline is 
unthinkable without the control of emotions while its ultimate aim is to determine 
subjects to self-govern their conduct. The military body is made productive through the 
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military subjects’ active engagement with their emotions, be them anger, fear, anxiety, 
resentment, compassion, devotion, patriotism, and loyalty towards the state.  
Departing from Foucault, this research indicates a shift in the construction and 
representation of hegemonic military masculinity that refashions his insights on 
military subjectivity. Traditionally, constituting military subjectivity has involved risk-
taking, physical and mental toughness, emotional control, and readiness to fight. 
Military training and preparation for combat required recruits to restrain and control 
their emotions. Training would ideally transform recruits to be physically fit and 
mentally strong, and if possible, detached and unemotional individuals that possess the 
necessary mental strength to confront the complexity of military service. A dominance 
of one’s emotions, feelings, and affects was important for victory and prevalence over 
the enemy. Today, (Western) militaries seem to put a different emphasis on emotions 
insofar as they pay attention to recruits’ affective baggage and encourage them to work 
through their emotions rather than repress them. In contemporary soldiering, Dyvik 
argues, expressions of emotions are not associated solely with weakness and femininity. 
By studying representations of Norwegian soldiering, her research indicates that in 
constituting contemporary military subjectivity, ‘emotional displays of sadness, despair 
and vulnerability are not necessarily problematic, and oftentimes they are encouraged, 
particularly in situations where fellow soldiers have been wounded or killed’.14 This 
thesis broadens Dyvik’s argument regarding the role of emotions in constructing 
military subjectivity and shows they are part and parcel of cultivating military 
subjectivity prior, during, and in the aftermath of military service. As the second and 
third chapters have indicated, didactic and aesthetic military practices invite recruits to 
work through or to express emotions in order to construct and represent a desirable 
military subjectivity for the purposes of local and international consumption. The aim 
of these social practices is to build an affective affiliation between the society and the 
Israeli military and to enhance the recruits’ desire to join the military since service it is 
envisaged as an appealing activity. This study argues emotions, rather than their 
absence, are pivotal to crafting contemporary military subjectivity and to securing the 
broader support for the military. Nevertheless, this novel representation of military 
subjectivity carries significant political implications insofar as it depoliticises the 
violence enacted by the Israeli military forces. By presenting military service as a self-
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fulfilling practice, ‘emotional military training’ determines the development of a myth 
of invincibility, invulnerability, and faultlessness that serves the justification, the 
concealing, and the excusing of violence. Explicitly, the techniques of teaching recruits 
to govern and to represent themselves in the public sphere that were investigated in the 
second and third chapters indicate the role of emotions in reducing the possibility to 
hold military forces accountable for the violence enacted against Palestinians. 
Witnessing and participating at the construction of an appealing and faultless military 
subjectivity, the Israeli citizen-soldiers ultimately envisage violence against 
Palestinians as either individual failures to live up to the expectations of the military or 
as exceptional episodes detached from the power dynamics that sanction war and 
conflict.  
Furthermore, the study of the productive role of emotions in the 
Israel/Palestine indicates that apart from the military, a variety of actors rely on 
emotions in order to constitute the Israeli military subjectivity. The fourth chapter 
explored the emotional engagement with and the passionate debates that take place in 
the public sphere regarding the IDF’s violence against Palestinians. Political actors, 
military leaders, public figures, or Israeli citizen-soldiers themselves rely on affective 
discourses and interpretations in order to justify and downplay the military forces’ 
violence against Palestinians by imagining the former as defenceless and vulnerable 
victims that fight dangerous Palestinians. The fifth chapter showed that medical figures 
and religious authorities are important gatekeepers in upholding the ‘heroic victim’ 
status of the military personnel, and in concealing the violence that is enacted by and 
against the military. The diversity of individual and collective actors in constituting 
military subjectivity indicates the eclecticism of emotions, actors, representations, and 
social practices in constituting the Israeli remarkable military figure as an ‘affective 
frame of soldiering’ that nurtures the military, political, and public reluctance to hold 
Israeli military forces accountable for the violence enacted against Palestinians. 
Therefore, by mapping out the variety of emotions, actors, practices, and 
representations in cultivating military subjectivity, the thesis shows the Israeli 
soldiering figure is constructed through an array of social processes that engage recruits 
before, during, and in the aftermath of military service. Therefore, the thesis nuances 
the relation between violence, emotions, and military service. By studying emotions 
that accompany debates, interpretations, and representations of and about military 
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subjectivity, it indicates that emotions affect violence in a variety of ways from 
reinterpreting and condoning it to downplaying its consequences.  
Despite its insistence on showing that the military, political, and public 
tolerance for the IDF’s violence against Palestinians is determined by a variety of 
emotions, actors, representations, and bodies which cultivate individual and collective 
affective investment in the military, the project does not dismiss the possibility to 
unsettle the conviction that the ‘IDF is the most popular army in the world’. The fourth 
chapter of the project shows dissent against the Israeli military and the occupation 
should not be restricted to the circulation of visual and narratives representations of 
violence. The fifth chapter has investigated the efforts pursued by local activists in order 
to organise joint Israeli-Palestinian commemoration events regardless of their victim or 
perpetrator status. Although these events temporarily unsettle the antagonism that 
characterises the Israel/Palestine conflict, this research shows that affective boundaries 
that inform war and violence in the Middle East remain strong. Palestinians encounter 
emotional, bureaucratic, and legal barriers to honour their dead relatives while their 
pain and narrative are dismissed by the Israeli military, political, and public alike. 
Therefore, the study of the productive role of emotions in the Israel/Palestine conflict 
warns us that ‘emotions partake in relations of power’ and contribute to sustaining 
violence, war, and conflict in the Middle East yet leaving space for disruption and 
alteration.15  
 
Israel’s ‘Tough and Tender’ Military Subjectivity: Confining Local 
and International Criticism 
The investigation of the social practices that reinforce the faultless Israeli 
military image enables this project to put forward the claim that a novel military 
subjectivity emerges in Israel. This both complements and challenges the conventional 
images associated with the Israeli military as the heroic, and respectively, the disturbed 
military figure. Indicating an adjustment to the contemporary geopolitical dynamic of 
the Israel/Palestine conflict and to the socio-political changes that have shaped the 
Israeli society, the development of this novel soldiering image represents the Israeli 
military’s answer to the growing local and international criticism against the occupation 
and against the Israeli forces’ violence against Palestinians. Traditionally, the IDF 
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cultivated the image of heroism and the importance of self-sacrifice. This was 
constructed through a detachment of the narratives that characterised the Jewish life in 
exile and through a revival of the myths of sacrifice (the Biblical myth of the binding 
of Isaac, the myth of Masada, or the story of Samson, or the myth of Joseph 
Trumpeldor).16 Inspired by discourses about nationalism, colonialism, race, militarism, 
and respectively Social Darwinism that emerged at the end of nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century, Zionism both assimilated and extended these discourses by 
grafting individual and collective Jewish rejuvenation on the body of the ‘New Jew’.17 
This was envisaged as muscular, sturdy, and morally fit Jew that would construct the 
State of Israel.18 As a trademark of Zionism, ‘muscular Judaism’ was perceived as an 
antidote to the Jewish Diaspora, who was represented through the image of a studious, 
wondering, passive, and effeminate Jew.19 This gendered and racialised image served 
the cultivation of heroism, and ultimately the development of a uniform culture of 
bereavement, grief, and mourning that prohibited parents to personalise the tombs of 
their loved ones, that barred parents from changing the words inscribed on tombs, or 
that forbade military personnel to cry at funerals in order to avoid imagining the IDF 
outside its heroic and extraordinary features.20 Although both the second and the fifth 
chapter have indicated that the symbolism of the Sabra has not disappeared from the 
Israeli public imaginary insofar as it represents the quintessence of the IDF’s 
representation as a remarkable and heroic military, this research has showed the 
growing readiness of the Israeli society to question the IDF’s heroic myth and its 
refashioning within the constitution of the Israeli contemporary military subjectivity. 
Throughout time, various political events have led to a relaxation of the 
uniformity of bereavement practices and of the heroic military myth in Israel. The 
emergence of a movement of conscientious objectors, the withdrawal from South 
Lebanon, and the military forces’ engagement with routinised military practices in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories have questioned the official military narrative of 
bravery and invincibility by addressing more openly the trauma of military service.21 
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For instance, Israeli documentaries and films, especially produced during the early 
2000s, cultivated the Israeli public’s interest in the figure of a distressed and troubled 
soldier. Raya Morag argues films like Lebanon (Samuel Maoz, 2009) Beaufort (Joseph 
Cedar, 2007) and Waltz With Bashir (Ari Folman, 2008) indicate a turning point in the 
visual politics that characterise the Israel/Palestine conflict insofar as they confront the 
Israeli public with the moral complexity of military service, expose the dire 
psychological effects of military service upon the individual and the collective body of 
the military, and raise questions regarding the accountability of the military’s violent 
practices against non-combatants and civilians.22 Other documentaries such as Local 
Angel: Theological Political Fragments (Udi Alon, 2002) and Avenge but One of My 
Two Eyes (Avi Mograbi, 2005) criticise the prevalence of ancient myths in the Israeli 
society and raise ethical questions regarding their persistence in the context of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict.23 Likewise, the Israeli servicemen and women have authored 
documentaries about their own military experience. They focus on the personal 
experience of either serving during the Second Lebanon War or on performing routine 
military practices in the West Bank. For instance, Avi Mograbi’s Z32 (2008) is a 
documentary that addresses the moral dilemmas faced by an Israeli veteran who 
recounts his participation in a covert operation in the West Bank. Yariv Mozer’s My 
First War (2008) documents the author’s participation in the Second Lebanon War. 
Equipped with his personal recording camera, Mozer interprets his combat experience 
through the lens of the myth of the binding of Isaac and imagines himself as an innocent 
victim that risks being sacrificed by the military. Finally, Tamar Yarom’s To See If I 
am Smiling (2007) illustrates the military experiences of four women who have served 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The documentary shows the Israeli female 
soldiers are exposed both to Palestinian attacks and to their male peers and 
commanders’ practices of objectification and sexualisation.24  
By studying these socio-cultural representations or by performing 
phenomenological investigations of female and male Israeli military service, scholars 
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like Erella Grassiani, Ron James, or Matthew Zagor used embodied representations of 
military subjectivity in order to map out the role of emotions that shape military service 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. These authors highlight fear, anger, hate, 
tiredness, or boredom causes the Israeli servicemen and women’s unrestrained violence 
against Palestinians. 25  The project has criticised this literature, and implicitly the 
circulation of the morally conflicted military figure, for its role in alleviating the Israeli 
forces’ individual and collective responsibility for their violent behaviour against 
Palestinians. It argues that an insistence on the impact of the architecture of the 
occupation on the morale of the Israeli servicemen and women either constrains or puts 
too much emphasis on the Israeli forces’ agency when addressing their violent 
behavior. In this regard, the symbolism of the troubled military figure risks reinforcing 
the Israeli narrative regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict while ignoring both the 
Palestinian precarious experience under the occupation and the power structures that 
permit the enactment of violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Therefore, this 
research suggests, the figure of a panicked, anxious, and worried soldier serves the 
humanisation of the Israeli serviceman or woman, highlights its defenselessness during 
combat, and reinforces the need to protect the vulnerable lives of those that defend the 
Israeli collective body.  
More significantly, the circulation of this image in the public sphere and its 
role as a reliable source to disclose the Israeli forces violence against Palestinians is 
carefully scrutinised and profoundly disliked by the Israeli public and authorities. For 
instance, wary of the role of Breaking the Silence and other human rights organisations 
in exposing the Israeli forces’ violent behaviour, state authorities and some Israeli 
reservists have pursued legal and activist efforts to curb the impact of left wing activists 
both at the local and international level. For instance, the passing of the ‘NGO Law’ 
shows the Israeli authorities’ active interest in reducing criticism against Israel and 
against the military. This law requires civil organisations, which receive more than half 
of their funding from foreign bodies, to disclose this information to the Israeli public 
and authorities. Local and international bodies have criticised this law for potentially 
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harming the workings of human rights organisations in Israel.26 Seemingly targeting 
left wing organisations, the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed this law as a 
means to secure transparency, to avoid foreign intervention in Israel, and to raise 
awareness among the Israeli public regarding the political agenda of human rights 
organisations. 27  Furthermore, Netanyahu’s decision to cancel a meeting with the 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Signal Gabriel, in the aftermath of the minister’s 
meeting with leaders of Breaking the Silence during his visit in Israel, shows the Israeli 
authorities’ dislike towards activism against the occupation, their discomfort with the 
image of the distressed and remorseful soldier as tool for activism, and their active 
efforts to avoid the cultivation of a negative view about the Israeli military at the local 
and international levels.28 Finally, yet significantly, some veterans and reservists have 
highlighted their discontent with the dissenting practices pursued by Breaking the 
Silence or B’Tselem. In exchange, they have set up their own organisation, Reservists 
on Duty, in order to contest activist practices that, according to them, denigrate the 
Israeli military by presenting violence against Palestinians as a widespread practice in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories.29  
Despite witnessing a growing anxiety at the political level and amongst groups 
of veterans and reservists regarding the possible impact of human rights activism upon 
the Israeli society and military, the fourth and the fifth chapter of the project show the 
success of left wing activism against the military is fairly reduced. The fourth chapter 
indicated the strength of the nationalist and right wing voices in downplaying the Israeli 
military forces’ violence against Palestinians and in representing them as defenseless 
victims who have to be protected against cunning and fearsome Palestinians. Moreover, 
the fifth one showed that the Israeli and Palestinian efforts to commemorate the victims 
of the conflict in a joint manner is vehemently contested by political and military 
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authorities, public figures and bodies, or private citizens. Taking account of the findings 
of these two chapters and the recent legal and activist efforts pursued in order to restrain 
left wing activism in Israel, the thesis argues the development of a professional, non-
threatening, and humanitarian military figure carries significant political implications 
for the Israeli and Palestinian societies alike. It conceals the violence that is inherent to 
military service and shields the Israeli military from collective and individual 
responsibility for the violence enacted against Palestinian civilians. Specifically, the 
emergence of this novel image challenges local dissenting voices against the military 
by reconfiguring the IDF’s gendered identity through the projection of a ‘tough and 
tender’ military masculinity, moderates the strengthening of a conscientious objectors’ 
activism against the military and against the occupation, and confines international 
criticism against the IDF’s violence by likening the Israeli military with other Western 
forces engaged in humanitarian and combat missions alike.30  
This research claims that the cultivation of a humanitarian, compassionate, and 
non-threatening military conceals the violence that is often associated with the 
cultivation of a militarised masculinity and that is inherent in military service. 
Presenting military service as a practice of self-growth, the IDF alleviate the Israeli 
public’s concerns regarding the harshness of the military service yet obscures the 
traumatic experience of military service by presenting the latter as an opportunity to 
enhance one’s physical and mental resilience. The new gendered identity of the military 
refashions ideals of masculinity by attaching a new significance to what heroism and 
vulnerability mean within the context of the Israeli military. Specifically, this fresh 
military image suggests that being a hero means not only sacrifice but also caring for 
strangers that find themselves under distress. Moreover, emotions associated with 
military service such as vulnerability, fear, doubt, or uncertainty are less a sign of 
weakness and more a pedagogical opportunity to cultivate a remarkable military 
subjectivity. The IDF’s refashioned identity, which incorporates features pertaining 
both to the heroic and to the troubled military figures, cultivates a soft masculine 
military image in order to appease the public’s worries (especially parents’ concerns) 
regarding their children’s lives and their exposure to violence during military service. 
Starting with the 1990s, Israeli parents have begun to exercise significant influence over 
the Israeli military by scrutinising the wellbeing of their children during their military 
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service. Parents’ influence has materialised through a variety of practices from phone 
calls at training bases urging commanders to ease military training to lobbying practices 
to remove military personnel from bases stationed near the Gaza Strip that do not offer 
adequate shelters against Qassam rocket attacks.31 Indicating awareness regarding the 
Israeli public’s contestation of the heroic military myth and responding to the parental 
pressure exercised upon the military to secure the safety of their recruits, the benign 
military image presents the IDF as thoroughly invested in the self-growth of and the 
wellbeing of the Israeli youth.32 This (self-)representation enhances the Israeli public’s 
confidence in the Israeli military and in its commitment to the welfare of the military 
personnel.  
However, the presentation of military service as an opportunity to develop 
oneself not only obscures the violence that is inherent in military service, but also masks 
the (possible) traumatic experience of military service. Therefore, this idealised and 
gentle military image cultivates discrepancy between a fictive non-threatening pursuit 
and the violent reality of military service. For instance, the aesthetic military (self-
)representations that have been investigated in the third chapter show the relentless 
effort of the IDF to imagine themselves as a modern military that responds both to local 
and international grievances. The construction of a playful, cosmopolitan, and 
humanitarian military image through aesthetic practices masks the violence of military 
service by presenting it as an opportunity for development, regardless of gender, race, 
ethnicity, religion or class. Furthermore, this image presents military subjectivity as an 
opportunity to acquire skills and as a network of friends that serves military and civilian 
lives alike, and as a commendable activity that permits recruits to provide Palestinians 
and foreigners with humanitarian help and support. Furthermore, the cultivation of 
positive military figure by imagining military service as an opportunity to enhance 
personal growth effaces the impact of the military upon the physical and psychological 
wellbeing of the Israeli recruits. As explored in the second chapter, the didactic 
practices that invite recruits to work through their emotions in order to enhance their 
                                                        
31 Levy, Y. ‘The Essence of the “Market Army” ’, Public Administration Review, 70 (2010) pp. 378-
89; Weiss, E. ‘Incentivized Obedience: How a Gentler Israeli Military Prevents Organized Resistance’, 
American Ethnologist, 118 (2016) pp. 91-103. 
32 Lebel, U. and Rochlin, Y. ‘From ‘Fighting Family’ to ‘Belligerent Families’: Family – Military – 
Nation Interrelationships and the Forming of Israeli Public Behavior among Families of Fallen Soldiers 
and Families of MIAs and POWs’, Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social Cultural and Political 
Protest, 8 (2009) pp. 359-74. 
 
  226 
preparation for serving in an urban space, show the military’s interest in teaching 
(future) soldiers to be resilient and self-reliant during complex military operations by 
making them aware of the importance of governing their emotions. Contrary to 
expectations, talking about one’s feelings does not weaken the Israeli recruits yet 
represents an opportunity to manage and overcome the negative experience of military 
service. Through ‘experiential’ trainings, the IDF recognise that although military 
service is emotionally strenuous, recruits are taught how to overcome its affective 
burden by talking, naming, and making sense of their affective dispositions. 
 The strong emphasis that the military puts on recruits’ efforts (and ultimately, 
duty) to work with and through their emotions in order to fortify their mental strength 
is evidenced as well in the Israeli military’s recent endeavors to develop prevention 
programmes that alleviates the trauma of military service. The psychology department 
from Tel Aviv University collaborated with the Sagol Brain Sciences School and the 
IDF Medical Corps in order to design a computer programme that permits recruits to 
undergo preventive attention training. During this training, each recruit is confronted 
with neutral and threatening scenarios, words and pictures in order to enhance their 
preventive attention skills. 33  According to the IDF, this military training proved 
successful. During the Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip (2014), military 
personnel who have undergone preventive attention training were sent to combat 
together with peers that have not pursued a similar preparation. Medical reports showed 
that those who have not participated at the preventive attention training developed post-
traumatic stress disorder in a higher percentage than those that have been subjected to 
this kind of training.34 Moreover, the Israeli media reported that select army bases and 
units have indicated their interest to teach recruits to practice yoga as a means to keep 
them calm and focused. Although far from being institutionalised across the entire 
military, soldiers who have been included in this pilot programme have expressed their 
excitement and interest to continue practicing yoga throughout their military duty both 
as a means to relax and as a technique to enhance their resilience.35  
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Through their active engagement in cultivating resilience and a mentally strong 
military figure, the IDF resemble other Western militaries that are designing 
programmes in order to fortify the morale and the psychological strength of their 
recruits. Howell shows the growing Western militaries’ reliance on resilience training 
contributes to the perpetuation of violence and conflict insofar as it cultivates 
invulnerability and determines recruits to ignore the negative effects of war.36 Thus an 
insistence on recruits’ resilience envisages military subjects that are able to fight and 
thrive during ‘inevitable, enduring, and persistent’ situations of war and conflict.37 
Similarly, Jauregui argues an emphasis on military resilience indicates the 
reconfiguration of soldiering identity insofar as ‘heroism and honor, discipline and 
duty, pride and sacrifice in war’ are translated into ‘technological superiority and social 
savoir faire in combat, indomitable strength and prowess, and psychological buoyancy 
in the face of incessant strife’.38 Although the Israeli military’s programme to foster 
resilience seems less developed than its Western counterparts, the IDF’s interest to 
avoid PTSD by cultivating recruits’ preventive attention and by determing them to 
discuss and share their emotional experiences during ‘experiential’ training shows the 
military’s acknowledgement that fortifying Israeli recruits’ morale and mental strength 
is as important as their physical skills for achieving victory.  
Seemingly a positive development that addresses the impact of PTSD on all 
militaries not only on the Israeli one, the programme that cultivates resilience carries 
unforeseen consequence both for the Israeli recruits and for the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
With regard to the Israeli forces’ wellbeing, by putting to much emphasis on individual 
responsibility to become resilient and self-reliant, the IDF risk contributing to a 
reinforcement of the stigma associated with PTSD and risk encouraging the Israeli 
recruits to interpret their (potential) failure to cultivate resilience as a personal defeat 
rather than a systemic one. Furthermore, the cultivation of a resilient military figure 
affects the Israel/Palestine conflict dynamic. The IDF’s interest to avoid the trauma of 
military service is linked with its interest to restrict the use of the traumatised figure as 
a symbol of dissent against the military and implicitly, against its continuous presence 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The reliance on an array of activities that focus 
on the individual practice of cultivating resilience, the dissemination of aesthetic 
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representations of positive and playful military personnel, and the circulation of the 
IDF’s finest heroic figures through digital technology confines the popularisation of a 
disturbed military image and its possibility to affect the collective morale of the Israeli 
military and society. More significantly, the disturbed military figure may challenge 
official discourses and grand narratives of heroism, self-defense, and patriotic duty that 
are used to justify war, violence, and conflict. By indicating an acceptance of the 
traumatic experience of military service yet putting considerable effort into confining 
its impact on the Israeli recruits, the IDF reinforce the myth of invincibility and strength 
upon the adversary that not only normalises violence and the occupation but it also 
serves the enhancement of Israeli public’s trust and support for the military. Within this 
context, an emphasis on individuals’ personal responsibility for their experiences deters 
criticism against the structural dynamics of war, conflict and violence in the Middle 
East since an individualised approach on military experience restricts ‘the space for 
critical engagement with the causes and consequences of war’, while the understanding 
of ‘the military body as a political and geopolitical body, is reduced’.39  
In addition, the development of a new military image reduces local dissent 
against the military and against the occupation by moderating the impact of the 
conscientious objectors movement on the Israeli society. Specifically, the crafting and 
the dissemination of a virtuous military image weakens the consolidation of the 
conscientious objectors movement in Israel by presenting military service as an 
appealing pursuit rather than as an obligatory duty that might ask or determine recruits 
to act in an unethical manner in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Although the IDF 
have witnessed military service refusal throughout time, the Israeli military has changed 
its approach towards conscientious objectors from imprisoning them to quietly 
releasing them from their military duties. Stuart Cohen shows the Israeli military has 
witnessed dissenting voices regarding military service since the late 1940s but 
underlines the discontent grew in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatila massacre in 
1982 and has gained more and more supporters during and in the aftermath of the First 
and respectively, the Second Intifada.40 In Israel, refusal to perform military service is 
prohibited and punishable by prison. Although the imprisonment of refuseniks is rarely 
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acknowledged in the international media, one episode has reverberated beyond the 
Israeli public sphere and has indicated the Israeli military’s harsh approach towards 
conscientious objectors. In 2003, a group of high school students sent an official letter 
to the Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and explained their refusal to enlist in the ‘army of 
occupation’. When they were sent letters of invitation to report to the military induction 
centres, the high school students kept by their beliefs and refused to enlist in the army. 
After taking disciplinary actions against these refuseniks, the military command 
decided to send the five leaders of the group to the martial court.41 This decision was a 
turning point in the way in which the IDF dealt with the refusenik movement and raised 
a number of questions concerning the legality of this measure. These conscientious 
objectors were civilians that refused to don the uniform therefore their trial in front of 
a military court was groundless. However, the Israeli High Court rejected the petition 
of one of the defendants to be tried in front of a civilian court since he was not part of 
the IDF. Similarly, the State Prosecutor argued the IDF Service Law allows the military 
establishment to try at a martial court anyone who refuses to enlist in the military.42 
The IDF’s decision to take refuseniks in front of the martial court was an 
acknowledgement of the impact the conscientious objectors movement could have on 
the Israeli society and on the military establishment thus indicating the IDF’s interest 
to deter future recruits from taking similar decisions.  
Erica Weiss has investigated the Israeli military’s engagement with 
conscientious objectors in the aftermath of the Second Intifada and found that the Israeli 
military has tempered its punitive actions against the recruits that refuse to serve in the 
military. Interestingly enough, this study shows conscientious objectors are not only 
given military exemptions within a more accommodating style, but the IDF also 
depoliticises conscientious objectors’ reasons for refusing to serve by granting them 
exemptions on the basis of imaginary health problems rather than taking into account 
their political reasons for refusing military enrolment.43 Furthermore, this benevolent 
approach permits the IDF as well to reinforce the Israeli recruits’ motivation to join the 
military. Recent reports have shown the Israeli military is fraught by the Israeli youth’s 
growing disinterest to enlist in the IDF. For instance, Amos Harel, writing for Haaretz, 
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has highlighted that one of the challenges the Israeli military faces in 2017 is the 
discrepancy between the reluctance of recruits to serve in combat positions, and the 
growing interest for positions in intelligence units that do not require recruits to risk 
their lives, and which consequently permit them to access high-paid jobs in their 
civilian lives. In order to restrict criticism and to enhance the military’s appeal for 
today’s recruits, the IDF are increasingly refashioning military service as a practice of 
self-development that benefits the Israelis’ civilian and soldiering identities for the 
purposes of attracting quality individuals.44 Less a rite of passage that might determine 
the Israeli recruits to sacrifice themselves and more a constructive step in one’s 
professional career and daily life, military service is presented as an opportunity for the 
Israeli youth to become engaged local and global citizen. 
The findings of this thesis show the breath and the depth of the efforts pursued 
by the Israeli military to limit dissent against the IDF and/or against the occupation. 
They indicate the significant efforts pursued by the Israeli military to constrain criticism 
through a variety of practices apart from the bureaucratic ones that permit Israeli 
recruits to avoid military service without hassle and without loud activism against the 
occupation. The project explores the pedagogical and the aesthetic practices that craft 
military subjectivity and indicates the military infuses its ideological and nationalistic 
assumptions with a personal growth rationale. In the third chapter, the Israeli military 
(self-)representations on social media blend traditional representations of heroic 
masculinity with softer representations such as humanitarian practices or service on 
behalf of the Israeli community. Equally significant, the second chapter shows that 
‘experiential workshops’, visits to military museums or to the Holocaust center, and 
field trips to historical sites are presented less as tools to inculcate a particular historical 
and political rationale and more as emotional opportunities for Israeli recruits to 
enhance their knowledge regarding their place in the Israeli society and in the world. 
Moreover, didactic practices that situate the recruit at the center of their educational 
endeavor and aesthetic practices that present military service as a rewarding and as a 
pleasant activity demonstrate the growing modalities and techniques through which the 
IDF waters down even the compulsory trait of military service. In this context, the 
circulation of a benign military image is transforming obligatory military service into a 
desirable and appealing activity. Rather than reflecting total subordination and 
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unconditional acceptance of the military ethos, the mandatory military duty becomes a 
means through which the IDF cater for the individual needs and ambitions of the Israeli 
recruits.45  
Nevertheless, the efforts to present military service as a satisfying and pleasant 
activity and as a site of self-growth conceals gendered, racialised, and classed 
assumptions about whose life is worth sacrificing in the name of the Israeli state 
security. In this regard, the IDF resemble other Western militaries that rely on 
marginalised groups in order to recruit members to pursue violence in the name of the 
state. The study of the high rate of mortality of women, national religious soldiers, 
Druze or Mizrahi Jews during the Second Intifada indicates marginalised groups filled 
in the places (mostly combat positions) left empty by Ashkenazi Jews. Increasingly, 
this group has showed their lack of interest for joining the military either due to political 
and ethical reasons or because they found other opportunities to climb the social ladder 
without necessarily relying on military enrollment.46 Similarly, Catherine Lutz and 
Matthew Gutmann stress that young Americans have been enticed to join the military 
through promises of greater financial stability,of funding for education, and of the 
possibility to acquire skills that would serve them in their careers in the aftermath of 
their military service. 47  Likewise, Gina M. Pérez provides an ethnographic 
investigation of the expansion of Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) 
programme in public schools populated by Latina/o and African American students. 
Apparently a practice to discipline youth ‘at risk’, these young participants are far from 
being a danger to the American society yet represent a guaranteed and valuable source 
of bodies for the American military forces. The young recruits’ willingness to join this 
programme is based on a socio-economic rationale insofar as they view military service 
as a window of opportunity towards a better life.48 Likewise, Victoria Basham has 
investigated the British military’s recruitment practices targeting working class youth 
and shows these practices not only reinforce class divisions in the British army but also, 
most importantly, they relegate recruits from a poorer background to the lowest military 
ranks while exposing them to danger and death. The British military, like the American 
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and the Israeli ones, discloses a dangerous rationale according to which ‘the most 
vulnerable, and often least politically enfranchised, continue to fight and die in 
disproportionate numbers’.49  
The demographic cleavages that mark the Israeli military became apparent in 
the public debate that surrounded Azaria’s case that was discussed in the first chapter. 
Critical voices argued the public debate regarding his trial was informed by his Mizrahi 
Jewish identity (a Jew of Middle Eastern and North African origins), thus by his 
belonging to a lower Israeli social class. Rohn Cahlili, writing for Haaretz, argues that 
had Azaria been an Ashkenazi Jew, the public conversation would have been less about 
the combat medic and more about the futility of the occupation and the occupation’s 
moral corruption of the military. Far from arguing that Azaria would have not been 
convicted or sentenced had he been an Ashkenazi Jew, the journalist condemns the 
blindness of the Israeli military to recognise the reverberation of the Israeli societal 
inequality and discrimination within the military. Coming from a poor neighbourhood 
in Ramle, Azaria was exposed to a new right wing and nationalist discourse that appeals 
to Mizrahi Jews due to their feeling of disenfranchisement within the Israeli society and 
their resentment towards the privileges afforded to the middle and upper classed, 
formed mostly of Ashkenazi Jews of European origins.50 Within this societal dynamic, 
Azaria’s social position hindered him from accessing a high standard education that 
would have offered him the possibility to access elite units such as cyber warfare or air 
force units. These units are highly populated by Ashkenazi Jews who benefit from 
social capital and financial resources to study at select schools that equip them with 
enough proficient knowledge to attain a higher score during their military recruitment 
tests thus enabling them to access the most coveted units in the IDF. Serving in special 
units such as targeted killings or intelligence analysis, Ashkenazi Jews remain shielded 
from the complexity of the everyday service in the military yet confident they are moral 
and good forces that defend Israel. 51  Informed by class, race, and ethnicity 
discrepancies, Azaria’s trial could be read as yet another example through which a 
marginalised group (Mizrahi Jews) is paying for Ashkenazi Jews’ mistakes (highly 
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represented amongst Israeli military and political elites), the latter enforcing an 
occupation while detached from the realities the Israeli Border Police and patrolling 
military brigades witness and experience every day.52 The support the combat medic 
received throughout his trial and in the aftermath of his sentencing and conviction 
indicates less the much-discussed left–right political division discourse in Israel and 
highlights the resentment against relegating marginalised and disenfranchised groups 
to do the ‘dirty labour’ of the occupation. Therefore, Azaria becomes not only a victim 
of the societal and military inequality, but also an instrument through which the 
morality of the IDF is sustained insofar as an unruly, bad, and disobedient Mizrahi Jew 
sergeant, who acted against open-fire regulations was punished for the purposes of 
reiterating the highest standard of the Israeli military’s morality. Relatedly, archival 
research shows the IDF, since their establishment, have perceived Mizrahi Jews as 
inferior subjects who had to be educated, ‘civilised’, and taught to behave properly 
within the military and respectively, the Israeli society.53 Finally, Mizrahi Jews have 
been perceived as an internal threat in Israel insofar as they could have allied with 
Palestinians against Israeli Jews (of Ashkenazi, European origins). Critical voices argue 
that sending Mizrahi Jews to Occupied Palestinian Territories represents a strategic 
movement to hinder an alliance between Palestinians and Mizrahi Jews by pitting them 
against one another.54 Far from implying that Azaria’s marginalised status in the Israeli 
society determined him to kill al-Sharif, this detour through the complexity of the 
demography of the Israeli military and society shows the similarities between Israel and 
other states who rely on and reinforce societal divisions for the purposes of war 
recruitment and fighting. More significantly, Azaria’s case displays the links between 
practices of racialisation and marginalisation within the Israeli military, the increasing 
role of nationalist discourse in the Israeli civil-military relations, and the violence of 
the occupation against Palestinians.  
Despite that the presentation of military service as an opportunity for self-
development that enhances the vulnerability of some groups at the detriment of others 
characterises militaries in different states, the illustration of the Israeli military service 
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as a rewarding and pleasing experience carries serious political consequences for the 
Israel/Palestine conflict in the context of the IDF’s obligatory conscription. Through 
these techniques – adopting a softer attitude towards conscientious objectors and 
presenting military service as a self-advancement practice – the IDF discredit critiques 
against the military and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The 
core of the conscientious objectors’ activism and of the efforts pursued by human rights 
organisations to question the Israeli military and the occupation is reflected in their 
criticism against the harshness of the military, against the militarisation of the Israeli 
society, and against the moral corruption of the Israeli society triggered by the 
continuous occupation of the Palestinian people. Faced with the image of a gentle, 
benevolent, and tender military, critical voices lose their appeal, are ignored by the 
Israeli society and risk becoming irrelevant. By moderating dissent and constraining 
the room of maneuver for conscientious objectors, the IDF distance themselves from 
the possibility to be held accountable for their violence against Palestinians. By 
circulating a positive image of military service, the IDF question the legitimacy of the 
activism against the occupation and against human rights abuses, and avoid the 
construction of a bridge of trust and confidence between the Israeli public and activists 
that criticise the occupation. Therefore, this countermove against dissent strengthens 
the Israeli public’s indifference towards Palestinian suffering and their support for the 
Israeli military despite contrary visual and written evidence that shows the IDF’s 
widespread violence against Palestinians. More significantly, a societal reluctance to 
condemn the military provides little impetus for the IDF to punish servicemen and 
women who have abused Palestinian civilians. A more thorough process of 
accountability would require the Israeli military to recognise its complex legal, military, 
and political presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, to acknowledge the 
military’s widespread violence against Palestinians, and to sever the trust link between 
the society and the military. Within this context, episodes of violence, similar to those 
discussed in the fourth chapter, continue to be perceived as exceptions to the 
impeccable military image, as instances that demonstrate the vulnerability and the 
defenselessness of the Israeli recruits, and as instruments through which Palestinians 
are constituted as fearsome individuals. 
Finally, yet significantly, the cultivation of an altruistic, benevolent and non-
threatening military figure represents not only an effort to moderate local dissent, but 
also a means to avoid international criticism. Specifically, this new military identity 
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curbs the political complexity of the Israel/Palestine conflict by situating the IDF 
alongside other Western militaries that fight radicalised forces and who engage in 
humanitarian practices. The study of the pedagogical, aesthetic, forensic, rhetorical, and 
commemoration practices that construct military subjectivity shows the IDF cultivate 
an image that resembles other Western militaries. This is highlighted through images 
and narratives that note the Israeli military’s humanitarian practices towards 
Palestinians and towards other populations that find themselves under distress, and 
through its involvement in joint military exercises with other Western forces in order 
to highlight the IDF’s participation in the Western security alliance against the global 
threat of terrorism. By emphasising its role in alleviating the suffering of strangers and 
in fighting nameless (Palestinian) radical fighters, the Israeli military imagines itself 
‘not only [as] a protective public service but also a constructive resource for society, 
and not just for [Israeli] society but, inter alia, for humanity at large’. 55  Situating 
themselves alongside other Western militaries that perform combat operations and 
humanitarian missions, the IDF do not only address themselves to a global public, but 
equally significant, present the Israeli military service less as a patriotic duty and more 
as a ‘global opportunity’ to serve and defend the Western world. 56 This image permits 
the IDF to project the impression they are defending and taking care of the entire 
humanity not only of the Israeli state. As a new form of ‘winning hearts and minds’, 
this image addresses less the populations helped and more the local and global public 
that witnesses Israel’s military operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and 
its humanitarian actions abroad. Therefore, the IDF use the image of a kind, benevolent, 
and benign military in order to moderate the complexity of the Israel/Palestine conflict, 
to reject the image of an ‘occupation army’ and to represent its presence in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories as a security necessity that addresses the violence of radicalised 
freedom fighters.  
At the same time, this research has mapped out the IDF’s reliance on the 
gendered and racialised image of the Palestinians in order to highlight their 
impeccability and to hinder local and international audiences to build a bridge of 
solidarity with Palestinians. The didactic activities studied in the second chapter, the 
aesthetic representations examined in the third chapter, the rhetorical practices mapped 
                                                        
55 Jauregui, ‘World Fitness’, p. 466. 
56 Jauregui, ‘World Fitness’, p. 451. 
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out in the fourth chapter and the commemoration practices analysed in the fifth chapter 
have showed the IDF’s relentless effort to transform Palestinians in ultimate strangers 
and others. Through this stereotypical representation, the Israeli military delegitimise 
the Palestinian calls for social justice and confines the political weight of their suffering 
and grievances. Equally significant, the combination between the humanitarian 
practices and combat military operations serves the IDF to justify their presence in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories while creating the image of a persistent war and 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians yet indicating their devotion to help 
Palestinians if they need. The concern for both Israeli security and Palestinian 
wellbeing effaces the violence of the occupation and shifts the responsibility of the 
Middle East conflict onto Palestinians who are imagined as reluctant to accept Israel’s 
benign intentions. This blurred military image that intersects combat operations, with 
humanitarian concerns for Palestinians, and aid for other populations that find 
themselves under distress likens the Israeli military with British, American, or 
Canadian militaries that perceive themselves as force for good in the world yet do not 
recognise the political implications of their interventions in non-Western parts of the 
world.  
Relatedly, proficiency in using media technology serves the IDF’s projection 
of a humanitarian, compassionate, and benign military figure (and presence in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories) for the purposes of deterring local and international 
criticism. The third chapter, the fourth and respectively, the fifth chapter of the project 
show media technology enables the IDF to make themselves available to local and 
international audiences by imagining themselves as an ‘army that is approachable, 
comprehensible, and transparent’.57 As a growing trend among Western militaries, the 
use of social media for the purposes of local and international public outreach indicates 
the need to reconfigure the study of civil-military relations by attaching them with a 
transnational perspective thus paying attention to the international(ised) dimension of 
their military identities. The engagement with the emotions captured, circulated, and 
provoked by social media either in the context of crafting military service as a pleasant 
or rewarding experience or in imagining a virtuous and heroic military subjectivity 
shows that social media blur the public/private debate and erase confinements on time 
and space. Digital technology helps the IDF to disseminate to wider audiences the 
                                                        
57 Jauregui, ‘World Fitness’, p. 461. 
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intimacy of military service while determining these audiences to affectively engage 
with the visual representations they encounter. This research shows the IDF’s social 
media presence ‘progressively integrates the [Western] citizen into the momentum of 
the war machine’ therefore permitting the Israeli military to project the idea of a joint 
military experience due to social media users’ interaction with, following of, and 
repetitive returning to check the IDF’s Official Blog, the Facebook, and respectively, 
the Instagram accounts of the military.58 By creating a proximate space of interaction, 
social media invite users ‘to cross over and try on a soldier identity’, and contribute to 
the normalisation of war, violence, and conflict by attracting them ‘into an interactive 
military thrill ride’.59 The users’ engagement with the information circulated on social 
media, hardly limited to local audiences insofar as the IDF’s Blog, and the IDF’s 
Facebook and Instagram accounts can be accessed by anyone who comes across them, 
shows the users’ readiness not only to assent to the image projected by the Israeli 
military but, equally significant, to contribute to the co-constitution of the meaning of 
enemy.60 They send messages of encouragement for the IDF, they castigate nameless 
and imaginary radicalised Palestinian freedom fighter and they praise the Israeli 
military’s combat operations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and its humanitarian 
missions in Nepal or Turkey. Thus the global audience that scrolls through and 
comments on the IDF’s social media images enters into an imaginary kinship with the 
Israeli military and disregards the socio-political context in which the Israeli 
servicemen and women (pictured on social media) fight and perform their military 
service. As Kevin McSorely cautions, intimate representations of military service serve 
the normalisation of war, conflict, and violence because individual stories of military 
service erase geopolitical dimensions of conflict.61 Within this context, the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip seemingly become 
 
‘inhospitable backdrops against which timeless Western experiential 
dramas – coming of age, heroic struggle – are played out. Any 
particular geopolitical context largely disappears from such a 
mythological narrative framing, the deployment of state violence 
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particularly decontextualized and depoliticized, portrayed as 
essentially a defensive and inevitable act.62 
 
The thesis contributes to the feminist and critical engagements with the Israeli 
military and its violent behaviour against Palestinian civilians. Intrigued by the public, 
military, and political reluctance to condemn the Israeli military forces for their violent 
behaviour against Palestinians, this research has sought to reveal the artificial and 
multifaceted construction of a professional, non-threatening, and humanitarian military 
subjectivity as a material and symbolic soldiering figure that constrains local and 
international dissent against the IDF. The examination of the productive power of 
emotions in the Israel/Palestine conflict indicates this idealised figure is invented 
through a variety of interpretations, representations, and discourses that capture, 
circulate, and provoke emotions that determine affinity with the Israeli military and 
respectively, hostility against Palestinians. Therefore, the constitution and circulation 
of this romanticised military image strengthens the affective divisions that sanction and 
justify the enactment of violence in the Middle East.  
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